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A bstract
The process of individual identity formation is still an enigma, as is the capacity of 
public bodies to intervene in it. This thesis is the first to  take a step in this direction.
Using individual data from the World Value Survey, the second chapter presents several 
findings on the relationship between national sentiment and ethnic diversity. Contrary 
to conventional wisdom, we find no evidence of a lower intensity of national sentiment 
in more ethnically fragmented countries or in minority groups. National feelings in a 
minority can be higher or lower than in a majority, depending on the degree of ethnic 
diversity of a country. On the one hand, in countries with high ethnic polarization, 
minorities have weaker national sentiments than majorities; on the other hand, in 
countries with low ethnic polarization, the reverse is true. We then develop a model of 
national identity formation tha t is consistent with the facts presented in the empirical 
section.
As a second step, using survey data  from Catalonia, we estimate the impact on identity 
of the 1983 educational reform, by which the education system became bilingual, and 
Catalan, together with Spanish, was taught in schools. Using within and between 
cohort variation in exposure to the Catalan language at school, the results show tha t 
individuals who have experienced greater exposure to teaching in Catalan are more 
likely to say tha t they feel more Catalan than Spanish.
In the subsequent chapter, we study the effect of the Catalan reform on political be­
haviour. We find that the change in the educational system stimulated turnout and 
changed the political choices of the agents.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Identity, beliefs and social norms are at the centre of many social and economic phe­
nomena. The outcome of an organization is likely to  be affected by the degree of identi­
fication of its employees with their tasks within the organization. The identification of 
the teachers with the mission of the school can improve the quality of education within 
th a t school and, at the same time, the effort of the students is likely to be function of 
the gap between the students’ self image and the person tha t the school intends them 
to be. The choice of ethnic minorities to adopt oppositional identities may affect the 
level of cooperation within a society and generate social and economic conflicts. E th­
nic riots are recurrent events in many countries and ethnic conflicts are a widespread 
phenomenon across the world. The effectiveness of policies and their political viability 
may depend on their impact on individual identity.
Only recently has the economic literature come to focus on individual identity. In an 
influential series of papers, Akerlof and Kranton (2000, 2002, 2005) and Akerlof (2007) 
incorporated identity, a person’s sense of self, into an economic model of behaviour. 
They proposed a utility function tha t depends on the individual’s assigned social cat­
egory, on the match between the prescriptions for tha t category and the individual’s 
given characteristics, and on his and others’ actions. They then presented several ap­
plications of their theory in the fields of the Economics of Education, the Economics of 
Organizations and Macroeconomics. Previous literature on economics mentioned and 
studied the concept of identity (Sen (1985), Folbre (1994), Kevane (1994) and Landa 
(1994)), but never considered it as an argument in the utility function. A few theoret­
ical studies followed the work of Akerlof and Kranton; among others, one by Benabou 
and Tirole (2007) which endogenized identity payoffs and categorical prescriptions. 
However, empirical research into both the determinants of individual identity and how 
identity affects individual behaviour remains limited.
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This thesis focuses on two particular types of identity, national and ethnic identity, 
and contains some theoretical work (Chapter Two) and some empirical work (Chapters 
Two, Three and Four). The concepts of nation, nationalism and national sentiment 
have captured the attention and fed the creativity of many political scientists, politi­
cians, philosophers and writers, including Armstrong, Breully, Fishman, Hroch, Smith, 
Stalin and Tilly. Benedict Anderson (1983) provided the following suggestive definition: 
"nation is an imagined political community and imagined as both inherently limited and 
sovereign". More recently Gellner (1983) wrote: "nationalism is a theory o f political 
legitimacy, which requires that ethnic boundaries should not cut across political bound­
aries To the best of our knowledge, no definitions, nor answers, are widely accepted. 
However, the panoply of books, articles and reviews th a t flourished in the last century 
testify to the importance of this topic.
Moreover, in the economic literature the study of how ethnic diversity can affect eco­
nomic outcomes has attracted a lot of attention1. A vast amount of economic literature 
has investigated the relationship between ethnic diversity and economic development. 
Mauro (1995) claims tha t ethno-linguistic diversity has a direct negative effect on the 
level of investment. Easterly and Levine (1997) find tha t a high level of ethnic frag­
mentation has a negative impact on economic growth. La Porta et al. (1999) show that 
ethnic heterogeneity contributes to the explanation of the quality of government. More 
recently, Montalvo and Reynal (2005) suggest th a t ethnic (and religious) polarization 
is one of the factors explaining economic development through its impact on the rate of 
investment, the proportion of government consumption over GDP and the probability 
of civil wars.
However, there is still a very small body of literature tha t explores the sources of ethnic 
identification. Using the Afrobarometer surveys in nine Sub-Saharan African democ­
racies, Miguel and Posner (2006) estimate the likelihood th a t an individual identifies 
himself in ethnic terms rather than in class or religious ones. They found, surprisingly, 
th a t the salience of ethnicity is negatively related to ethnic diversity, and claim tha t 
exposure to competition for jobs and political power are factors th a t predispose indi­
viduals to identify themselves in ethnic terms. Caselli and Coleman (2002) present a 
model of ethnic conflict in which ethnic identity is endogenous.
Chapters Two and Three analyze the determinants of national and ethnic identity. 
The second chapter examines the relationship between ethnic diversity and national 
sentiment. Using individual data from the World Value Survey, the second chapter 
presents several findings on the relationship between national sentiment and ethnic 
diversity. Contrary to conventional wisdom, we find no evidence of a lower intensity
1Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) extensively studied and surveyed the relationship between ethnic 
diversity and economic performance.
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of national sentiment in more ethnically fragmented countries or in minority groups. 
National feelings in a minority can be higher or lower than in a majority, depending 
on the degree of ethnic diversity of a country. On the one hand, in countries with 
high ethnic polarization, minorities have weaker national sentiments than majorities; 
on the other hand, in countries with low ethnic polarization, the reverse is true. We 
then develop a model of national identity formation th a t is consistent with the facts 
presented in the empirical section.
Limited research has examined the extent to which identity can be shifted by cultural 
policies and regulation. As the UN report 2004 pointed out, language regulation does 
exert an influence on the social environment, which encourages identity formation (and, 
since core individual identity is typically formed in the early ages of life, language at 
school turns out to be particularly im portant). Chapter Three takes a step forward 
in this direction by analyzing the effect of a language policy on the process of identity 
formation. Using survey data  from Catalonia, it estimates the impact on identity 
of the 1983 educational reform whereby the education system became bilingual, and 
Catalan, together with Spanish, was taught in schools. Using within and between 
cohort variation in exposure to the Catalan language at school, the results show tha t 
individuals who have experienced greater exposure to teaching in Catalan are more 
likely to say tha t they feel more Catalan than Spanish. Interestingly, this effect appears 
to be present also among individuals whose parents do not have Catalan origins.
In ethnically diverse countries, politicians and political scientists have focused on very 
different policies as mechanisms for minority integration and conflict reduction (see 
Horowitz 1985 for a review of this topic). Nation building policies (for example, the 
implementation of a unique national language across the entire territory of a state) as 
well as multicultural policies th a t explicitly recognize cultural differences (regional au­
tonomy, devolution of powers and the use of multiple languages in school and in other 
contexts) have often been proposed as sources of conflict management. Miguel (2003) 
shows tha t nation-building has allowed diverse communities in Tanzania to  achieve bet­
ter economic outcomes than diverse communities in the Kenyan region. The linguistic 
law we study can be interpreted as an example of a multicultural policy in Spain, where 
individuals living in Catalonia are the relevant minority, and, at the same time, as an 
example of a nation building policy in Catalonia, where individuals living in Catalonia 
who were born elsewhere or whose parents do not have Catalan origins are the relevant 
minority. As a result, nation building policies and multicultural policies deliver very 
different outcomes in terms of the effects on individual sentiments: multicultural poli­
cies tend to favour the development of regional identities while nation building policies 
tend to promote the expansion of a common national feeling.
Chapter Four focuses on the relationship between schooling and political behaviour.
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We explore how the linguistic reform tha t took place in Catalonia affected turnout 
and party choice. Using the survey data described in the th ird  chapter, we find tha t 
individuals who have experienced a greater exposure to  teaching in Catalan are more 
likely to declare tha t they voted in the 1998 regional election and to  have chosen a party 
with a Catalanist (i.e Catalan regionalist) platform. The introduction of a bilingual 
education system increased the salience of the ethnic issue in the Catalan society and 
helped the consolidation of a political system organized along ethnic lines. Identity is 
a likely channel through which the linguistic reform affected political choices.
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Chapter 2
N ational Identity and Ethnic 
D iversity: Theory and  
C ross-C ountry Evidence
2.1 Introduction
Ethnic diversity has a negative impact on economic development and political stability. 
A high level of ethnic fractionalization implies a lower level of investment and worse 
institutional quality; a high level of ethnic polarization increases the probability of 
civil conflict. "Nation building" (policies tha t promote attachment to nation over ethnic 
and regional identities) has been often proposed as a mechanism for integration and 
conflict reduction. This chapter studies the determinants of national sentiment and, in 
particular, examines the relationship between ethnic diversity and national sentiment.
A vast amount of economic literature has investigated the relationship between eth­
nic diversity and economic development. Mauro (1995) claims th a t ethno-linguistic 
diversity has a direct negative effect on the level of investment. Easterly and Levine 
(1997) find tha t a high level of ethnic fragmentation has a negative impact on eco­
nomic growth. La Porta et al. (1999) show tha t ethnic heterogeneity contributes to 
the explanation of the quality of government. More recently, Montalvo and Reynal
(2005) suggest tha t ethnic (and religious) polarization is one of the factors explaining 
economic development through its impact on the rate of investment, the proportion of 
government consumption over GDP and the probability of civil wars.
However, there is still only a very small body of literature which explores the sources
17
of ethnic identification. Using the Afrobarometer surveys in nine Sub-Saharan African 
democracies, Miguel and Posner (2006) estimate the likelihood tha t an individual iden­
tifies himself in ethnic terms rather than in terms of class or religion. They found, 
surprisingly, tha t the salience of ethnicity is negatively related to ethnic diversity and 
claim th a t exposure to competition for jobs and political power are factors th a t pre­
dispose individuals to identify themselves in ethnic terms. Caselli and Coleman (2002) 
present a model of ethnic conflict in which ethnic identity is endogenous.
"Nation building" (policies th a t promote attachm ent to nation over ethnic and regional 
identities) has been proposed as a mechanism for integration and conflict reduction by 
a large number of scholars. They1 have mostly focused on policies (particularly edu­
cational policies) th a t are able to change individual preferences and provoke a massive 
shift of loyalties from the ascriptive group to the State. Miguel (2003) documents how 
nation building reforms were implemented in the newly independent East African na­
tions in the 1960s and 1970s. He focuses on the economic development of two countries: 
Tanzania and Kenya. Despite their similar colonial institutional legacy, ethnic make up 
and geographical conditions, leaders in Kenya and Tanzania have adopted very differ­
ent policies, especially with regards to ethnic groups, over a wide range of dimensions. 
Nyerere (Tanzania) followed a “Pan-Africanist” nation building policy, along with a 
centralized economic policy. Miguel shows tha t nation-building has allowed diverse 
communities in Tanzania to achieve better economic outcomes than diverse communi­
ties in the Kenyan regions.
The aim of this work is to investigate the main determinants of national sentiment 
and, more importantly, the relationship between ethnic diversity and the intensity of 
national feeling. Figures 2.1 and 2.2 cast some doubts on the conventional views. They 
plot ethnic diversity (in Figure 2.1 we use the index of ethnic polarization, in Figure
2.2 tha t of ethnic fractionalization2) against the level of national identification of each 
country3. The two graphs suggest the absence of a negative relationship between ethnic 
heterogeneity and national sentiment. The chapter has an empirical side th a t draws 
on survey data  from the last three waves of the World Value Survey and a theoretical 
side, th a t relies on a recent contribution by Bisin et al. (2006) and tha t is consistent 
with the facts presented in the empirical part.
We use data  from the World Value survey, a multi-country survey project tha t employs
1Among others, Deutch and Foltz (1963), Coleman and Rosberg (1964), Jacob and Toscano (1964) 
and Tilly (1975).
2 The ethnic fractionalization index can be interpreted as measuring the probability that two ran­
domly selected individuals in a country belong to different ethnic groups. On the other hand, the 
purpose of the ethnic polarization index is to capture how far the distribution of the ethnic groups is 
from a bipolar distribution, which represents the highest level of polarization.
3 The country level of national sentiments is measured as the proportion of individuals who choose 
to identify with their nation rather than their ethnic group.
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standardized questionnaires to investigate citizens’ attitudes in a vast set of countries. 
We estimate the likelihood th a t an individual identifies himself in national terms rather 
than  in ethnic ones. Contrary to conventional wisdom, we find no evidence of lower 
intensity of national sentiment in more ethnically fragmented countries or in minority 
groups. However, we find tha t national feelings in a minority are higher (lower) than 
in a majority depending on the ethnic diversity of a country. On the one hand, in 
countries th a t are more polarized, minorities have a lower level of national sentiment 
than  majorities, on the other hand, in less polarized countries, the reverse is true. The 
empirical section provides two further findings. Larger groups tend to have weaker 
national feelings and individuals with higher income are less inclined to feel associated 
with their ethnic group.
As illustrative examples, let us now consider the cases of Macedonia, China and Brazil. 
China is the country with the lowest level of ethnic polarization in the sample, while 
Brazil has the highest . In China there is a very large ethnic group, the Chinese Han 
(around 92% of the population) and several other smaller groups (Zhuang Chinese, 
Hui Chinese, Uyghur Chinese, Miao Chinese and Manchu Chinese). The proportion of 
Chinese Han in the sample who identify themselves with China rather than with the 
Han nationality is around 1%, while the proportion of individuals belonging to other 
ethnic groups who identify themselves with China rather than with their respective 
nationalities is far higher (more than 50%). On the contrary, if we consider Brazil 
we have a very different picture. 55% of the Brazilian population is white. There is 
a consistent portion of m ulatto (above 30%) and quite a few black individuals (above 
5%). On the one hand, half of the white people consider themselves just Brazilian rather 
than  white Brazilian; on the other hand, among the individuals belonging to the ethnic 
minorities, only 37% consider themselves as just Brazilian. Hence, in a country with 
low ethnic polarization such as China, national sentiments are weaker in the majority 
than in the minorities, while in a country th a t is very polarized, like Brazil, national 
sentiments are weaker among minorities than within the largest group.
The Republic of Macedonia is a country with a level of ethnic diversity tha t is close 
to  the sample average. Macedonians are obviously the largest group, while Albanians 
are the largest minority (more than 20%) and there is quite a substantial fraction of 
Turks (4%) and Serbs (2%). The fraction of Albanians who identify themselves with 
their country is around 5%; the fraction of Turks and Serbs is around 40% and 60%, 
respectively. The larger the size of an ethnic minority, the lower seems to be the average 
intensity of its national sentiment.
We then develop a theoretical model th a t is consistent with the facts presented in the 
empirical section. In each ethnic group there is an accepted social norm; deviating 
from tha t social norm involves some costs. We assume tha t these costs are higher the
19
more widespread the norm in the population. In our model, in order to overcome the 
psychological shocks due to the distance from their own ethnic group, each individual 
decides to ask asylum in tha t "imagined community " we call nation4 and then chooses to 
develop national feelings. In other words, national sentiments represent a psychological 
need to  abandon the ethnic convention. In the model, the ethnic composition of the 
population has two effects on the intensity of national sentiment: a direct effect and an 
indirect effect, through the political choices of the politicians in power.
We believe tha t the political oppression of a minority ultimately affects its feelings 
towards the nation. We decided to model political oppression in the simplest possible 
way: allowing inter-ethnic redistribution. The degree of integration of individuals from 
ethnic minorities is going to be weakened by a set of economic policies th a t constantly 
discriminate against them. We present a simplified political setting where, in ethnically 
polarized societies (with a large minority), the (small) ethnic majority in power chooses 
to implement a strong policy of inter-ethnic redistribution because the benefits of the 
tax  revenue axe going to be divided among a small fraction of people. This is consistent 
with the findings tha t ethnic conflicts are more likely when society consists of two 
groups th a t are fairly similar in size and also with a recent work by Posner (2004). He 
finds th a t cultural cleavages become more salient when the size of the ethnic minorities 
is sufficiently large.
On the other hand, size also has a direct effect. The cost function we assume implies a 
direct and negative effect of size on the intensity of national feelings. Individuals tend 
to deviate more from norms set by smaller ethnic groups. This is in harmony with 
the assumptions used in the construction of the ethnic polarization index (and more in 
general with all the classes of polarization indices) where identification with one’s own 
(ethnic) group is supposed to be a positive function of its size5.
We then compare the level of national sentiment within the largest ethnic group with the 
level of national sentiment within the ethnic minority. The main results arise from the 
interaction of the political side with the "direct" size effect mentioned previously. In a 
two-group framework, when ethnic diversity is high, the "direct" size effect plays no role 
since the sizes of the minority and majority are similar. There is, however, a large inter­
ethnic redistribution and, as a result, on average, the intensity of national sentiment 
is higher in individuals from the majority than in individuals from the minority. On 
the other hand, when there is a very large majority group and ethnic heterogeneity is 
low, there is a large difference between the size of the majority group and th a t of the 
minority. The size effect is the prevailing one and national feelings could be even higher
4 "nation is an imagined political community and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign " 
Anderson (1983).
5See Esteban and Ray (1994) and Montalvo and Reynal (2005).
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within the minority than within the majority group.
This chapter is closely related to several strands in the literature. On the theoretical 
side there is an increasing amount of literature on endogenous identity; let us mention, 
among others, Akerlof and Kranton (2000), Bisin and Verdier (2000) and Bisin et al
(2006). The model in the theoretical section builds on these contributions and, in 
particular, on tha t of Bisin et al (2006). According to their contribution, the social 
norm is the behaviour of the majority. Minorities have to bear some costs because of 
the lack of assimilation. A strong ethnic identity reduces those costs. This chapter 
focuses more on national identity formation and considers the identity choice of all 
the ethnic groups, while Bisin and al. (2006) focus only on the ethnic assimilation 
of minorities. Moreover, with respect to their framework, we introduce a political 
economy aspect and we make exercises of comparative statics also at a more aggregate 
level (country level and ethnic group level). These crucial ingredients allow national 
sentiments in a minority to be stronger (weaker) than in a majority depending on the 
ethnic diversity of a country.
On the empirical side the study by Miguel and Posner (2005) is the one tha t is most 
closely related to  this chapter. They study the determinants of ethnic identity and 
how the salience of ethnicity is related to ethnic diversity. This chapter focuses more 
on national identity and moreover attem pts to study how the intensity of national 
sentiments may differ depending on the characteristics of the ethnic group to  which the 
individual belongs.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes the data  and 
presents some empirical evidence. Section 2.3 analyzes the model. Section 2.4 discusses 
the 2 group assumption of the model. Section 2.5 provides some concluding remarks. 
All the proofs are in the Appendix.
2.2 Empirical evidence
2.2 .1  D a ta
The data  in this study comes from the World Values Surveys (WVS) waves two (1990- 
1993), three (1995-1997) and four (1998-2000). This is a multi-country survey project 
tha t employs standardized questionnaires to investigate citizens’ attitudes in a vast set 
of countries. In particular, one crucial question for our purposes is the following (here, 
we provide the US example):
"Which of the following best describes you? 1 above all, I  am an Hispanic American 2
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above all, I  am a Black American 3 above all, I  am a White American 4 above all, I  
am an Asian American 5 I  am an American first and a member of some ethnic group 
second "
We build a variable, "national identity", which is equal to 1 if individuals answer " /  
am an American first and a member of some ethnic group second", 0 otherwise. It 
is constructed from the responses to the previous question by 32644 individuals in 25 
separate World Value Survey rounds conducted in 22 countries: the United States, 
Canada, Spain, China, South Africa, Brazil, Byelorussia, Latvia, Uruguay, Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Macedonia, Georgia, Albania, Bosnia, Indonesia, Israel, Moldova, Pakistan, 
Singapore, Zimbabwe and Jordan.
The World Value Survey was conducted via face to  face interviews during which inter­
viewers coded the respondents’ ethnic characteristics by their observations. We create 
a variable tha t we call "minority"; this variable is equal to 0 if the ethnic group to 
which the individual belongs is the largest in the country, 1 otherwise. We also in­
clude controls for individual income (each respondent has been asked to choose among 
10 income categories, net of transfers and taxes), individual education (we have "pri­
mary", a  dummy variable equal to one if the agent has, at most, primary education) 
and individual occupation. During the survey, individuals were asked what was their 
main occupation. They could choose between 13 options. The omitted category is 
" agricultural workers ".
We also include as explanatory variables characteristics of the ethnic groups and country 
variables. The dataset by Fearon (2003) provides the size of the ethnic groups in the 
sample. As a proxy of the average income of the group, we use sample averages. As a 
measure of the ethnic diversity of a country we use two different indices: the index of 
ethnic fractionalization and th a t of ethnic polarization. The former is quite common in 
the literature, while the index of ethnic polarization has been used only more recently.
A fractionalization index is defined as
N
Frac = l - ^ 2 q f
i=1
This indicator can be interpreted as measuring the probability th a t two randomly se­
lected individuals in a country will belong to different ethnic groups. Therefore this 
index increases when the number of groups increases.
We also use the index R Q  proposed by Reynal-Queirol
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where g* is the size of the ethnic group i. The purpose of this index is to capture how far 
the distribution of the ethnic groups is from a bipolar distribution, which represents the 
highest level of polarization. This index fulfills the two basic properties tha t a proper 
index of polarization needs to satisfy:
1) If there are 3 groups of sizes, p, q, and r, and p > q > r , then if we merge the 
two smallest groups into a new group, the new distribution is more polarized than the 
original one.
2) If there are 3 groups of sizes, p, q, and p, then if we shift population mass from the 
q group equally to the other two groups, the polarization index increases.
The index of ethnic polarization and th a t of ethnic fractionalization are perfectly corre­
lated when the number of groups is two, but differ when the number of groups increases. 
Montalvo and Reynal (2005) showed that, for low levels of fractionalization, the rela­
tionship between the two indices is positive and close to linear. For medium ranges of 
fractionalization, however, it is zero, while for high levels of fractionalization it becomes 
negative. Figure 2.3 shows the correlation between the index of ethnic polarization and 
the one of ethnic fractionalization using only the countries included in the sample.
We should mention tha t we use two weight variables provided by the survey. One 
is a national weight, which reflects a country’s national distribution of key variables 
such as the urban-rural divide, education, demographics and economic activity, while 
the second variable assigns the same weight to every country in order to avoid a large 
sample bias in the pooled country study.
Table 2.1 reports the share of respondents who identify themselves with their country 
for each of the twenty-five surveys in our sample. Uruguay has the highest share 
of respondents who identify themselves with their country (about 79 per cent) and 
Albania the lowest (about 1.5 per cent). Table 2.2 gives descriptive statistics of the 
main variables used in the analysis.
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2 .2 .2  E m pirical stra teg y  and  resu lts
2.2.2.1 Individual sources o f national identification
As a very first step, we begin by regressing the variable "national identity" on a set 
of individual characteristics plus country-year dummies. Standard errors are always 
clustered at the country-time level. Column 1 of Table 2.3 reports our minimal speci­
fication. Respondents with higher income are more likely to choose nation over ethnic 
group. Being part of a minority group does not affect individual identity. In Column 
2 we introduce the variable "primary". Its coefficient is negative and significant. This 
suggests tha t low educated people (with at most primary education) tend to be less 
likely to be nationally identified than ethnically identified. The coefficient, however, 
does not appear very large. An individual with more than a primary degree is (almost) 
three per cent more likely to  identify himself with the nation than an individual with, at 
most, a primary degree. In Column 3, we add variables tha t control for individual oc­
cupation. The omitted category is "agricultural workers". It turns out tha t individual 
identity varies quite strongly with occupation. Individuals belonging to categories such 
as "professionals" (teachers, lawyer...), "armed forces", "farmer" and to some extent 
"foreman" are more likely to be identified with the nation than "agricultural workers". 
In Column 4, we include all the possible individual characteristics. The coefficient of 
"minority" is never significant, while the coefficient of income is always positive and 
significant.
2.2.2.2 National identity and ethnic diversity
As a further step, we check if there is any relationship between identification and 
ethnic diversity. We regress identity on the usual set of individual controls and on 
ethnic diversity (in Table 2.4, we use the index of ethnic polarization, in Table 2.5 tha t 
of ethnic fractionalization). We find no evidence of any negative relationship between 
ethnic diversity and national identity. The tables show weak evidence in favour of an 
inverted U shaped relationship between ethnic diversity and national identity. The size 
of the sample, however, is limited and the countries included in our study may not be 
a good substitute for a world-wide sample.
We turn now to the main specification. In the previous section, we found tha t the 
coefficient of the variable minority is not significant. Respondents from minority groups 
do not tend to be more or less identified with their nation than respondents from 
majority groups. In this section, we study whether the feelings of respondents from 
minority groups depend somehow on the degree of ethnic diversity of the country in
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which they live. We introduce an interaction term  between the variable "minority" and 
a country variable tha t measures ethnic diversity.
The specification of the pooled cross-country analysis is given by:
national identityi c t =  a C)t+incomei)C)t/3+minorityi)C)<7+m inorityi)C)t*ethnic diversityc<5+£i)C)t
There are country-time fixed effects, so it cannot be the case tha t omitted country 
characteristics, correlated with ethnic polarization, affect individual identity. However, 
there can be omitted country-variables having differential impacts on individual identity 
and correlated with right hand side variables (ethnic diversity in this case).
In Table 2.6, we use ethnic polarization as a measure of ethnic diversity, in Table 2.7, 
ethnic fractionalization.
Let us describe briefly Table 2.6. The variable minority has a positive coefficient while 
the sign of the coefficient of the interaction term  is negative. Both are significant. Let 
us now discuss the magnitude of the main result. In countries with average ethnic 
polarization, there is no difference between the identity choice of the minority and tha t 
of the majority group. However if we increase the ethnic polarization index by one 
standard deviation, we find th a t individuals from ethnic minority groups are 8 per 
cent less likely to have national identity than those from the majority group, while 
if we decrease the ethnic polarization index by one standard deviation, we find tha t 
individuals from ethnic minority groups are 8 per cent more likely to have national 
identity than those from the majority group.
In Table 2.7, we perform the same exercise using ethnic fractionalization as a measure 
of ethnic diversity. This exercise is less successful. The signs of the coefficients are the 
same as in the previous Table, but they are not significant.
2.2.2.3 Size of the ethnic group
In a second set of regressions we study the relationship between national identity and 
the size of the ethnic group to which the individual belongs. We divide the sample in 
two subsamples: a subsample with all the individuals belonging to a minority group 
and a subsample with all the individuals belonging to  the majority group.
We regress identity on a set of individual characteristics and on the size of the group.
In several regressions, we also include the sample mean income for each ethnic group.
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Obviously, we can include country fixed effects only when we use the subsample tha t 
includes agents from minority groups. The results are shown in Tables 2.8, 2.9 and 
2 .10.
The coefficient of the variable measuring the size of the ethnic groups to which the 
respondent belongs is always negative and significant. As in the previous subsection, no 
causality can be claimed; omitted group characteristics (and also country characteristics 
when country fixed effects are not included), correlated with the size of the group, may 
affect individual identity.
2 .2 .3  M easurem en t issu es and  o th er  concerns
Several limitations of the analysis are worthy of mention. Firstly, the respondents’ 
answers are context specific. We try  to  control for this by using what we know about 
the context in which the individuals were being surveyed (particularly where and when 
the survey was conducted). However, clearly, there are aspects for which we cannot 
control, such as the proximity of ethnic festivals.
Secondly, there can be measurement errors, which are particularly im portant in attitude 
surveys. Respondents in societies in which there are social norms tha t prevent any open 
talk about ethnicity may be less likely to declare ethnic identification. There would be 
an upward bias in measured national identity in tha t society. However the survey 
was conducted by private enumerators who were not affiliated to any political party 
or government. So, it is likely th a t the survey has not been perceived as related to 
any national institution. More importantly, the question analyzed was only one of 
220 questions asked in the standard World Values Survey, the only one which clearly 
mentions ethnicity. It is fair to claim tha t ethnicity is only a marginal issue with which 
the survey deals. In addition, country fixed effects can partially address this problem.
Thirdly, it is not clear if the countries included in our study may be a good substitute 
for a world-wide sample. Our findings will have to be interpreted with the caveat tha t 
they may not be representative of the whole world.
We find th a t income is positively correlated with the likelihood tha t an individual 
identifies himself in national terms rather than ethnic ones. The size of the group 
is negatively correlated. Omitted variables correlated with size or income may affect 
national identity. On the other hand, some causality may be claimed in the case of the 
main specification when we use country fixed effects. However, there can be omitted 
country-variables having differential impacts on individual identity and correlated with 
right hand side variables (ethnic diversity in this case).
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2 .2 .4  Su m m ary o f  th e  em pirical findings
•  Respondents with higher income axe more likely to choose nation over ethnic 
group
• There is no evidence of any negative relationship between ethnic diversity and 
national identity
• On the one hand, in countries with low ethnic diversity, individuals from minori­
ties have stronger national sentiments than individuals from majorities; on the 
other hand, in countries with high ethnic diversity, on average, individuals from 
minorities have weaker national sentiments than individuals from majorities. This 
result, however, is robust only if we use ethnic polarization as an index of ethnic 
diversity.
•  The likelihood tha t an individual identifies himself in national terms rather than in 
ethnic ones is negatively related with the size of the group the individual belongs 
to
2.3 The model
Consider a society populated by a continuum of citizens of mass 1. Citizens belong 
to one of two ethnic groups, A or B. The size of group A is qa- Each individual i 
has an initial exogenous income stream yi. Income distribution F  (y) is uniform on 
[y — ip,y + <p\ and, for simplicity, we assume th a t this is independent of ethnicity.
Each agent decides the intensity of his national identity. We suppose identity to  be a 
personal choice; it is not inherited through the family. The proposed framework builds 
on th a t provided recently by Bisin et al (2006)6.
In each ethnic group, there is an accepted social norm, deviating from which involves 
some costs. Individuals develop strong national feelings as a mechanism for reducing 
such psychological costs. The intensity of national sentiment depends on the individ­
ual’s disposable income and on the size of the ethnic group to which he belongs. As 
a result the ethnic composition of the population has two effects on the individual’s 
choice: a direct one, through the size of the group, and an indirect one, through the 
political outcome and its impact on the disposable income of each agent.
The disposable income is determined after the voting stage. We use a standard Down- 
sian model of electoral competition. The policy space consists of transfers to the whole
6In Bisin et al (2006), the social norm is the behaviour of the majority. Minorities have to bear 
some costs because of the lack of assimilation. A strong ethnic identity reduces those costs.
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population or only targeted towards a specific ethnic group. Transfers are financed by 
a standard proportional income tax. The voting equilibrium depends on the degree of 
ethnic diversity of the society.
The sequence of events is as follows: first there is a voting stage -politicians are elected; 
once policies are implemented, each individual decides the intensity of his national 
identity.
The section is organized as follows: as a first step we describe the individual preferences, 
then introduce the policy space and study the voting equilibrium (and the individual 
disposable income). Finally we consider the identity choice and study how it depends 
on the ethnic composition of the population.
2.3 .1  P referen ces
Preferences are summarized by the utility function u  ^ r, y f  ^ j  where y f  z is the disposable 
income of an individual i belonging to group 2 , while x  is an abstract argument that 
collects the whole set of choices of the individual i, z. As usual, the utility function 
is a positive function of disposable income. We postulate th a t there exists a social 
norm within each ethnic group tha t prescribes a behaviour x  = x$. Ethnic norms often 
prescribe individual behaviour in a vast array of activities. Members of an ethnic group 
might be expected to  respect a specific dress code (the Islamic veil, for instance) or a 
particular diet (the Jewish dietary laws are one of the many examples), as discussed 
by Epstein (2006). Norms can involve the use of the local language at home (Lazear, 
1999), influence the choice of the partner or interfere with the gender division of labour 
and more in general with many gender relationships within the family (Amott and 
M atthei, 1996). Individuals are likely to be asked to invest their time in ritual and 
festivals (Kuran, 1998) and, in the extreme case, to  participate in episodes of violence, 
like during the Rwandan genocide (as documented by Bhavnani, 2006).
According to Kuran (1998), individuals follow ethnic norms in order to retain social 
acceptance. Norms might be sustained by economic sanctions, reputational concerns 
or simply psychological need to accommodate social pressure. In our model deviating 
from such norms entails some psychological costs. This approach is consistent with 
a broad class of conformity models (see, among others, Akerlof, 1980; Jones , 1984; 
Akerlof, 1997; Ballester, Calvo Armengol, and Zenou, 2005; B attu, Mwale, and Zenou, 
2005; Bernheim, 1994; Glaeser and Scheinkman, 2001; Kandel and Lazear, 1992; Fer- 
shtman and Weiss, 1998) where failing to conform to the own group norms involves 
some costs. In Akerlof (1980) persons who disobey the code of honour of a commu­
nity sacrifice "reputation", in Kandel and Lazear (1992) sentiments like shame and
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guilt can affect individuals who, in large organizations, work less than the group norm. 
Berhheim (1997) and Fershstmam and Weiss (1998) suppose that, in addition to  stan­
dard preferences, individual also cares about esteem and social status, while Akerlof 
(1997) adopts a utility function tha t explicitly includes a conformist component: the 
agents lose utility from failing to conform to others.
We denote such psychological costs with A(a’gz)(a:~a:o) . where q2 is the size of group 
z. They are assumed to  be higher the more widespread the norm in the population. 
Similar assumptions are adopted by Bisin et al. (2006) and Akerlof (1980)7. Kandel 
and Lazear (1992) discuss the relationship between firm size and peer pressure; they 
suggest tha t the level of monitoring can increase with the size of the firm and also that, 
if more workers observe an individual, the sanctions imposed might be greater, a  is the 
intensity of national feeling and, as mentioned earlier, it is supposed to  alleviate such 
psychological costs8.
x _  d \{ a ,q z) ^ n
Qz — a ^  udqz 
d \  (a ,qz)
/'a — q v. Uoa
Building a national identity, however, involves some costs too. We adopt standard 
convex costs
As a result, the entire problem can be summarized in the following way: each individual 
has to choose a set of actions x  and the intensity of national identity a  such th a t U^z 
is maximized, where
7In Akerlof (1980), the individual reputation depends on his obedience of the code of behaviour of 
the community. The larger the number of believers in that code, the larger is the individual loss of 
reputation from disobeying it. However, the setting is dynamic and the fraction of believers in the next 
generation is a negative function of the fraction of individuals who, in the current generation, disobey 
the code.
8 As in Bisin et al (2006), we make further assumptions in order to make the maximization problem 
well defined and the exercise interesting enough. We assume uxx <  0 and without any loss of generality 
x i (Vi,z) — argm axu (x , y f iZ) >  xo for all yfiZ. Moreover we assume that if a  —» 0, then A —► oo, while 
to guarantee the concavity of the problem Xaa >  0.
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2 .3 .2  P o litica l aren a and  vo tin g  equilibrium
We first describe the policy space. There are two types of transfer: transfers (Tr) to the
whole population and transfers towards a particular ethnic group z  (T r z) th a t are thus
enjoyed only by a fraction qz of the population .9 Ethnicity allows the policy maker to
target transfers towards a specific fraction of the population .10 Transfers are financed
by proportional income taxation .11 Taxation, however, is assumed to  be distortionary
2
in the sense tha t it wastes resources of C  (r) =  . The cost function is increasing and
convex in r .12 As a consequence the policy maker faces the following budget constraint:
7  t 2
ry  = T r  + T rAqA +  T rBqB +  - y  
where y  is the total (and average) income in the country.
We use a standard model of Downsian electoral competition. There is a 2 party elec­
toral competition, political candidates are opportunistic and, more precisely, their only 
motivation is to hold office. Moreover, we assume tha t candidates can commit to a 
well defined policy ahead of the elections. So, as a result, the timing is as follows: the 
two candidates announce a policy platform, so as to  maximize the probability of vic­
tory, then voters select their preferred policy; eventually the policy announced by the 
winning candidate gets implemented. In this political setting, the policy implemented 
coincides with the Condorcet winner (if any). Despite the multidimensional policy space 
and thanks to the assumptions about the income distribution, it is possible to show 
the existence of a policy 7rM capable of beating any alternative policy 7r in a pairwise 
voting.
The median voter belongs to the largest group (we consider group A as being the 
largest) and he is the individual, with income yM, such th a t the size of the group 
of agents, belonging to  group A, with lower income stream than him, is one half: 
F  (yM, z = A) =  \  (as illustrated by Figure 2.4).
9 Alternatively we can think in terms of public goods. So we could have had an environment that is 
more similar to the one provided by Fernandez and Levy (2005). The policy maker can provide two types 
of public good: one is a standard public good from which the whole society derives utility, the other 
is a "targeted" public good. The fact that those goods can be targeted may result from preference 
differences (a public good can be useful only for one particular ethnic group) or from geographical 
differences across groups (locally provided public good, if an ethnic good is concentrated in a particular 
area of the country).
10It is close to the Caselli and Coleman’s (2002) view. In their work, the role of ethnicity was to  
enforce coalition membership.
11 Taxation cannot be ethnically targeted. This is crucial to guarantee the existence of a Condorcet 
winner.
12 As usual the assumption of distortionary tax allows us to get an interior solution.
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As a result, the higher is the degree of ethnic heterogeneity the richer is the median 
voter. Fernandez and Levy (2005) and Roemer (1998) obtained similar results using 
different political settings. Fernandez and Levy (2005) show that, under certain condi­
tions, when ethnic diversity increases the set of equilibrium policies involves lower pro­
poor policies; Roemer (1998) shows tha t the existence of the ethnic issue (if sufficiently 
salient) can work against the interests of the poor. This is consistent with empirical 
findings in the literature. Easterly and Levine (1997) and Alesina, Glaeser and Sac- 
erdote (2 0 0 1 ) provide cross country evidence of a strong negative correlation between 
ethnic (and racial) fragmentation and public goods provision (mainly education and 
infrastructure). Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (2000) finds a similar relationship across 
US States.
P ro p o s itio n  2.1 There exists a unique voting equilibrium 7rM. The tax rate is r M = 
and an tfe  iax revenue is devoted to transfers to group A. T r ^  =
Proof: In Appendix
The median voter is an individual who belongs to  the largest ethnic group with an initial 
income stream higher than the average income stream, yM > y. As a direct consequence, 
in a world with proportional income taxation, he does not finance transfers (TV) to the 
whole population with a positive amount of tax  rate. On the other hand he accepts 
th a t t m  >  0  in order to  finance a positive amount of transfers directed only towards 
individuals from his ethnic group (T r^ )13. Then the total tax  revenue, r My, net of the 
distortions C  ( r M) , is redistributed among a fraction of agents qA- The median voter 
chooses the tax  rate tha t maximizes his disposable income, ( l  — r M) yM + T— • 
Since the benefits of the tax  revenue are divided among fewer people, the tax  rate is 
higher the lower the size of the majority group.
The model seems to  be consistent with casual and formal evidence provided by previous 
literature. A governance outcome tha t is commonly associated with severe divided so­
cieties is patronage. Patronage refers to the situation of extended benefits to members 
of an ethnic group (the one in power) while discriminating members of other ethnic 
groups. Usual examples (see Padro, 2006) of groups advantaged by political leaders 
are Northern groups in both Nigeria and Uganda or Tutsis in Burundi. More formal 
evidence is provided by Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (1998): they show th a t public 
employment is significantly higher in US cities where ethnic fragmentation is higher.
13There is no other policy able to beat ttm  in a pairwise voting. ttm  uses only transfers towards 
group A. This allows politicians to channel a high amount of resources towards a specific group of the 
population without using a high level of taxation and so without wasting a huge amount of resources 
(taxes are distortionary).
t m v _  i t p :
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They interpret public employment as an example of subsidy to ethnically defined inter­
est groups. An other outcome of the model is the positive relationship between tax  rate 
and level of ethnic diversity. Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (1999) finds th a t per capita 
local taxes are positively associated with ethnic fractionalization in US cities (but not 
in US counties and in US metro areas). However, using a different specification, Berry 
(2 0 0 2 ) shows tha t per capita property taxes are positively correlated with ethnic frac­
tionalization in US counties as well. Moreover, La Porta et al (1998) find tha t more 
ethnically heterogenous countries have an higher top marginal tax rate.
From Proposition 2.1 we easily derive that:
V*A
yf,B =  i -
( i  -  q a ) {y  -  <p)
7
0
(1  - q ) ( y -  <p) 
7
^  Vi,B
(i-gA)(y-y) _£7
^-gAKv-y)7
QA
L em m a 2.1 y fB is increasing in qA for every i, B ; while y fA is increasing (decreasing) 
in qA if  yi,A is higher (lower) than a given threshold
Proof: In Appendix
The intuition is straightforward: the higher the size of the largest group, the lower the 
tax  rate and the lower the transfers to group A. So, the higher the size of A (and the 
lower the size of their own group), the higher the disposable income of each agent from 
group B. An increase in qA, however, has 2  opposite effects on the disposable income 
of an agent from group A: on the one hand, it decreases the tax rate, on the other 
hand it decreases the transfers too. Since taxes are proportional to income, it is easy 
to conclude tha t the first effect dominates the second only if the initial income stream 
is sufficiently high.
In this simple political setting, inter-ethnic redistribution is the only form of redistri­
bution tha t can arise as equilibrium outcome. The existence of a Condorcet winner, 
however, is guaranteed by the assumptions on the income distribution: F  (y ) is assumed 
to be uniform and independent of ethnicity. Once we remove one of these 2  assump­
tions, n M might be beaten by a policy tha t allows for both inter-ethnic redistribution 
and general redistribution (T R  > 0) and tha t is supported by individuals with a low 
level of income from both the ethnic groups. Altough the structure of the political 
side is very simple and does not allow for standard redistribution in equilibrium, it
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delivers results consistent with more complex theoretical frameworks which, however, 
can be less easily integrated with the other part of our model, the identity decision. 
Fernandez and Levy (2005) study a framework with a similar policy space but with a 
different structure of political competition. They study the equilibrium of a game in 
which political parties endogenously arise. Political parties are restricted to offering 
platforms th a t belong to the Pareto set of their members. In equilibrium, parties of 
different kind can arise, they can represent economic interests but also ethnic interests. 
They find, consistently with the results delivered by our political setting, th a t when 
ethnic diversity increases the set of equilibrium policies involves lower pro-poor policies 
and larger ethnic transfers. However, in Fernandez and Levy (2005), under a large set 
of parameters, there are multiple equilibria and an equilibrium with maximum general 
redistributive taxation cohexists with equilibria in which the party in power implements 
a mix of general redistribution and inter-ethnic redistribution. Esteban and Ray (2007) 
provided an other setting tha t allows for both class and ethnic coalitions to emerge. 
They study a non democratic setting in which peace and conflict are the two possible 
outcomes. They find that, under broad parametric conditions, class conflict is never 
the equilibrium outcome and ethnic conflict or peace are the only possible equilibria. 
In their framework, ethnic salience is the product of economic inequality: while class 
coalitions display strong within group economic homogeneity, in ethnic coalitions there 
is strong economic heterogeneity which allows im portant sinergies. Rich components 
of the ethnic coalitions provide economic resources, poor components conflict labor.
2 .3 .3  Id en tity  choice
As previously stated, the individual problem is:
( i \  \ ( a , q z ) ( x - x 0)2 a2 ™ x u [ x , y itZ) -----------------------   —
It is straightforward to see that, as a result of the maximization problem, we get 
a*z (qz 'i V i ) ; feelings are a function of the size of the ethnic group to which the individual 
belongs and of his initial income stream. We study the signs of dctx'XQq*'V%^ and 
and we get results analogous to Bisin et al. (2006).
_  da* , da*  „  d u fx .v ^  1
L em m a 2.2 ^  and ^  are positive i f  dxdyd’J - > 0 
Proof: In Appendix
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du(x^y^ 1
If Qxdy4Z >  0 individuals from group z with a higher disposable income (and so 
also with higher initial income stream) tend to  get higher utility from actions tha t are 
more distant from the social norm of their group and, as a result, they choose a higher 
intensity of national identity. The lower the income, the higher is the utility gained 
from respecting dress and language codes, gender roles imposed by the group or from 
giving up work time to  participate to (not necessarily violent) ethnic activities. In 
other words, wearing specific clothes, not working on the Sabbath, praying five times a 
day, doing most of the housework (gender division of labour) or being part of a violent 
faction in a conflict environment, all have an opportunity cost. The condition on the 
cross derivative states tha t those opportunity costs are increasing with income.
Casual evidence seems to be consistent with Lemma 2.2. According to Jeffres (1983), 
income is negatively correlated with ethnic behaviour. There is also some evidence tha t 
the use of regional languages (Grin, 1999 and Padilla, 2004) and endogamy (McCaa, 
1993 and W ildsmith et al., 2007) are associated with lower socio- economic status. 
Moreover, very poor individuals in Sierra Leone (Humphreys and Weinstein, 2004) 
and landless individuals in Rwanda (Verwimp, 2005) were more likely to  participate in 
episodes of violence.
We are now looking for the sign of dahz^ y%’z  ^# We need to take into account several 
effects.
•  a direct effect of qz on the costs of deviating from the social norm established 
within each group. We assumed th a t dX&}' ^  >  0; so the higher the qz, the higher 
are the costs tha t the agent has to  bear, the smaller the deviation from the ethnic 
norm undertaken by him, then the lower the intensity of national sentiment he 
needs to alleviate such costs. As a result, there is a negative direct effect.
•  there is also an indirect effect: the effect of a change in qz on which is the
marginal effect of a  on the unit cost of deviating from the social norm. Consider 
a positive sign, Xaq > 0. This implies tha t the larger the size of the ethnic group, 
the smaller, in absolute value, the marginal effect of a  on the unit cost. Xaq > 0  
implies a negative indirect effect.
•  moreover, we need to consider the effect of an increase in qz on the disposable 
income of each individual. The size of the largest group affects the tax  rate and 
so the disposable income of the population. In a 2 group model, with population 
normalized to 1 , an increase in qA coincides with a decrease in qB and viceversa.
du(x^y^ ^
Consider the case ■ QxQydz > 0- Prom Lemma 2.2, the higher the disposable 
income, the stronger the intensity of the national feeling. From Lemma 2.1, an 
increase in qA leads to  an increase in the disposable income of the (very) rich
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people in A and to  a decrease of the disposable income of the poor people in A. 
As a result, we can conclude tha t there is a negative effect for the poor agents 
from A and a positive one for the rich ones. On the other hand, an increase 
in qB (and consequently a decrease in qA) leads to  a decrease in the disposable 
income of every agent from B. Then, we can conclude tha t there is a negative
d u (x )iy^> 1
effect for all the agent from B. Consider now the case aKJ j ZJ < o. Following°x°yi,z
similar reasoning, we can conclude tha t there is a positive effect for all the agents 
from B and the poor agents from A, while there is a negative effect for the rich 
agents in A.
As a result, when Xaq is positive the first and second effects we mentioned are negative, 
while the third effect is positive for a fraction of the population and negative for the 
remaining part. If \ aq is sufficiently large, then the sum of all the three effects will be 
negative for every agent in the society. 14
dot*L em m a 2.3 I f  Xaq >  0 is positive and sufficiently large, then < 0  
Proof : In Appendix
2 .3 .4  N a tio n a l sen tim en t and e th n ic  d iversity
In a 2 ethnic group environment, the lower the size of the largest ethnic group, the 
higher the degree of ethnic diversity. 15 As an initial exercise, we compare the average 
intensity of the national feeling of the majority (group A) with the average intensity of 
national feeling of the minority (group B). We call a A the average intensity of national 
feelings of group A (aA = ot*A (Vi) Qa) dF ( y i \ z  — A)) and a B the average intensity 
of national feeling of group B (olb  = a*B (y { \ qB ) dF ( y { \z  =  B)).
P ro p o s itio n  2 . 2  Let >  0 and ^aq > X, then a A > a B i f  qA < k\ a A < a B
otherwise
14We could get similar results even if dX(£*q’qz  ^ >  0. In this case the first effect would be positive. 
However, if the second effect is sufficiently large, then it can dominate the other 2 effects.
15 The index of ethnic fractionalization is the most common index of ethnic diversity. More recently 
a new index was introduced in the literature: the index of ethnic polarization. The purpose of the 
ethnic polarization index is to capture how far the distribution of the ethnic groups is from a bipolar 
distribution, which represents the highest level of polarization. In a 2 group context, however, it turns 
out that they both provide the same ranking. The higher the size of the majority, the lower they are.
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Proof: In Appendix16
In order to  study the relationship between ethnic diversity and the difference between 
o l a  and or8 , we need to take into account 2  conflicting effects: a direct effect (the size 
effect) and an indirect effect (the political effect).
On the one hand, from Lemma 2.3, we find th a t when Xaq > A, the intensity of national 
identity chosen by each agent is a negative function of the size of the group to which 
he belongs. Larger groups (group A in our case) protect the (ethnic) identity of their 
components more efficiently. This effect, on average, clearly makes national feelings 
weaker in a majority group than in a minority group. Hence, the size effect has a 
negative impact on the difference between a A and a B.
On the other hand, an indirect effect is also at work. Resources are redistributed 
from the minority to the majority. This affects individual identity through changes in 
disposable income. When * %z' > 0, since intensity of national feeling is positively
VijZ
related to disposable income (Lemma 2.2), political outcomes have a positive effect on 
the national sentiments of group A (majority) and a negative one on the sentiments of 
group B (minority). Thus, the political effect positively influences (a A — a B).
The balance of the two forces depends on the level of ethnic diversity. Suppose we live 
in a very heterogeneous society. This means tha t there are 2 groups of very similar size. 
The size effect plays no role. The majority group is relatively small and the benefits 
from the tax  revenues are divided among a small fraction of people, so the tax  rate is 
very high and inter-ethnic redistribution assumes large proportions. The political effect 
dominates the size effect and the average intensity of the national feeling of the majority 
group is stronger than the average intensity of national feeling of the minority. On the 
contrary, in homogeneous societies with a very large ethnic majority and a very small 
ethnic minority, the size effect is the prominent one and (a A — a B) has a negative sign. 
The interplay between the two effects and the role of ethnic diversity is illustrated in 
Figure 2.5. 17
Now, we tu rn  to the relationship between ethnic diversity and the average intensity of 
national feeling in a country, which we call a T; we want to study the sign of
— fs T __
Proposition 2.3 Let Xaq > X, then < 0 i f  q a >  <IA
16The Appendix shows also how results change when we remove the conditions >  0 and
X a q  ^  X.
17 We arbitrarily depicted linear intensity functions for both group A and group B.
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Proof: In Appendix18
We can see a T as a weighted average of a A and a B , where the weights are, of course, 
the sizes of the 2  groups.
W hen qA increases (and, of course, at the same time qB decreases), both the size effect 
and the political effect (lower inter ethnic redistribution) have a negative impact on 
a A and a positive one on a B . As a consequence, there are two conflicting effects on a T : 
qAOLA decreases while qsOiB increases.
The balance of these 2 forces depends on the shape of the intensity function (namely, 
on OLqq  and a q y  that, in turn, depends on several characteristics of the utility function 
and cost function). The effect on group A, however, is directed towards a larger share 
of the population (the weight of group A is larger then group B and becomes larger 
when qA increases). This explains the previous proposition.
Let us summarize the results obtained in the following corollary.
C o ro lla ry  2.1 There is no negative relationship between ethnic diversity and average 
national identity. Once we distinguish between minority and majority groups, however, 
it is possible to claim that: on the one hand, in countries with low ethnic diversity, on 
average, individuals from  minorities have stronger national sentiments than individuals 
from majorities; on the other hand, in countries with high ethnic diversity, on aver­
age, individuals from minorities have weaker national sentiments than individuals from  
majorities.
2.4 Discussion: a m odel w ith  n groups
The empirical section of the chapter produced, among other considerations, two inter­
esting results:
• within each country, agents in larger ethnic minorities have a lower intensity of 
national identity.
• the results are robust only if we use ethnic polarization as an index of ethnic 
diversity.
18 Also in this case, the Appendix shows how the results change when we relax the conditions 
2^ P > 0 andA„,>A.
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Both of the results mentioned above need the theoretical support of a model with n 
groups.
The first change we need to consider is related to the policy space. In an n group setting 
there are n+ 1  types of transfer: transfers to all the population and transfers towards 
each ethnic group z, with z =  l..n . It turns out that, as long as the size of the largest 
ethnic group (group A) is greater than a half (qA > i ) .  Proposition 2.1 and Lemma
2 .1  still holds. There is still a Condorcet winner, the identity of the median voter is 
still the same and, moreover, the lower the size of the largest ethnic group, the higher 
the redistribution between the ethnic groups (from the ethnic minorities to group A). 
In the following part of this section, we keep assuming qA>
L em m a 2.4 I f  > \  there exists a unique voting equilibrium ttm . The tax rate is 
r M _  {i-qA){y-<p) an(j  an fae ^  revenue is devoted to transfers to group A. Tr%  =
Proof: In Appendix
The intensity of the national feelings of each individual i, z  depends on the size of the 
ethnic group to which he belongs (qz) and on his disposable income that, in turn, is a 
function of his initial income stream and of the size of the largest ethnic group (qA) , 
a*z (qz ; yi, qA) • Lemma 2.2 and Lemma 2.3 still hold, then:
P ro p o s itio n  2.4 I f  Xaq is positive and sufficiently large and qA > \ ,  then if  qz < qh, 
with z , h ^ A ,  ol\ z (qz \y i , qA) > ot*ih  (qh; yu qA)
r MV
Proof: It comes directly from Lemma 2.3
The proposition simply states th a t within each country, the agents in larger ethnic 
minorities have a lower intensity of national identity.
Let us define the average intensity of national sentiment within the minority (in a
y^ a j z(<lz]yi,qA)
society in which the minority consists of several ethnic groups): a m =  —l^qA------- ’
We are interested in the sign of a A — a m .
Prom the previous discussion, it is straightforward to claim that: when Xaq > A and
du{^yjz) .  n
~ d x d y f ~
if qA > k then ola  < a m (if qA is sufficiently large, the "size" effect dominates the 
"political" effect)
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•  if the ethnic composition of the population tends towards a perfect bipolar distri­
bution (the maximum level of ethnic polarization), then a A > a m (the "political" 
effect dominates the "size" effect ).
Finally, let us consider the two basic properties of a polarization index:
P ro p o s itio n  2.5 (i) Let society consists of 3 groups o f sizes, qa, qB and Qc, and 
Qa  > qB > qc- Then if  we merge the two smallest groups into a new group a A — a m 
increases (ii) Let society consists of 3 groups of sizes, qB,qA> and qs, and qa >  qB- 
Then, i f  we shift mass (2A) from group A equally to the other two groups then a A — a m 
increases.
Proof: In Appendix
Both of the properties imply an increase in the polarization index; however, only the 
second one implies an increase in the fractionalization index19.
Since the "size effect", when we merge the two smallest group a m decreases, while a A 
is constant. This explains the first part of the proposition. Also the intuition of the 
second part of the proposition is quite straightforward. When we shift mass from group 
A equally to the other two groups, the size of the largest group decreases and then the 
between groups income redistribution increases. The size of each of the two minorities 
increases. Both the effects point in the same direction. National feelings among group 
A increase, while national feelings among each of the two minorities decrease.
These considerations suggest tha t, in countries with low ethnic polarization (qA is suffi­
ciently large), the average intensity of the national identity within the minority is higher 
than the average intensity of the national identity within the majority, while in coun­
tries with high ethnic polarization (close to a perfect bipolar distribution) the average 
intensity of the national identity within the majority is higher than the average intensity 
of the national identity within the minority. On the other hand, this is not necessarily 
true if we replace the ethnic polarization index with the ethnic fractionalization one.
2.5 Conclusions
This chapter investigates the relationship between ethnic diversity and individual iden­
tity. Using data  from the World Values Surveys, we first provide some empirical facts,
19 This is because we need to impose qA — 2A >  5 in order to have a Condorcet winner.
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then we develop a model tha t is consistent with the data. There is no evidence of a 
lower intensity of national sentiment in more ethnically fragmented countries or in mi­
nority groups. National feelings in a minority can be higher or lower than in a majority, 
depending on the degree of ethnic diversity of a country. On the one hand, in coun­
tries with high ethnic polarization, minorities have weaker national sentiments than 
majorities; on the other hand, in countries with low ethnic polarization, the reverse is 
true.
We then provide a model tha t can help explaining such empirical findings. The model 
builds on a previous work by Bisin et al. (2006). In each ethnic group there is an 
accepted social norm and deviating from tha t social norm involves some costs. Indi­
viduals develop national feelings in order to reduce these psychological costs. National 
sentiments are affected by political decisions (inter-ethnic redistribution) and by the 
ethnic composition of the population.
2.6 A ppendix A
2.6 .1  P r o o f o f  P ro p o sitio n  2.1
Let us first prove th a t the policy preferred by the median voter is the one stated in the 
previous proposition and then let us prove tha t th a t policy is the winner of Condorcet.
•  The median voter is the citizen belonging to group A such tha t F  (yM , z  =  A) = \  
and so, since F (y ) is a uniform distribution and is independent of ethnicity, the 
income stream of the median voter is yM — y +  ^  — (p. Clearly the best policy for 
an agent from group A is to devote all the tax  revenue to  transfers targeted only 
towards agents belonging to  group A, so T r#  =  T r  = 0. As a result he will choose 
t m  th a t maximizes his disposable income which is yM,d = (1  — r) (y  +  — tp'j +
i l l
TVqA2 ■ It is straightforward to see tha t r M = .
•  Let us call n M the policy preferred by the agent with income yM.
, M M7r  = I 7 = (1  -  qA) (y -  (fi) ;Tr%  =
7
(1 -QA)(y-<p) _  [(1 - 9A)(y-¥?)]2
 ^ ^ --------; T tq = 0; T r M = 0
Q A
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Now, let us prove tha t the policy n M , chosen by the individual with income stream 
y M , is the winner of Condorcet. In a pairwise competition 7rM must defeat all of the 
possible other policies.
•  A general policy 7rK (r K < r M\T r A > OjTV^ >  0 ,T r K > 0) would be defeated 
by 7rM. All the agents belonging to  A with y^A <  yM would vote for ttm  .
•  It is easy to check tha t any other policy with T r s  = T r  = 0 and T ta > Tr%  
would be also defeated by n M. All the agents belonging to B and all the agents 
belonging to  A with y^A >  yM would vote for 7rM.
•  Let us now take a general policy 7tk  (t k  > r M; T rA >  0; Trjg > 0; T r K > 0). 7rK 
generates y f)P  and
•  Let us now consider the set of policies tth  (r H > t m \T r A > 0; T r q > 0; T r 11 =  0) . 
It is easy to see tha t it is always possible to  find a policy
7rH (t h  = t k  > r M\T r A > 0;T rjj > 0 ,T r H = 0) such tha t y f) ^  = yfj/P  and 
y f ^  = y f P -  We then check if there is any policy irH th a t can defeat irM .
It turns out tha t there is not. In order to  prove this, we use the following procedure:
i) fo r each agent i,A with income y^A, we find the set o f policies 7rl,j4 (r;Tr>i, TV#) 
such that y f  A (tM )  = y f  A (ttm ) .
Such a set of policies can be summarized by the following equation:
T rA = ( r  -  t m ) yitA +  Tr%
ii) i f  an agent i,A with income y^A is indifferent between 7rl,A and 7rM, then all the 
agents with lower income (and belonging to A ) prefer 7rt,A, while all the agents with 
higher income (and belonging to A ) prefer 7rM
It is straightforward since r  > r M.
Hi) for each tt^ a  we find the size qA of agents from group A that would favor n^A over 
trM.
It turns out qA (yitA) = qA(Vl'A~y+(p) .
iv) we then find the correspondent size o f B  that tt^ a  needs in order to defeat 7rM.
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q'B (Vi,A) =  \  ~  ({A (Vi,A) •
v) i f  an agent i,B  with income y^B prefers a policy 7t^ a  to n M, all the agents with 
lower income (and belonging to B) do likewise.
As a result, in order tt^ a to  defeat irM, it has to be true tha t y'^ B (^^a ) > y’i B C71^ ) ’ 
where y fB is the disposable income of the agent from group B with income stream  y' B 
such th a t F  (yi, z  = B ) = q'B . Of course it is possible to write y'i B as a function of q'A 
and then as a function of y^A-
vi) we then find the set of policies such that y'fB (k^a ) > y'^ s (7rM)
T r A < r ^ _ ^ _ { r - r ^ - ^  
QA 2  qA qA
vii) end of the proof.
The set of points such that:
TrA  
T r  a
< qA 2qA 
= (T ~
> r M.
7 r 2 ( r  -  r M) ( I - q a )
qA y'i,B ( jm )
M \  I r p  M
) Pi,A +  T r A
is an empty set for each possible level of y^A-
Intuition: There is no other policy able to beat ttm  in a pairwise voting, irM uses only 
transfers towards group A. This allows politicians to channel a high amount o f resources 
towards a specific group o f the population without using a high level o f taxation and so 
without wasting a huge amount of resources (taxes are distortionary).
2.6 .2  P r o o f o f  L em m a 2.1
T s j f  =  t y i , B  { y - < p ) >  o 
=  \ y i , A  ( y  -  <p ) +  ^  ( - *  ( y - < p ) - £ j ( y - < p ) 2 (2 p a  -  2 ) )  -  
- j r  ( *  ( y  -  (p) ( i  -  9 a )  - £ ; ( y -  v ?  ( i  -  q A) 2)  >  o
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^ (-^ (2 /-¥ ’) -^ (y -¥ ’)2(2 ^ -2 ))-^ -^ (y -^ )(l-g A )-^ (y -^ )2(l-9A)2) 
if Vi,a  >  7 --------------------------------------- 5 ^ 5 ---------------------------------------
2 .6 .3  P r o o f o f  L em m a 2.2
As in Bisin et al (2006), we need to make a further assumption in order to have the 
Hessian m atrix negative semidefinite, tha t is
D  — (Uxx A) 1 +  Ac
(x -  x 0 y
— (x — Xq)2 > 0  Vi
Now we apply the implicit function theorem and we get:
dx*u xi,z
dVi,z
d a i,z
dVi,z
(x-xo)2 9u(x,yf z) dyf 3 
2 dxdyfz dyi,i
D
\  ( r  - r r  \  dU( X’y t z )  d v tXa (x  XQ) dxdyd^  dyi<2
D
where > 0  for every i , 2
2 .6 .4  P r o o f o f  L em m a 2.3
We apply the implicit function theorem again and we get
d x *i,z Xq (x — Xq) 1 +  Xaa X^ 2 °^  j +  Aa Aag ^  2 ---
1 j_ \ {x-x0y  ■*- 1 Aaa 2
du(x,yf z) dyf 
dxdyf dqz
dqz D
d a tz
( „  „ \ 2 \  A , A.. { x - x o ) 2 x  ^ 9 u ( x , y f z ) d Vi,( x  X q )  X a Xq  +  \ U XX A )  A aq  2 X a  ( X  X q )  Q x Q y d  g qz
dqz
'ay 2
~D
2.6 .5  P r o o f o f  P ro p o sitio n  2.2
dxl( x  y ^  ) — dot*
q ’ > 0 and Xaq >  A. We know from Lemma 2.2 and Lemma 2.3 tha t > 0°xuy i z  °Viyz
da?Vi, 2  and <  0 Vz. We start by considering individuals with the same initial income
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stream  y*, but who belong to different ethnic groups. As emerged from the previous 
discussion, we know ot*i z [ y fz (y*; qA) ; q ^ j . We compare a*A [y f A (y*; qA) ; qAj and
a i,B (yf,B (V*i Qa ) ; Qb )  and we study 2 cases:
1) (QA - q B ) - *  0
Vi A (v*) ~  ViB (y*) > an(  ^ so since d^ XaVd'z  ^ >  by Lemma 2.2, we can claim th a t> > oxayi z
<x*,a  ( yf,A fo*;qa) ; -  <xI b  ( yftB (v*\qa) ; g s )  >  o
2 ) qA -*• 1 ; qB -»> 0
From Proposition 2.1 and Lemma 2.1, r  —► 0 and then, y ^  (y*) — y^B (y*) —> 0,
a i,A (y*A (2/*; ; qa)  -  (yf,B (y*\ qa) -,qb)  < o
Since we assumed tha t F  (y) is uniform and independent of ethnicity, we can then 
conclude tha t a A — a B > 0 when qA —> \  and a A — a B < 0 when qA —> 1. Since 
a A — a B is a decreasing function of qA , it is possible to claim th a t there exists a value 
q*A such th a t a A > a B if qA < q*A\ a A < a B otherwise. This proves Proposition 2.2.
d u f x ^
Let us now investigate how results change when we remove the conditions dxQyd’z >  0
and Xaq >  A, tha t is when we do not restrict ourselves to having a negative "size 
effect" on national identity and a positive correlation between national sentiments and 
disposable income. As is predictable, the interaction between size effect and political 
effect delivers very different results, depending on the signs of the two cross derivatives:
Proposition 2.2 bis:
if dUQx^ydz  ^ >  0 and Xaq >  A, then a A >  a ?  if qA < k \  a A <  a B otherwise
if ~^xQ~d'z  ^ >  0 and Xaq <  A, then a A >  otB
if d^ QxQydZ^  <  0 and Xaq >  A, then a A <  a B
if - ^xg~d,z  ^ <  0 and Xaq <  A, then a A <  a B if qA < k \  a A >  a B
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2 .6 .6  P r o o f o f  P ro p o sitio n  2.3
We define the average intensity of national feelings in a country a T, and how it depends 
on ethnic diversity.
“ T =  Sy-% <*lz (y>> Qz) dF  (Vi) =  fy-%  a i,A (w; qa) dF  (w . 2  =  A ) +
+  Sy-v a ',B (Vi> qb) dF  (yu z = B ) =
= QA <*Ia  (w, Qa ) dF  (yi\z = A) + (1 -  qA) }*** a \ B (yj; qB) dF  (y{\z = B )
* £  = a A - a B + qA jv+ * a^ lA dF  (!/i|z = A ) - ( 1 -  qA) B-£ ? d F  (Vi\z =  B )
Since Xaq > X , when qA —► 1, by Proposition 2.2 bis, a A — a B < 0.
QA d<dqA ^  (Vi\z = A) <  0 and the last term  goes to 0 (provided th a t A (.) and
dot*u (.)  are such tha t is bounded below). This proves Proposition 2.3.
Let us now investigate how the results change when we remove the condition Xaq > A. 
Proposition 2.3 bis:
• If AQg > A, then ^  < 0 if qA > Qa
•  If Xaq < A, then >  0 if qA > qA
2 .6 .7  P r o o f o f  L em m a 2.4
The structure of the proof is very similar to the case with 2 groups. We need to  check 
if there is any policy tth  th a t can defeat 7rM where n H is such tha t
7t h  (t h  > r M; T r f  >  0 Vj; T r H = 0)
i) for each agent i,A with income y^A, we find the set o f policies 7rl,A ( r ]T r A ,T r B>j  
such that y f  A (7r*,j4) =  y?A (ttm )
ii) i f  an agent i,A with income y^A is indifferent between irl,A and 7tm , then all the 
agents with lower income (and belonging to A ) prefer 7rl,A, while all the agents with 
higher income (and belonging to A ) prefer n M. As a second step we find the size q'A of 
agents from group A that would favor tt^a over 1xM.
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Hi) then we find the amount o f transfers Tr*j > 0 needed for a generic amount q'j > 0
from n-2 groups to support tt^ a  and finally we check i f  the remaining part of the budget
is enough to convince \  — qrA — ^  q'j individuals from the remaining group (group
& a ,n
N) to support it^a  •
In order to  convince q'j people from group j, we need to provide T rj  such tha t Tr*- = 
( t  -  t m ) yi}j  where y^j is such tha t g' =  -
It turns out tha t in order to convince ^ — q'A — q'j from group N to support tt^ a , 
it must be true tha t
T rA <  H  _  T l  +  (T _  (JM  _  y) _  ( r - r p gNy 
QA 2qA qA
As a final step, we need to check if the following system has any solution
2 (T _  r  ) q N y
T r A < —  -  —  + { T - T M) { yi,A - y ) - - ------ -----------
QA Zqa  qa
T rA = ( r -  t m ) yi>A +  T r%
T rA <
ry  7  t 2
QA ‘Lqa
It turns out tha t the system does not have any solution for V y i j  with j  ^  N
2 .6 .8  P r o o f o f  P ro p o sitio n  2.5
(i) It comes directly from Lemma 2.3 (ii) We shift mass from group A equally to the 
other two groups. So the size of group A becomes qA — 2 A, while the size of each of 
the other 2 groups becomes qs +  A. Of course, in order to have a Condorcet winner, 
it is crucial th a t qa — 2A > From Lemma 2.3 we know that, when \ aq > A, a*A is 
a decreasing function of qA\ as a result, when the size of group A decreases by 2  A, a  a  
increases. On the other hand, a*z depends on the size of the ethnic group to which 
he belongs (qz) and on his disposable income, th a t is a function of his initial income 
stream and of the size of the largest ethnic group {qjC) , a*z (qz \yi, . From Lemma
dot* dot*
2.3 < 0 and from Lemma 2 .1  > 0 .  As a result, when we shift mass A from
group A equally to the other two groups, a m decreases.
46
2.7 A ppendix B
2.7 .1  D efin ition  o f  variables
-National identity: dummy equal to 1, if the respondent says ” I  am an American first 
and a member o f some ethnic group second" (US example). Source: WVS
-Minority: dummy equal to 0, if the ethnic group to which the individual belongs is 
the largest in the country; otherwise it is equal to  1. Each interviewer has been asked 
to  code the ethnic group of each individual in the sample. Source: WVS
-Age: age of the respondent. Source: WVS
-Female: dummy equal to 1 , if the respondent is female. Source: WVS
-Primary: dummy equal to 1, if the respondent has, at most, primary school education. 
Source: WVS
-Married: dummy equal to  1 , if respondent is married. Source: WVS
-Income: Proxy for individual income stream (not disposable). There are 10 income 
categories (net of transfers and taxes); they have been coded by deciles for each country, 
l=low est decile; 10=highest decile. Source: WVS
-Employer> 10: dummy equal to 1 , if the respondent is employer/manager of an estab­
lishment with 10 or more employees. Source: WVS
-Employer< 10: dummy equal to 1, if the respondent is employer/manager of an estab­
lishment with less thanlO employees. Source: WVS
-Professional: dummy equal to 1, if the respondent is a professional worker, lawyer, 
accountant, teacher, etc Source: WVS
-Supervisor: dummy equal to 1 , if the respondent is a supervisory, non-manual office 
worker Source: WVS
-Office: dummy equal to 1 , if the respondent is a non-supervisory, non-manual office 
worker. Source: WVS
-Foreman: dummy equal to 1, if the respondent is a foreman and supervisor Source: 
WVS
-Skilled: dummy equal to 1, if the respondent is a skilled manual worker Source: WVS
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-Semi-skilled: dummy equal to 1 , if the respondent is a semi-skilled manual worker 
Source: WVS
-Unskilled: dummy equal to 1, if the respondent is an unskilled manual worker Source: 
WVS
-Farmer: dummy equal to 1, if the respondent has his/her farm Source: WVS
-Armed forces: dummy equal to  1 , if the respondent is a member of armed forces. 
Source: W V S
-Never job: dummy equal to 1, if the respondent never had a job Source: WVS 
-Size: size of ethnic group to which the individual belongs. Source: Fearon’s dataset 
-Etfra: country index of ethnic fractionalization. Source: Fearon’s dataset 
-Etpol: country index of ethnic polarization. Source: Fearon’s dataset
2 .7 .2  C oun tries and  e th n ic  groups
2.7.2.1 Criteria of inclusion
We include in the sample only countries whose ethnic groups coded by the interviewers 
match the ones included by Fearon in his dataset (and whenever there is not a perfect 
match between WVS and Fearon’s source, we also include those countries whose ethnic 
groups as coded by the interviewers match the ones listed by the CIA in "The World 
Factbook", as in the case of South Africa and Zimbabwe20).
2.7.2.2 Countries selected
For each ethnic group we report the average values of the variable “national identity” .
U S (wave IV): white (.29); black (.18); Asian (.09); Hispanic (.23); other (.4)
U S (wave III): white (.33); black (.17); Asian (.35); other (.18)
U S ( wave II). white (.44), black (.23), .Asian (.41), Hispanic (.23), other (.49)
Canada (wave IV): english Canadian (.67); french Canadian (.15); black (.51); south 
Asian (.53); east Asian (.5); other (.54)
20Results do not change if we remove South Africa and Zimbabwe from the sample.
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S p a in  (wave IV): Castillano (.33); Catalan (.34); Basque (.16); Galician (.07); other 
(.32)
S p a in  (wave in): Castillano (.4); Catalan (.24); Basque (.19); Galician (.09); other 
(.25)
C h in a  (wave II): Han (.06); other (.58)
S o u th  A frica  (wave IV): black (.12); white (.21); coloured (.43); Indian (.37)
B raz il (wave III): white (.49); mulatto (.55); black (.37); other (.15)
B ie lo ru ss ia  (wave III): Bielorussian (.28); Russian (.5); Polish (.53); Ukranian (.75); 
other (.95)
L a tv ia  (wave III): Latvian (.27); Russian (.54); Byelorussian (.6 ); Ukrainian (.71); 
Polish (.6 8 )
U ru g u a y  (wavelV): white (.79); black (.81); south Asian (.6 8 ); other (.85)
A rm e n ia  (wave III): Armenian (.04); Russian (.33); Kurd (.2)
A z e rb a ija n  (wave III): Azerbaijanian (.03); Russian (.13); Tataria (.26); Lezgin (.14); 
other (.19)
M aced o n ia  (wave IV): Macedonian (.17); Albanian (.05); Turkish (.4); Serb (.6 ); other 
(.52)
A lb a n ia  (wave IV): Albanian (.01); Greek (.5); other (.33)
B o sn ia  (wavelV): Bosniak (.53); Serbs (.08); Croats (.4); other (.96)
In d o n e s ia  (wave IV): Javanese (.54); Malay (.54); Chinese (1); Sundanese (.4); Suma- 
tranese (.5)
Is ra e le  (wave IV): Jewish (.51); Arabic (0)
M oldova (wave III): Moldovian (.11); Russian (.34); Bulgarian (.3); Ucrainian (.67); 
Gaugas (.16)
P a k is ta n  (wave IV): Punjabi (.83); Pathan (.7); Baluchi (.54); Sindhi (.6 ); Urdu speak­
ing (.85)
S in g ap o re  (wave IV): Malay (.11); south Asian (.3); Chinese (.53); Arabic (.08)
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Z im babw e (wave IV): black (.07); white (.07); other (0) 
J o rd a n ia  (wave IV): Jordanian (.2); Palestinian (.07); other (.1) 
G eo rg ia  (wave III): Georgian (.17); other (.15)
2.8 Figures and Tables
ethnic polarization
Figure 2.1: National Identity and Ethnic Polarization
Note: The country level of National Identity is m easured as the fraction of individuals in each country who 
choose to identify with the nation rather then with the ethnic group.
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Figure 2.2: National Identity and Ethnic Fractionalization
Note: The country level of National Identity is m easured as the fraction of individuals in each country who 
choose to identify with the nation rather then with the ethnic group.
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Figure 2.4: M edian  V oter
Note: Figure 2.3 depicts both the (uniform) income distribution of the 
majority group (A) and of the minority group (B). The median voter 
belongs to group A and has a higher initial income stream  than the 
average
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Figure 2.5: In tensity  as a function  o f the size o f group A
Note: Figure 2.4 depicts the average level of national identity of each ethnic group a s  a function of its size. 
W e arbitrarily depict linear intensity function.
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Table 2.1: National identity by country______
National Identity National Identity
Albania (w. IV) 0.015
Armenia (w. Ill) 0.0444
Azerbaijan (w.lll) 0.0501
Bielorussia (w. Ill) 0.3459
Bosnia (w.lV) 0.3837
Brazil (w. Ill) 0.4599
Canada (w. IV) 0.5288
Cina (w. II) 0.0454
Georgia (w.lll) 0.1633
Indonesia (w. IV) 0.524
Israele (w.lV) 0.7835
Jordania (w.lV) 0.1427
Latvia (w. Ill) 0.4077
Macedonia (w. IV) 0.1655
Moldova (w. Ill) 0.1726
Pakistan (w. IV) 0.7835
Singapore (w. IV) 0.2929
South Africa (w. IV) 0.1828
Spain (w. IV) 0.3075
Spain (w. Ill) 0.3424
Uruguay (w.lV) 0.7906
US (w. IV) 0.3912
US (w. Ill) 0.3025
US (w. II) 0.2752
Zimbabwe (w. IV) 0.0703
Note: The country level of National Identity is measured as the fraction of individuals in each country who 
choose to identify with the nation rather then with the ethnic group.
Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics
Mean St. dev. obs
Age 42.41 40.76 37377
Female 0.5255 0.4993 37377
Married 0.5805 0.3934 37377
Income 4.34 2.34 37377
manager>10 0.0302 0.1713 35319
manager<10 0.0432 0.2033 35319
professional 0.1378 0.3447 35319
supervisor 0.0611 0.2395 35319
nonmanual 0.0957 0.2942 35319
foreman 0.0347 0.183 35319
skilled 0.1485 0.3536 35319
semiskilled 0.0811 0.273 35319
unskilled 0.09 0.2862 35319
farmer .0239 0.1529 35319
armed forces 0.0452 0.2079 35319
never worked 0.19 0.3923 35319
primary 0.2283 0.4197 34533
av. Group income 3.7825 1.5861 95
minority 0.2525 0.2502 37377
etfra 0.4667 0.1885 25
size 0.1825 0.2669 95
etpol 0.6446 0.2119 25
national identity 0.675 0.1671 37377
Table 2.3 Sources of national identification: individual characteristics
national identity
Age .0001 0.0004 .0001 0.0003
(0.95) (1.33) (0.96) (1.25)
Female -0.0005 0.0028 -0.0013 0.0018
(-0.06) (0.32) (-0.17) (0.88)
married 0.0133 0.0095 0.0085 0.0053
(1.54) (1.09) (0.96) (0.6)
income 0.0077** 0.0066* 0.0065** 0.0064**
(2.07) (1.86) (2.11) (2.08)
minority -0.0387 -0.0477 -0.0307 -0.0411
(-0.81) (-0.98) (-0.66) (-0.87)
primary(at most) -0.027** -0.0222
(-2.33) (-1.64)
man>10 0.0182 0.0046
(0.87) (0.19)
man<10 0.0456* 0.0366
(1.77) (1.41)
professional 0.074*** 0.0598***
(3.25) (2.83)
supervisor 0.0199 0.0083
(1.09) (0.43)
nonmanual .0119 0.0033
(0.7) (0.18)
foreman 0.05*** 0.0427**
(3.10) (2.26)
skilled 0.0075 0.0066
(0.5) (0.41)
semiskilled -0.0024 0.0003
(-0.2) (0.03)
unskilled 0.0043 0.0074
(0.23) (0.39)
farmer 0.0432** 0.0465**
(2.57) (2.72)
armforc 0.0522** 0.0442*
(2.33) (1.82)
neverworked 0.0058 0.0036
(0.34) (0.21)
country-time f.e. yes yes yes yes
observations 32644 30038 31000 28514
country-time obs 25 23 24 22
R squared 0.2152 0.2141 0.2289 0.2278
Note: The dependent variable is a Dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent 
identifies himself with the nation rather then his ethnic group. The variable primary is 
a Dummy equal to 1 if the respondent has a low level of education (with at most 
primary education). The variable minority is a Dummy equal to 1 if the individual 
belongs to a minority group. All specifications include country-time fixed effects, t- 
statistics are reported between parenthesis. Standard errors are clustered at the 
country-time level. * Significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
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Table 2.4 Sources of national identification: country characteristics (1)
National identity
income 0.0218*** 0.0173*** 0.0226*** 0 .0186*** 0.0213*** 0.0174*** 0.0226*** 0.0188***
(4.5) (3.33) (4.03) (3.12) (4.56) (3.72) (4.24) (3.44)
minority -0.0223 -0.0269 -0.0333 -0.0394 -.0105 -0.0164 -.0221 -0.00297
(-0.45) (-0.47) (-0.65) (-0.75) (-0.22) (-0.74) (-0.45) (-0.6)
etpol 0.3768** 1.9612*** 0.3011 1.9657*** 0.346* 1.9807*** 0.3028 1.9706***
(2.08) (3.72) (1.6) (3.61) (1.91) (3.57) (1.39) (3.51)
etpol squared -1.3971** -1.4151** -1.4409*** -1.4532***
(-2.81) (-2.8) (-2.79) (-2.83)
country*time F.E. no no no no no no no no
country*time obs 25 25 23 23 24 24 22 22
control standard standard + edu + edu +occup +occup all all
R squared 0.0412 0.0693 0.0343 0.0639 0.0477 0.0786 0.0427 0.0752
Note: The dependent variable is a Dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent identifies himself with the nation rather then his ethnic group. The specifications reported in 
Columns 1 and 2 control for individual income. The specifications reported in Columns 3 and 4 control for individual income and the level of education of the respondent. 
The specifications reported in Columns 5 and 6 control for individual income and the occupation of the respondent. The specifications reported in Columns 7 and 8 control 
for individual income, the level of education and the occupation of the respondent, t-statistics are reported between parenthesis. Standard errors are clustered at the country­
time level. *Significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
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Table 2.5 Sources of national identification: country characteristics (2)
National identity
income 0.0183*** 0.0191*** 0.0195*** 0.0206*** 0.0179*** 0.0192*** 0.0196*** 0.0211***
(3.37) (3.93) (2.94) (3.49) (3.33) (4.02) (3.11) (3.8)
minority -.0272 -0.036 -0.0373 -.0472 -0.0147 -0.0245 -0.0258 -0.0363
(-0.51) (-0.72) (-0.67) (-0.92) (-0.28) (-0.51) (-0.49) (-0.74)
etfra 0.3999 1.3939** 0.3521 1.3585** 0.3703 1.3129** 0.3189 1.2529*
(2.56) (2.6) (1.23) (2.17) (1.49) (2.43) (1.15) (1.94)
etfra squared -1.127** -1.1151* -1.0641* -1.0313*
(-2.15) (-1.94) (-2) (-1.75)
country*time F.E. no no no no no no no no
country*time obs 25 25 23 23 24 24 22 22
control standard standard + edu + edu +occup +occup all all
R squared 0.0385 0.0524 0.0316 0.0451 0.0465 0.0592 0.0418 0.0537
Note: The dependent variable is a Dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent identifies himself with the nation rather than his ethnic group. The specifications reported in 
Columns 1 and 2 control for individual income. The specifications reported in Columns 3 and 4 control for individual income and the level of education of the respondent. 
The specifications reported in Columns 5 and 6 control for individual income and the occupation of the respondent. The specifications reported in Columns 7 and 8 control 
for individual income, the level of education and the occupation of the respondent, t-statistics are reported between parenthesis. Standard errors are clustered at the country­
time level. ‘ Significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
58
Table 2.6 Sources of national identification: country characteristics (3)
National identity
income 0.0077** 0.0068* 0.0066* 0.0059* 0.0065** 0.0058* 0.0064** 0.0058*
(2.07) (1.93) (1.86) (1.72) (2.11) (1.99) (2.08) (1.99)
minority -0.0387 0.3539** -0.0477 0.2581** -0.0307 0.3348** -0.0411 0.2358*
(-0.81) (2.58) (-0.98) (2.11) (-0.66) (2.34) (-0.87) (2)
etpol*min -0.5647** -0.435** -0.479** -0.396*
(-2.51) (-2.08) (-2.48) (-1.94)
country*time F.E. yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
country*time obs 25 25 23 23 24 24 22 22
control standard standard + edu + edu +occup +occup all all
R squared 0.2152 0.2213 0.2141 0.2175 0.2289 0.2345 0.2278 0.2307
Note: The dependent variable is a Dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent identifies himself with the nation rather than his ethnic group. All the specifications include 
country time fixed effects.The specifications reported in Columns 1 and 2 control for individual income. The specifications reported in Columns 3 and 4 control for individual 
income and the level of education of the respondent. The specifications reported in Columns 5 and 6 control for individual income and the occupation of the respondent. The 
specifications reported in Columns 7 and 8 control for individual income, the level of education and the occupation of the respondent, t-statistics are reported between 
parenthesis. Standard errors are clustered at the country-time level. ‘ Significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
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Table 2.7 Sources of national identification: country characteristics (4)
National identity
income 0.0077** 0.0086** 0.0066* 0.0071* 0.0065** 0.0074** 0.0064** 0.0069**
(2.07) (2.31) (1.86) (1.98) (2.11) (2.41) (2.08) (2.23)
minority -0.0387 0.1662 -0.0477 0.0728 -0.0307 0.1724 -0.0411 0.0751
(-0.81) (0.98) (-0.98) (0.46) (-0.66) (1.08) (-0.87) (1.76)
etfra*min -0.386 -0.2235 -0.3813 -0.2147
(-1.14) (-0.71) (-1.18) (-0.72)
country*time F.E. yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
country*time obs 25 25 23 23 24 24 22 22
control standard standard + edu + edu +occup +occup all all
R squared 0.2152 0.2177 0.2141 2149 0.2289 0.2315 0.2278 2286
Note: The dependent variable is a Dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent identifies himself with the nation rather than his ethnic group. All the specifications include 
country time fixed effects.The specifications reported in Columns 1 and 2 control for individual income. The specifications reported in Columns 3 and 4 control for individual 
income and the level of education of the respondent. The specifications reported in Columns 5 and 6 control for individual income and the occupation of the respondent. The 
specifications reported in Columns 7 and 8 control for individual income, the level of education and the occupation of the respondent, t-statistics are reported between 
parenthesis. Standard errors are clustered at the country-time level. ‘ Significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
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Table 2.8: Sources of national identification: size of the group -only majority groups-
National identity
av.group inc. 0.054 0.0478 0.0666 0.0591
(1.26) (1.18) (1.43) (1.37)
size -0.7095** -0.6749** -0.6472** -0.6299* -0.6595** -0.6042* 0.5823* -0.5515*
(-2.52) (-2.26) (-2.13) (-2.01) (-2.38) (-1.99) (-1.91) (-1.72)
country*time F.E. no no no no no no no no
country*time obs 25 25 23 23 24 24 22 22
total obs. 23523 23523 21236 21236 22215 22215 20030 20030
control standard standard + edu + edu +occup +occup all all
R squared 0.0726 0.0839 0.0616 0.0707 0.0795 0.0961 0.0721 0.0853
Note: The dependent variable is a Dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent identifies himself with the nation rather than his ethnic group. The variable size maesures the 
size of the ethnic group which the repondent belongs to. The variable average group income measures the sample average of the income of the components of the ethnic 
group which the respondent belongs to. All the specifications include only respondents belonging to the largest ethnic group (the majority group) of the country where they 
reside. The specifications reported in Columns 1 and 2 control for individual income. The specifications reported in Columns 3 and 4 control for individual income and the 
level of education of the respondent. The specifications reported in Columns 5 and 6 control for individual income and the occupation of the respondent. The specifications 
reported in Columns 7 and 8 control for individual income, the level of education and the occupation of the respondent, t-statistics are reported between parenthesis. 
Standard errors are clustered at the country-time level. ‘ Significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
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Table 2.9 Sources of national identification: size of the group -only minorities- (1)
National identity
av.group inc. 0.0623** 0.0646** 0.0626** 0.065***
(2.68) (2.78) (2.76) (2.86)
size -0.6862*** -0.6204*** -0.68** -0.6046*** -0.6501*** -0.59389** -0.6408*** -0.5762***
(-4.19) (-4.17) (-4.06) (-4.09) (-3.54) (3.59) (-3.47) (-3.54)
country*time F.E. no no no no no no no no
country*time obs 25 25 23 23 24 24 22 22
total obs. 8968 8968 8649 8649 8641 8641 8340 8340
control standard standard + edu + edu +occup +occup all all
R squared 0.0576 0.0738 0.0617 0.0789 0.058 0.0735 0.0616 0.0783
Note: The dependent variable is a Dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent identifies himself with the nation rather than his ethnic group. The variable size maesures the 
size of the ethnic group which the repondent belongs to. The variable average group income measures the sample average of the income of the components of the ethnic 
group which the respondent belongs to. All the specifications include only respondents belonging to the minority groups. The specifications reported in Columns 1 and 2 
control for individual income. The specifications reported in Columns 3 and 4 control for individual income and the level of education of the respondent. The specifications 
reported in Columns 5 and 6 control for individual income and the occupation of the respondent. The specifications reported in Columns 7 and 8 control for individual income, 
the level of education and the occupation of the respondent, t-statistics are reported between parenthesis. Standard errors are clustered at the country-time level. ‘ Significant 
at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
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Table 2.10 Sources of national identification: size of the group -only minorities- (2)
National identity
av.group inc. 0.0426 0.0465 0.0421 0.0469
(0.96) (1.02) (0.92) (1.01)
size -0.792* -0.7611* -0.7924* -0.7599* -0.8125* -0.7806* -0.8107* -0.7761*
(-1.85) (-1.94) (-1.85) (-1.94) (-1.89) (-1.97) (-1.88) (-1.97)
country*time F.E. yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
country*time obs 25 25 23 23 24 24 22 22
total obs. 8968 8968 8649 8649 8641 8641 8340 8340
control standard standard + edu + edu +occup +occup all all
R squared 0.1724 0.174 0.1753 0.1773 0.174 0.1756 0.1762 0.1782
Note: The dependent variable is a Dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent identifies himself with the nation rather than his ethnic group. The variable size maesures the 
size of the ethnic group which the repondent belongs to. The variable average group income measures the sample average of the income of the components of the ethnic 
group which the respondent belongs to. All the specifications include only respondents belonging to the minority groups and country time fixed effects. The specifications 
reported in Columns 1 and 2 control for individual income. The specifications reported in Columns 3 and 4 control for individual income and the level of education of the 
respondent. The specifications reported in Columns 5 and 6 control for individual income and the occupation of the respondent. The specifications reported in Columns 7 
and 8 control for individual income, the level of education and the occupation of the respondent, t-statistics are reported between parenthesis. Standard errors are clustered 
at the country-time level. ‘ Significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
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Chapter 3
Identity Form ation and Language 
Policies: th e C atalan Case
(joint with Oriol Aspachs-Bracons and Irma Clots-Figueras)
3.1 Introduction
Several social scientists (Anderson 1983, Bates 1983, Horowitz 1985) have argued tha t 
the boundaries of ethnic groups are not exogenous and change over time. They are 
likely to be affected by social and economic conditions and be dependent on a number 
of economic and policy choices.
Thus, ethnic diversity can be influenced by precise political strategies aimed at promot­
ing national or ethnic identities among the population. In fact, in ethnically diverse 
countries, politicians and political scientists have focused on very different policies as 
mechanisms of minority integration and conflict reduction. Nation building policies (for 
example the implementation of a unique national language across the entire territory 
of a State) as well as multicultural policies th a t explicitly recognize cultural differences 
(regional autonomy, the devolution of powers, the use of multiple languages in schools 
and in other contexts) have often been proposed as sources of conflict management.
Limited research, however, has examined the extent to which identity can be shifted 
by cultural policies and regulation. As the UN report 2004 pointed out, language 
regulation does exert an influence on the social environment th a t encourages identity 
formation. Since the core individual identity is typically formed in the early stages of 
life, language in schools turns out to be particularly important.
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This chapter takes a step in this direction by analyzing the effect of a  particular ed­
ucational policy on the process of identity formation. In 1983, the Catalan education 
system became bilingual, and Catalan, together with Spanish, was taught in schools. 
Using survey data  from Catalonia and exploiting within and between cohort variation 
in the exposure to the Catalan language in schools, the results show th a t individuals 
who have experienced greater exposure to  teaching in Catalan are more likely to say 
th a t they feel more Catalan than Spanish. Interestingly, this effect appears to be posi­
tive also among individuals educated in Catalonia after the reform but whose parents 
do have not Catalan origins.
This reform can be interpreted as an example of a multicultural policy in Spain, where 
individuals living in Catalonia are the relevant minority and, at the same time, as an 
example of a nation building policy in Catalonia, where individuals living in Catalonia 
who were born elsewhere or whose parents do not have Catalan origins are the relevant 
minority. As a result, nation building policies and multicultural policies deliver very 
different outcomes in terms of the effects on individual sentiments: multicultural policies 
tend to  favour the development of regional identities, while nation building policies tend 
to promote the expansion of a common national feeling.
Our empirical argument relies on within and between cohort variation in exposure to 
Catalan language at school. Between cohorts, the 1983 educational reform affected 
younger cohorts more than the older generations. W ithin a given cohort, the exposure 
to Catalan varies according to the number of years they remain in education (some 
students leave school earlier than others).
A number of factors leads us to believe tha t the link between the linguistic reform and 
individual identity is causal. Firstly, a number of robustness checks allow us to rule out 
the existence of education specific cohorts’ trends for Catalan feelings. Secondly, we can 
exclude the idea tha t the reform changed the composition of the Catalan population, 
as comparisons between migration patterns in Catalonia and other Spanish regions 
show th a t Catalonia does not present anomalous patterns. Moreover, since individual 
years of schooling are typically an individual and parental choice, we may be concerned 
th a t they are affected by the reform. Both another identification strategy tha t relies 
on the number of years for which students were taught in Catalan within compulsory 
education and comparisons with the patterns of the education achievements in other 
Spanish regions suggest th a t this is not the case.
This chapter is related to a growing amount of economic literature on the identity for­
mation process. In an influential series of papers, Akerlof and Kranton (2000, 2002, 
2005) and Akerlof (2007) incorporated identity, a person’s sense of self, into an economic 
model of behaviour. They proposed a utility function tha t depends on the individual’s
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assigned social category, on the match between the prescriptions for th a t category and 
the individual’s given characteristics, and on his and others’ actions. They then pre­
sented several applications of their theory in the fields of the Economics of Education, 
the Economics of Organizations and Macroeconomics. Previous literature in economics 
discussed and studied the concept of identity (Sen (1985), Folbre (1994), Kevane (1994) 
and Landa (1994)), but never considered it as an argument in the utility function. Sev­
eral theoretical studies followed the work of Akerlof and Kranton, including tha t by 
Benabou and Tirole (2007) which endogenized identity payoffs and categorical pre­
scriptions. However, the number of empirical works which study both the determinants 
of individual identity and how identity affects individual behaviour remains limited.
Our work is also connected to  the literature on endogenous preferences. This literature 
(see Bowles 1998 for a review of this topic) studies how political and economic insti­
tutions shape preferences through their effects on social norms, cultural transmission 
or through other channels. If identity is part of the utility function, this study isolates 
a particular institutional arrangement (bilingual education) th a t is able to influence 
individual preferences.
The structure of the chapter is as follows: in Section 3.2 we provide a brief description 
of the reform and more generally of the institutional setting in Catalonia after 1983, 
then we discuss the data and the empirical strategy employed. Section 3.3 presents the 
basic empirical evidence and provides several robustness checks. Section 3.4 shows the 
results under a different identification strategy, while Section 3.5 discusses the role of 
individual origin. Section 3.6 provides the conclusion.
3.2 Background, data and empirical strategy
3.2 .1  B ackground
The Catalan language had developed by the 9th century from vulgar Latin on both 
sides of the eastern part of the Pyrenees. Its territorial expansion went hand in hand 
with the expansion of the Catalano-Aragonese Crown, which was established in the 
"Pafs Valencia,", the Balearic Islands, the south of France and the town of Alghero (in 
Sardinia, Italy) over many centuries.
These are the regions where Catalan is in use nowadays with over 9 million speakers, 
making it the most im portant regional language of the European Union. Catalonia is 
the region tha t hosts most of them, with over 6  million speakers. However, to  achieve 
this, the Catalan Government has had to protect the Catalan language, and sometimes
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even promote its usage, because it was banned during Franco’s dictatorship (1940-1975).
The democratization process tha t took place in Spain during the late seventies led 
to  the approval of a Constitution that, within a decentralized government structure, 
recognized the existence of a  set of autonomous communities and allowed them  to have 
their own regional parliaments. One of the most im portant laws approved by the new 
C atalan Government was the "General Directory of Linguistic Policy (1983)" which 
allowed the educational system (which, prior to  tha t date, was all in Spanish as an 
inheritance from Franco’s period) to become bilingual. The law states that:
Art. 2: "The Certificate of Basic Educational Attainm ent will not be achieved without 
proving the proficiency of the official languages of Catalonia (Catalan and Spanish)".
Art. 6: "The Catalan language, as it is the own language o f Catalonia, it is also the 
language used in the education system ".
Art. 7.3: "The language used in the education system will never separate the alumni 
due to linguistic differences".
Since the Catalan Education system employed Spanish for a long time period, the 
transition to a bilingual system was smooth. As stated in the "Order of Application 
of the General Directory of Linguistic Policy (1983)", for the first 4 years of primary 
education the presence of Catalan had to be smoothly increased, and in no case could 
it impede the normal learning process of students already enrolled. For the subsequent 
4 years of primary education, the presence of the Catalan language in the education 
system was initially introduced in social and natural science courses, and was increased 
in the following years. For secondary education, the Order again makes it clear that, 
in order to minimize its effect on the normal learning process, the increased presence 
of Catalan language in each school had to be done in accordance with the students’ 
prior knowledge of Catalan.
3 .2 .2  D a ta  and descrip tive  s ta tis tic s
The empirical analysis uses representative data  about the institutional attachm ent of 
the residents of Catalonia to the Spanish State tha t was published by the “Centro de 
Investigaciones Sociologicas” in 2002. This survey is performed relatively often, but 
the one done in 2 0 0 2  is of special interest, as individuals were asked not only about 
their identity, but also their own origin and tha t of their parents. This additional piece 
of information turns out to be im portant in analyzing the effects tha t a change in the 
school language has on the identity of individuals. The reason lies in the im portant
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inflows of immigrants from Spain tha t Catalonia experienced during the 60s and 70s, a 
fact th a t has to be taken into account, since identity is likely to be affected by origin.
To identify the individuals’ attachm ent to  Spain or Catalonia, we rely on the following 
question: "W ith which of the following sentences do you identify the most? (i) I feel 
only Spanish, (ii) I feel more Spanish than Catalan, (iii) I feel as Spanish as Catalan, 
(iv) I feel more Catalan than Spanish, and (v) I feel only Catalan". T hat is, the closer 
this number is to 5, the more Catalan and less Spanish you feel, and vice versa.
In Spain, primary education lasts for 8  years and starts at the age of 6 , while secondary 
education lasts for 4 years. Therefore, the cohorts th a t may have been treated are those 
born between 1966 and 1983, while the control cohorts are those born between 1948 
and 1965. The treated cohorts are those exposed, or potentially exposed to more years 
of teaching in Catalan, while the control cohorts are those who have not been exposed 
to it. Thus, an individual from the 1966 cohort who completed his/her secondary 
education received one year of treatm ent, while an individual from the same cohort, 
but with only primary education, had no treatm ent at all. Similarly, an individual 
from the 1970 cohort who completed his/her secondary education received 5 years of 
treatm ent, while an individual from the same cohort but with only primary education 
received only 1 year of treatment.
Figure 3.1 describes the relationship between cohorts, years of schooling and years 
of treatm ent. There are 4 major educational categories: (i) individuals who did not 
complete their primary education, who we assume received 4 years of schooling; (ii) 
individuals who completed only primary education and so received 8  years of education;
(iii) individuals who started but did not complete their secondary education or who 
received some professional training, who we assume received 1 0  years of education; and
(iv) individuals who completed secondary education or a higher level of professional 
training, who had 1 2  years of education . 1
Figure 3.2 plots the average time for which each cohort has been exposed to Catalan in 
schools. The average presence of Catalan in schools is obtained from the questionnaire, 
where individuals are asked to classify between 1 and 5 how much of their education was 
in Catalan and how much of it was in Spanish, 1 being only Spanish and 5 only Catalan. 
This graph makes it clear th a t there has been a huge increase over time in the use of 
Catalan in schools. However, the increase started slightly after the 1960s’, and hence, 
prior the 1966, the year tha t we define as the first cohort to be potentially treated. This 
may show (as the anecdotal evidence we collected confirms) tha t some schools started 
teaching some subjects in Catalan earlier than this, at their own discretion.
1 We do not consider university education since the law we study did not affect it.
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W hat makes the change in the linguistic policy of Catalan schools a unique case study 
is the following: although Spanish immigrants saw th a t the language of instruction 
had been changed to a foreign one, they reached levels of education in Catalan very 
similar to those received by natives, both in terms of the average number of years of 
education and the number of hours of education in Catalan (see Tables 3.1 and 3.2). 
The main reasons for this are tha t primary and secondary education were publicly 
provided, schooling was mandatory until the age of 14 for most cohorts, and the reform 
was uniformly implemented across the Catalan territory.
Our identification strategy relies on the variation in Catalan instruction across cohorts 
and years of education. An initial, simple analysis of the data  shows interesting patterns 
in the variation of the Catalan sentiments between the treated and the control cohorts, 
and within each cohort (high vs. low educated). If there is a link between language 
policy and peoples’ identity, the reform will boost the Catalan sentiment for those 
cohorts who were educated in Catalan. Figures 3.3 to 3.15 show th a t this is indeed 
the case. Figures 3.3 and 3.4 plot, respectively, the identity of high (with secondary 
education) and low (without secondary education) educated Catalans against year of 
birth. The vertical lines divide the control and treated cohorts. As seen from Figure 3.3, 
among the control cohorts, the younger and more educated cohorts are more likely to 
feel "as Catalan as Spanish" and less likely to feel "only Catalan": Catalan sentiments 
decrease with the year of birth. The reform, however, seems to have reversed this 
trend in Catalan sentiments. A similar process took place among respondents without 
secondary education. Figure 3.4 shows that, among the control cohorts, the younger 
ones tend to feel "only Spanish". The linguistic policy seems to have altered this 
tendency and this is, in part, absorbed by the increase in the fraction of low educated 
Catalans feeling "more Spanish than Catalan". Moreover, it is also possible to  notice 
th a t prior to the reform, younger cohorts are more likely to feel "as Catalan as Spanish" 
and less likely to feel "more Catalan than Spanish". After the reform these trends 
change their sign, preventing the widening of the gap between the two.
The linguistic law is also expected to be accompanied by an increase in the within 
cohort variation, augmenting the Catalan sentiments of those individuals who received 
higher levels of treatm ent, th a t is, the more educated. To check whether this is the case, 
Figure 3.5 plots, for each type of answer, the difference between the fractions of high 
and low educated people against year of birth. It is interesting to  describe the pattern  
of the effect of the education reform on the category of "only Catalan". While, prior 
to the reform, the difference was pretty stable around zero, with the reform, there is a 
clear change tha t leads the difference to increase significantly, as the gap between the 
treatm ent intensity widens. This is partly reduced when the low educated people begin 
to  be affected by the reform and the fraction of them feeling only Catalan increases.
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Figures 3.6 to  3.10 and 3.11 to 3.15 show between and within variation, respectively, in 
more detail.
Table 3.3 in the appendix provides the full set of descriptive statistics of the main 
variables used.
3 .2 .3  E m pirical stra teg y
Teaching in Catalan started at the beginning of the academic year 1983-1984. Cohorts 
who started their primary education in or after tha t academic year were completely 
affected, while cohorts who started their primary education prior to this, but were still 
in primary or secondary education after 1983-1984 were only partially affected by the 
reform. The students’ exposure to the Catalan language varies according to  the number 
of years they were in education after the reform.
Thus, exposure to the reform varies according to  year of birth  and the number of years 
of completed education for each individual. The effect of the Catalan law is identi­
fied using a difference-in-differences approach th a t exploits between cohort variation in 
Catalan instruction and within cohort variation in years of education. The identifica­
tion strategy used in this chapter is similar to tha t used in Angrist and Lavy (1997) 
and Angrist et al (2006).
The first econometric specification to be tested is:
V i j m  —  Oi -\~ f i f c L i j m  ' y j & m  4"  X i j - m f l  - | -  E i j m (3.1)
Where the dependent variable yijm indicates whether individual i, from cohort j and 
with m years of schooling answers: (1) I feel only Spanish, (2) I feel more Catalan than 
Spanish, (3) I feel as Spanish as Catalan, (4) I feel more Catalan than Spanish, (5) I 
feel only Catalan.
L i j m  is the length of exposure to teaching in Catalan, j j  is the cohort effect, S m  is a 
dummy for educational background and X ijm is a vector of the individual-level control 
variables, including gender, individual’s origin, parents’ origin and location dummies .2
The identification strategy relies on the fact tha t there is no other variable th a t affects 
how some cohort-years of education groups feel about the Catalan identity issue3. We
2 We exclude from the sample all the migrants who had received some education outside Catalonia.
3In another section of the paper we discuss the fact that years of education may not be exogenous 
to the reform.
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run this specification, first as a linear regression and then as an ordered logit, due to 
the ordinal nature of the dependent variable4. Robust standard errors are clustered at 
the cohort-years of education level, to control for the fact th a t observations in a given 
cohort-years of education group may be correlated.
3.3 R esults
3 .3 .1  D ifferen ce-in -D ifference E stim a tes
Table 3.4 reports estimates for equation 3.1. In Columns 1 and 2, we show estimates in 
which we only control for years of education and year of birth fixed effects, for the OLS 
and the ordered logit specifications, respectively. OLS estimates show a positive and 
significant coefficient, suggesting tha t an increase in exposure to the reform increases 
the probability tha t an individual feels more Catalan. The ordered logit results go in 
the same direction and are significant. In Columns 3 and 4, we add province dummies 
and controls for gender, family and individual origin. The coefficients are now slightly 
larger than before. Even if the coefficients for an OLS regression in which the depen­
dent variable is a discrete variable with values from 1 to 5 are difficult to  interpret, 
the results suggest tha t those who received Catalan-intensive instruction tend to  have 
significantly more intense Catalan feelings. The intensity of Catalan sentiment is, as 
predictable, correlated with individual origin and with the origin of the parents of the 
interviewee. We classified respondents into 4 categories: 1) individuals who were not 
born in Catalonia 2 ) individuals who were born in Catalonia but whose parents were 
not 3) individuals who were born in Catalonia but with only one parent born in Cat­
alonia and 4) individuals who were born in Catalonia whose parents were both born in 
Catalonia. We find tha t Catalan identity is strongest among respondents with Catalan 
origins and with parents with Catalan origins and, weakest among respondents who 
were not born in Catalonia.
In order to interpret the ordered logit coefficients, in Figure 3.16, we plot how the 
probability of each answer changes with the intensity of the reform, i.e. the number 
of years of Catalan instruction. This corresponds to the ordered logit regression in 
Column 4. This figure helps us understand the size of the effect of the exposure to 
Catalan instruction. On the one hand, while the probability th a t an individual with 
0 years of treatm ent says "I am only Catalan" is less than 0.1, the probability th a t a 
respondent with full treatm ent says "I am only Catalan" is slightly less than  0.5. On 
the other hand, the probability tha t an individual says " I am as Spanish as Catalan"
4 Results for ordered probit are very similar.
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appears to be strongly decreasing with years of treatm ent (from more than  0.5 with 
0 treatm ent to just more than 0.1 with 12 years of treatm ent). The probability of 
choosing "Only Spanish" and "more Spanish than Catalan" decreases slightly and the 
probability of choosing "More Catalan than Spanish" shows a small increase with the 
length of exposure to  the reform. Thus, the results suggest that, as a consequence of 
the reform, individuals are less likely to  answer tha t they feel "As Spanish as Catalan" 
and more likely to say tha t they feel "Only Catalan".
3 .3 .2  E ffect for each level o f  trea tm en t
The marginal effect of the treatm ent can be very different for each level of treatm ent. 
We wish to investigate how the effect increases with years of treatm ent. As a result, and 
similarly to Angrist et al. (2006), we decided to introduce a dummy for each possible 
level of treatm ent and run the following specification:
12
V i j m  =  Ck +  ^  ^ =  &) +  'Yj +  S m  +  +  E i j m  ( ^ '^ )
k= 1
W here /( )  is the indicator function. This specification is run both as an OLS and as 
an ordered logit model.
Columns 1 and 3 in Table 3.5 report ordinary least square estimates of Equation (3.2). 
In Column 1, only dummies for years of education and cohort are included. In Column 
3, individual controls and province dummies are added to the regressions. The results 
in both columns go in the same direction. Identity is affected by the reform; however, 
treatm ent effects do not increase monotonically with years of treatm ent, even though 
the effect seems to be stronger after 5 years of treatment. Ordered logit estimates for 
the same two specifications are provided in Columns 2 and 4.
Figure 3.17 confirms the patterns proposed in the previous section. In Figure 3.17, we 
plot how the effect the reform changes with the intensity of the reform, i.e. the number 
of years of Catalan instruction. This corresponds to the ordered logit regression in 
Column 4. The probability of answering "I am only Catalan" increases with the years 
of treatm ent, while the probability of answering " I am as Spanish as Catalan" appears 
to strongly decrease with years of treatm ent. The effect of the reform on the probability 
of choosing the other 3 categories (only Spanish/ more Spanish than C atalan / more 
Catalan than Spanish) does not seem to be very relevant, as the lines fluctuate around 
zero. The effect seems to be stronger during the first eight years of treatm ent than 
later on.
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3 .3 .3  C hannels
We now investigate whether language is one of the channels through which the reform 
affects individual identity. In order to check the validity of our hypothesis, we take 
advantage of several questions asked during the survey.
As already mentioned previously, individuals were asked to classify how much of their 
education was in Catalan and how much in Spanish. We then create an index from 
0 to 1, with 0 corresponding to education only in Spanish and 1 to education only in 
Catalan. In order to have a measure of the length of exposure of each respondent to 
Catalan teaching, we build a variable "Language exposure" tha t is the product between 
the index previously described and the years of education.
In the survey, there are also several questions th a t provide information about the use 
of the Catalan language in everyday life: 1 ) when the interviewee meets friends, 2) 
when he is at home, 3) when he goes shopping, 4) if he is asked for directions in the 
street, 5) when he answers the phone, 6 ) when he interacts with civil servants 7) or 
when he is with the colleagues at work. We then create an index of the "social use" of 
Catalan, tha t goes from 0 to 7, where 7 indicates tha t the interviewee uses the Catalan 
language in all of these circumstances. As a first step, in the first and second Columns 
of Table 3.6 we check whether the two indices are related to identity. As expected, 
there is a positive and strong relationship between the two: the greater the use of the 
Catalan language at school, the more intense the Catalan feelings and, a t the same 
time, the greater the use of Catalan in everyday life, the more intense are the Catalan 
feelings. As a second step, in Columns 7 and 8 , we run a 2SLS in which we regress 
the two indices on our measure of the intensity of the reform and then we regress our 
measure of identity on the predicted value obtained in the first stage. The coefficients 
are both positive and significant at the standard level, meaning th a t language was truly 
an im portant channel through which the reform affected individual feelings.
The fact tha t the 2SLS results are larger than the OLS ones indicates tha t, if there is 
an omitted variable th a t affects an individual identity and the self-reported measure 
of Catalan at school, this will be negatively correlated with identity and positively 
correlated with the self-reported measure of Catalan at school (or vice versa). A possible 
explanation for this is th a t people who say they feel more Catalan may be more likely to 
perceive the amount of education they received in Catalan as being less or insufficient, 
while people who feel more Spanish tend to perceive the amount of education they 
received in Catalan as excessive. There is no question in the survey th a t allows us to 
test this, but, since our self-reported measure of schooling in Catalan is based on recall, 
this remains a possibility.
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3 .3 .4  M igration  p attern s
Migration patterns in and out of Catalonia changed the composition of the Catalan 
population. As table 3.3 shows, the fraction of respondents whose parents were both 
born in Catalonia is larger among control cohorts than among treated cohorts. In 
general, the family characteristics of a respondent belonging to the control cohorts are 
different from the family characteristics of a respondent belonging to the treated (or 
potentially treated) cohorts. Altough in the main specification we control for the type 
of family of the respondents, migration patterns, affecting the composition of the cohort 
educational groups, might have biased our results. We might be capturing a change in 
Catalan society’s composition rather than the effect of the reform.
In order to control for this possible source of bias, we add a new set of controls in 
the regressions. As already mentioned, we classified respondents into 4 categories: 1 ) 
individuals who were not born in Catalonia 2 ) individuals who were born in Catalonia 
but whose parents were not 3) individuals who were born in Catalonia but with only one 
parent born in Catalonia and 4) individuals who were born in Catalonia whose parents 
were both born in Catalonia. We then calculate, within each cohort-educational group, 
the fraction of respondents belonging to each of the 4 categories. We adopt the following 
econometric specification
Vijm = & “1“ “t" Ifj “1“ Sm “1“ XijmfJi "1“ Sjm £ ijm (3.3)
W here the dependent variable yijm indicates, as usual, whether individual i, from cohort 
j and with m years of schooling answers (1) I feel only Spanish, (2) I feel more Catalan 
than Spanish, (3) I feel as Spanish as Catalan, (4) I feel more Catalan than Spanish, 
(5) I feel only Catalan. Sjm is a vector of 4 explanatory variables th a t control for 
the composition of each cohort educational group jm .  Each variable measures the size, 
within the cohort educational group j m , of one of the 4 family groups.
It turns out, as columns 1-2 of Table 3.7 show, tha t (3k, the coefficient of our variable 
of interest, is still positive and significant and the size of the coefficient is very similar 
to  the size of the coefficient in our baseline specification.
It could also be the case tha t the reform changed migration patterns into and out of 
Catalonia. Schooling in Catalan could have implied an additional cost of migration 
to Catalonia for Spanish speakers. Potential migrants with very intense Spanish senti­
ments could decide not to migrate to Catalonia and, vice-versa, the additional migration 
cost could have been lower for open minded migrants.
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Since we do not know the year in which the parents of the interviewee migrated, we 
cannot exclude from the sample individuals who are potentially affected by this problem 
(with parents who migrated as a consequence of the new law). We then decide to  check 
if our results hold only for individuals born in Catalonia. Since the youngest cohorts 
were born in 1983, we are then restricting the sample to  individuals whose parents 
were already in Catalonia when the reform was implemented, so the parents’ decision 
to  migrate to Catalonia is less likely to be affected by the linguistic reform. Columns 3 
and 4 of Table 3.7 show tha t the results are robust to  these further checks.
However, it may still be the case tha t parents somehow anticipated the reform tha t 
was taking place in 1983 and then took the migration decision before 1983. To avoid 
this anticipation problem, we restrict the sample even further and consider only cohorts 
born in Catalonia between 1953 and 1978. Columns 5 and 6  of Table 3.7 show th a t the 
results are robust to this check.
Table 3.7 should be sufficient to convince us th a t the results we find are not related to 
a change in the pattern  of migration inflows in Catalonia. However, it can still be the 
case th a t patterns of migration outflows are affected by the reform and, at the same 
time, lie at the root of the results we found in Tables 3.4 and 3.5. Unfortunately, the 
survey data  we have does not allow for any checks tha t would help us in this direction. 
Using data from INE, in Figure 3.18 we compare the patterns of migration in Catalonia 
over the last 40 years with the patterns of migration of another Spanish region th a t is 
comparable in terms of income, i.e. Madrid. We plot net migration flows as a fraction 
of to tal flow. It turns out there is no substantial difference, either before or after the 
reform.
3 .3 .5  R estr ic tin g  th e  sam ple
In our first specification, we were comparing individuals born in 1948 with those born 
in 1983. While this allows us to use the maximum data available, it may also introduce 
some noise. In order to  mitigate this, we perform the same regression but compare 
individuals aged 26 (cohort 1975) with those aged 45 (cohort 1956). As the cohorts we 
are comparing are more similar, the results should be more reliable. Table 3.8 shows 
tha t, when we restrict the sample and compare cohorts of similar ages, the results 
improve. This may be because we are comparing cohorts who are more similar to  each 
other and who have been affected by similar shocks. This allows us to  increase the 
precision of our estimates and to capture better the effects of the reform.
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3 .3 .6  E xogen ou s Trends
The estimates in Tables 3.4 and 3.5, which point to higher Catalan feelings among 
those who had been exposed to more intensive Catalan instruction, may be confounded 
by education-specific cohort trends in Catalan feelings. In particular, these trends 
may exist if different cohorts have been raised by parents with different values and 
preferences (the younger parents being more pro-Catalan), and if those parents with 
stronger Catalan preferences have invested more in their children’s education.
In order to check whether this is the case, and similarly to Angrist (2006), we propose 
the following two exercises. As a first step, we consider only cohorts who are not affected 
by the reform. These are cohorts born between 1930 and 1965. Then, among those 
cohorts, we assigned a pseudo-treatment to the younger cohorts (those born between 
1948 and 1965 whom we used as controls in the main specification). This pseudo­
treatm ent consists of the intensity of the reform received by individuals with the same 
number of years of education but born 18 years later. We run the specification proposed 
by Equation 3.1. We use both an ordinary least squares specification and an ordered 
logit one. The results are reported in Columns 1 and 2 of Table 3.9. The coefficient of 
the pseudo treatm ent variable is negative and not significant. This is reassuring, as it 
may indicate tha t our results are not spuriously capturing the effect of a  trend.
As a second check, we consider cohorts born between 1921 and 1980 and use the 
following specification5. To correct the difference-in-difference-type estimates for the 
education-cohort trends, we adopt a triple differences-type strategy. Triple difference 
estimates are based on the following equation,
Uijm =  QJ “t“ flLijm  “I" @lijm “b 'Yj ~b &m "1“ £ijm (3.4)
where Lijm is a term  tha t captures real exposure to teaching in Catalan, while lijm 
captures spurious effects.
Lijm are the years of real treatm ent for cohorts 1966-1980; while l{jm equals years of 
pseudo treatm ent for cohorts 1936-1950 (where now the pseudo-treatment consists of 
the intensity of the reform received by individuals with the same number of years of 
education but born 30 years later) and years of real treatm ent for cohorts 1966-1980. 
(3 are the triple difference estimates, i.e. the treatm ent effects from the real experiment 
minus the pseudo treatm ent effects estimated using cohorts 1921-1950. Columns 3 and 
4 report the results for this specification. Triple difference estimates are positive and
5 Due to lack of data about very old cohorts, we could not use a larger number of cohorts, such as, 
for example, from 1909 to 1983.
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significant, while the coefficient tha t would be capturing spurious trends is negative 
and not significant.
Finally we try  to establish whether or not Franco’s death (1975) affected the identity 
of younger and more educated cohorts. We perform the following exercise. We create a 
variable called "Franco Intensity" tha t measures the number of years for which individ­
uals attended school once Franco had died but before the educational system became 
bilingual. Then we run Specification 3.1 with our intensity measure and this additional 
variable. Results are shown in Columns 5 and 6  and show how our measure of intensity 
remains positive and significant, and tha t the coefficient is even slightly higher. The 
coefficient of the Franco intensity variable is, however, positive too and significant in 
the OLS specification. This suggests tha t the end of Franco’ s regime may have had an 
effect on the feelings of the younger and more educated cohorts, but it may also simply 
reveal th a t (as shown in Figure 3.2) some schools started teaching some subjects in 
Catalan earlier than 1983.
As a further test, we consider an other Spanish region: the Basque Country. In 1983 
the education system became bilingual in the Basque region too. However, whereas 
in Catalonia the reform was compulsory and homogenously spread across the Catalan 
population, in the Basque Country parents could choose the language used to  educate 
their children. The Basque and the Catalan languages are also very different: Basque 
is a non-Indo European language and it presents a completely different structure for 
native Spanish speakers. Moreover, the salience of the language issue is quite different 
in the two regions. While language is the main vehicle of identification within the 
Catalan group, this may not be the case within the Basque group. As a result, we are 
likely to  find tha t the reform in the Basque Country had no effect on the identity of 
residents (or at least lower than  in Catalonia). However, since the death of Franco is 
likely to  have affected residents of Catalonia and Basque Country in the same way and 
education-specific cohort trends are likely to follow similar patterns in both the regions, 
if our results were driven by such factors, the coefficient of the variable of interest 
should be positive and significant also using the Basque sample. We use representative 
survey data  on the institutional attachm ent of residents in the Basque Country to the 
Spanish State. This survey was also published by CIS in 2001 and is very similar to 
the survey conducted in Catalonia. The only difference is tha t the Basque survey was 
conducted one month before the Catalan one. When we apply the same empirical 
strategy to the Basque sample we find th a t the coefficient of the variable of interest 
(years of treatm ent) is not significantly different from zero (Columns 7-8). Thus, the 
comparison between Catalonia and Basque Country helps us to  exclude the possibility 
th a t the findings discussed in the previous sections are driven either by the existence 
of education-specific cohort trends or by the end of the Franco’s dictatorship.
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3.4 A n Alternative Identification Strategy
The identification strategy previously described relies both on between cohort variation 
(older cohorts have not been affected by the reform, while the younger ones have been) 
and on within cohort variation (individuals of the same age may have different levels 
of education and so may have been exposed to  different levels of treatm ent). However, 
the number of years of schooling is typically an individual choice (or a parental one) 
and may be affected by the introduction of the linguistic reform. One may imagine tha t 
individuals with very intense Spanish (and anti-Catalan) feelings, for example a migrant 
from another region of Spain, may have decided to drop out of school because of the 
new scheme and because they may feel less comfortable about receiving education in 
the Catalan language. Individuals who have more difficulties with the Catalan language 
may drop out of school earlier as a consequence of the reform, and these are the ones 
who are more likely to feel Spanish.
As an initial check to confirm whether or not this is the case, we add as a control into the 
regression a dummy variable tha t is equal to 1 if the individual spoke Catalan at home 
with his parents. An individual who normally speaks Catalan would have experienced 
less difficulties learning Catalan at school and was less likely to drop out of education 
after the reform. The results of this specification are shown in Columns 1 and 2 of 
Table 3.11 and are very similar to  those obtained previously. This is reassuring, as the 
language spoken at home could be the main source of endogeneity.
Secondly, we use a specification th a t relies mostly on between cohorts variation and we 
eliminate cohort-fixed effects. The econometric specification to be tested is now
Vi m = & "h Sm X i jTnf l  +  £ i m  (3*5)
where the dependent variable y^m indicates whether individual i with m years of school­
ing answers: (1) I feel only Spanish, (2) I feel more Catalan than  Spanish, (3) I feel 
as Spanish as Catalan, (4) I feel more Catalan than Spanish, (5) I feel only Catalan. 
L iiTn is the length of exposure to teaching in Catalan, 8m is a dummy for education 
background and X iyTn is a vector of individual-level control variables, including the in­
dividual’s gender, origin, parents’ origin and location dummies. There are no more 
cohort dummies, but we also include as controls the age and the squared age of the 
respondents.
The results of this specification are shown in Columns 3 and 4 of Table 3.11 and are 
similar to those obtained previously, although the coefficient is slightly smaller.
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As a third step, in order to avoid considering any within cohort variation, we instrument 
L^m  with a measure of exposure to the reform tha t is not the result of individual choice: 
the number of years of compulsory education for each individual. In this way we remove 
any within cohort variation. Each respondent belonging to the same cohort will be 
subject to the same amount of exposure to compulsory education. This should provide 
an exogenous measure of years of education, but it should also increase the measurement 
error and cause attenuation bias in the coefficient of our variable of interest.
The results are reported in Tables 3.10 and 3.11. As usual, we always use both the 
linear regression model and the ordered logit one. As predictable, the first stage of 
the IV analysis (Table 3.10) shows a strong correlation between the variable of interest 
and its instrument. Column 5 reports the second stage of the instrum ental variables 
strategy. Finally, Columns 6  and 7 report the results when we use the reduced form 
(this allows us to use an ordered logit model too). The results are consistent with the 
previous findings.
In addition, instead of using years of education as intra-cohort variation in years of 
treatm ent, we use variation in the timing of arrival as a determinant of more or less 
exposure to  the electoral reform6. In order to perform this exercise, we restrict the 
sample to individuals who were not born in Catalonia. These individuals arrived at 
different points in time and at different stages during their education. For each indi­
vidual we compute the number of years, within compulsory education, for which they 
have studied in Catalonia after 1983. This is now our intensity variable; we run the 
following specification:
U i j m  =  Oi -(- ( 3 L i j m  +  ' y j  + &m d- + S i j m (3.6)
W here the dependent variable yijm indicates whether individual i, from cohort j who 
arrived in Catalonia when he was m years old answers: (1) I feel only Spanish, (2) I feel 
more Catalan than Spanish, (3) I feel as Spanish as Catalan, (4) I feel more Catalan 
than Spanish, (5) I feel only Catalan.
Lijm is the length of exposure to teaching in Catalan. 7  ^ are the cohort dummies, Sm 
are age at arrival dummies and X ijm is a vector of individual-level control variables, 
including gender, origin and years of education dummies.
The results are shown in Column 8  of Table 3.11 and are very similar to those obtained 
when the within-cohort variation used was given by differences in the number of years
6 For this purpose, we include in the sample also migrants who received some education outside 
Catalonia and who were not included in any of the previous specifications.
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of education. Now we do not have enough observations to  run an ordered logit but the 
fact th a t the OLS results are very similar to those obtained previously is reassuring. 
This shows th a t our results are not driven by changes in years of education induced by 
the reform.
In any case, years of education are unlikely to  have changed endogenously as a con­
sequence of the reform. This is supported by the fact tha t schools provided facilities 
and extra time for students for whom Catalan was not their mother tongue. As a final 
check, we plot average years of education by cohort for Catalonia, the Madrid region 
(a region which have always been at the same level of development as Catalonia) and 
the rest of Spain. This is done using data  from the Spanish Census in 2001. The graph 
(Figure 3.19) shows tha t years of education for cohorts affected by the reform (those 
born after 1965) evolved quite similarly in Catalonia and in Madrid and did not decline 
for the Catalan cohorts affected by the reform. Years of education increased more for 
the other communities in Spain, as a result of a process of convergence.
3.5 H eterogeneous effects
The introduction of a Catalan-based schooling system (even if mitigated by the rule 
th a t a t least two subjects per year must be taught in Spanish) can also be interpreted as 
an example of a  nation building policy within the Catalan region. It is interesting then 
to  check whether the reform has had an impact on the feelings of minorities living in 
Catalonia. We define as part of a minority group all of the respondents of non-Catalan 
origin or with parents without Catalan origin (we also distinguish between individuals 
from families with a t least one parent born in Catalonia and those with neither parents 
born in Catalonia).
Columns 1-2 of Table 3.12 show th a t the reform had a positive and uniform impact on 
the whole population; the effect is positive not only on respondents of Catalan origin and 
whose parents were both born in Catalonia, but also on individuals born in Catalonia 
and from families with neither parents born in Catalonia or with only one parent of 
Catalan origin. Moreover, the coefficient of the interaction term  between the variable 
th a t captures the length of exposure to teaching in Catalan and a dummy variable 
different from zero if the respondent was born outside Catalonia is only marginally 
insignificant in Column 2 . 7 Overall, the results convey evidence tha t the new schooling 
system successfully increased the level of integration of minorities within Catalonia.
7 We also use other specifications: without cohort dummies, and with the instrumentation previously 
explained. All provide similar results.
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3.6 Summary and conclusions
Much has been said about the possibility tha t policies can affect individual identity, 
sentiments and preferences. However, to  date, little case study research has been con­
ducted on this m atter. This chapter presents evidence of the positive effect of the 
educational reform (by which the education system became bilingual, and Catalan - 
together with Spanish- was taught in schools) on Catalan feelings. This effect extends 
also to individuals whose parents have no Catalan origins.
The Catalan case allows us also to  compare multicultural policies and nation building 
policies. We interpret the reform as an example of multicultural policies within Spain 
and of nation building policies within Catalonia. We conclude tha t, while multicultural 
policies stimulate regional identities, nation building policies encourage the growth of 
a shared national sentiment.
Research of this sort together with the study of the effects of such reforms on the 
political and economic outcomes can be highly relevant in ethnically divided societies 
where policies (linguistic and not) can be seen as mechanisms of integration and conflict 
reduction.
3.7 A ppendix
3 .7 .1  D efin ition  o f  th e  variables
-Identity: ordered variable which assumes the following values: (1) if the respondent 
answered "I feel only Spanish" (2) if the respondent answered "I feel more Spanish 
than Catalan" (3) if the respondent answered "I feel as Spanish as Catalan" (4) if the 
respondent answered "I feel more Catalan than Spanish" and (5) if the respondent 
answered "I feel only Catalan". Source: CIS
- Years o f education: (i) if the respondent answered th a t he did not complete primary 
education, we assume tha t he received 4 years of schooling; (ii) if the respondent an­
swered th a t he completed only primary education, we assume tha t he received 8  years 
of education; (iii) if the respondent answered tha t he started but did not complete 
secondary education or th a t he received some professional training, we assume tha t 
he received 1 0  years of education; and (iv) if the respondent answered th a t he com­
pleted secondary education or a higher level of professional training, we assume tha t 
he received 1 2  years of education. Source: CIS
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-Catalan origin, Catalan family: dummy equal to  1 if the respondent answered tha t he 
was born in Catalonia and both his parents were born in Catalonia. Source: CIS
-Catalan origin, mixed family: dummy equal to 1 if the respondent answered th a t he 
was born in Catalonia and only one of his parents were born in Catalonia. Source: CIS
-Catalan origin, non Catalan family: dummy equal to  1 if the respondent answered tha t 
he was born in Catalonia and neither of his parents were born in Catalonia. Source: 
CIS
-non Catalan origin: dummy equal to 1 if the respondent answered th a t he was not 
born in Catalonia. Source: CIS
-Catalan at school: ordered variable which assumes the following values: (1 ) if the 
respondent answered tha t his education was only in Spanish (2) if the respondent 
answered tha t his education was more in Spanish than in Catalan (3) if the respondent 
answered tha t his education was half in Spanish half in Catalan (4) if the respondent 
answered tha t his education was more in Catalan than in Spanish (5) if the respondent 
answered th a t his education was only in Catalan. Source: CIS
-Language exposure: Using the variable "Catalan at school", we create an index tha t 
goes from 0 to 1, with 0 corresponding to education only in Spanish and 1 to education 
only in Catalan. "Language exposure" is the product between this index and years of 
education.
-Catalan social use: respondents were asked to provide information about the use of 
Catalan language 1) when they meet friends, 2 ) when they are a t home, 3) when they 
go shopping, 4) if they are asked for directions in the street, 5) when they answer the 
phone, 6 ) when they interact with civic servants 7) or when they are with colleagues 
a t work. We then create an index of the "social use" of Catalan, th a t goes from 0 
to  7, where 7 indicates tha t the interviewee uses the Catalan language in all of these 
circumstances.
-Language at home: dummy equal to 1 if the individual spoke Catalan at home with 
his parents
-Female: dummy equal to 1 if the respondent is female
3.8 Figures and Tables
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Treatment by Cohort and Education
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Figure 3.1: Treatm ent by Cohort and Education
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Figure 3.2: Catalan at School
Note: We plot the average time for which each cohort has been exposed to Catalan in schools. The 
average presence of Catalan in schools is obtained from the questionnaire, where individuals are 
asked to classify between 1 and 5 how much of their education was in Catalan and how much of it 
was in Spanish, 1 being only Spanish and 5 only Catalan.
Table 3.1: Average years of education by type of family
Total Sample (1948-83) Control Cohorts (1948-65) Treated Cohorts (1966-83)
Total Average 10.22 9.81 10.53
St. Dev. 1.90 1.94 1.82
Observations 1490.00 626.00 864.00
Catalan Origin Average 10.30 9.92 10.56
St. Dev. 1.87 1.89 1.81
Observations 1354.00 547.00 807.00
Cat. Origin with mixed Families Average 10.34 9.90 10.55
St. Dev. 1.81 1.86 1.76
Observations 246.00 79.00 167.00
Cat. Origin and No Cat. Family Average 10.04 9.62 10.23
St. Dev. 1.93 1.89 1.92
Observations 343.00 104.00 239.00
No Catalan Origin Average 9.50 9.09 10.07
St. Dev. 2.10 2.16 1.88
Observations 136.00 79.00 57.00
Note: W e classified respondents into 4 categories: 1) individuals who were not born in Catalonia 2) individuals who 
were bom in Catalonia but whose parents were not 3) individuals who were bom in Catalonia but with only one parent 
bom in Catalonia and 4) individuals who were bom in Catalonia whose parents were both bom in Catalonia.
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Table 3.2: Catalan at school by type of family
Total Sample (1948-83) Control Cohorts (1948-65) Treated Cohorts (1966-83)
Total Average 2.72 1.28 2.99
St. Dev. 1.45 0.79 1.40
Observations 1502.00 633.00 869.00
Catalan Origin Average 2.34 1.30 3.04
St. Dev. 1.46 0.83 1.38
Observations 1364.00 552.00 812.00
Cat. Origin with mixed Families Average 2.51 1.20 3.12
St. Dev. 1.49 0.72 1.37
Observations 249.00 79.00 170.00
Cat. Origin and No Cat. Family Average 2.18 1.29 2.58
St. Dev. 1.28 0.75 1.28
Observations 346.00 106.00 240.00
No Catalan Origin Average 1.62 1.16 2.28
St. Dev. 1.18 0.51 1.52
Observations 138.00 81.00 57.00
Table (2)
Note: W e classified respondents into 4 categories: 1) individuals who were not bom in Catalonia 2) individuals who were 
born in Catalonia but whose parents were not 3) individuals who were born in Catalonia but with only one parent bom in 
Catalonia and 4) individuals who were born in Catalonia whose parents were both bom in Catalonia. The variable Catalan 
at school is obtained from the questionnaire, where individuals are asked to classify between 1 and 5 how much of their 
education was in Catalan and how much of it was in Spanish, 1 being only Spanish and 5 only Catalan.
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Table 3.3: Descriptive Statistics
_________________total sample________with sec, edu______ without sec, edu
1948-83 1948-65 1966-83 1948-83 1948-65 1966-83 1948-83 1948-65 1966-83
Identity Average 
St. Dev. 
Observatio
3.51
1.04
1467
3.56
1.03
618
3.47
1.05
849
3.7
0.91
732
3.73
0.9
250
3.69
0.92
482
3.29
1 .1 2
735
3.42
1.1
368
3.16
1.13
367
Years of Education Average 
St. Dev. 
Observatio
10.33
1 .8 8
1490
9.92
1.97
626
10.61
1.77
864
1 2
0
749
1 2
0
255
1 2
0
494
8.45
0.97
741
8.29
0.96
371
8.61
0.95
370
Cat. Origin, Cat. Family Average 
St. Dev. 
Observatio
0.43
0.49
1490
0.48
0.50
626
0.40
0.49
864
0.49
0.5
749
0.56
0.49
255
0.45
0.49
494
0.37
0.48
741
0.42
0.49
371
0.32
0.46
370
Cat. Origin, mixed Family Average 
St. Dev. 
Observatio
0.17
0.37
1490
0.14
0.35
626
0.19
0.39
864
0.17
0.38
749
0.14
0.35
255
0.19
0.39
494
0.16
0.37
741
0.14
0.35
371
0.18
0.39
370
Cat. Origin, no Cat. Family Average 
St. Dev. 
Observatio
0.28
0.44
1490
0 .2 0
0.40
626
0.33
0.47
864
0.24
0.42
749
0.15
0.36
255
0.28
0.45
494
0.32
0.46
741
0.23
0.42
371
0.39
0.49
370
No Catalan Origin Average 
St. Dev. 
Observatio
0 .1 1
0.31
1490
0.16
0.37
626
0.07
0.26
864
0.08
0.28
749
0.13
0.33
255
0.06
0.24
494
0.13
0.34
741
0.19
0.39
371
0.08
0.28
370
Catalan at school Average 
St. Dev. 
Observatio
2.15
1.35
1487
1.23
0.71
625
2.78
1.33
862
2.44
1.39
747
1.34
0.85
255
3.01
1.27
492
1.82
1.23
740
1.15
0.57
370
2.46
1.35
370
Language exposure Average 
St. Dev. 
Observatio
3.13
3.78
1487
0.63
1.98
625
4.86
3.77
862
4.33
4.18
747
1.03
2.55
255
6.04
3.81
492
1.79
2.72
740
0.32
1.28
370
3.17
2.98
370
Catalan Social use Average 
St. Dev. 
Observatio
4.12
2.70
1340
4.45
2 .6 8
534
3.91
2.72
806
4.81
2.34
702
5.13
2 .2 2
230
4.66
2.39
472
3.3
2 .8 6
638
3.87
2.82
304
2.81
2 .8
334
Language at home Average 
St. Dev. 
Observatio
0.44
0.49
1480
0.49
0.50
622
0.40
0.49
858
0.5
0.5
743
0.56
0.49
252
0.47
0.49
491
0.37
0.48
737
0.44
0.49
370
0.29
0.45
367
Intensity of treatment Average 
St. Dev. 
Observatio
4.02
4.63
1490
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
626
6.78
4.18
864
5.37
4.99
749
0
0
255
8 .1 2
3.91
494
2.49
3.63
741
0
0
371
4.83
3.78
370
Intensity of (comp.) treat. Average 
St. Dev. 
Observatio
2 .6 8
3.51
1490
0 .0 0
0 .0 0
626
4.52
3.53 
864
3.02
3.53
749
0
0
255
4.57
3.43
494
2.29
3.45
741
0
0
371
4.45
3.67
370
Female Average 
St. Dev. 
Observatio
0.49
0.50
1490
0.49
0.50
626
0.49
0.50
864
0.49
0.5
749
0.43
0.49
255
0.51
0.5
494
0.49
0.5
741
0.53
0.49
371
0.45
0.49
370
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Figure 3.3: Identity of Catalans with Secondary Education by year of birth
Only Catalan More Cat. than  Sp. as  Cat. a s  Sp. More Sp. th an  Cat. Only Spanish
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Note: When they are asked to define their identity, respondents can choose among 5 categories: (1) I feel only 
Spanish, (2) I feel more Spanish than Catalan, (3) I feel as Spanish as  Catalan, (4) I feel more Catalan than Spanish, 
(5) I feel only Catalan. The graph plots the fraction of respondents with secondary education who choose each of the 
5 categories against year of birth. All series are (5,1,5) moving averages.
Figure 3.4: Identity of Catalans without Secondary Education by year of birth
“ ♦ -O n ly  C atalan More Cat. th an  Sp. As Cat. a s  Sp. More Sp. th an  Cat. Only Spanish
0.45 -I
0.35 (
0.25 ]
0.2 i
0.15 1
0.05 j
1953 1955 1957 1959 1961 1963 1965 1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977
Note: When they are asked to define their identity, respondents can choose among 5 categories: (1)1 feel only 
Spanish, (2) I feel more Spanish than Catalan, (3) I feel as Spanish as  Catalan, (4) I feel more Catalan than 
Spanish, (5) I feel only Catalan. The graph plots the fraction of respondents without secondary education who 
choose each of the 5 categories against year of birth. All series are (5,1,5) moving averages.
Figure 3.5: The effect of Education on the Identity
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All s e r ie s  a re  (5 ,1 ,5 ) m oving a v e ra g e s .
Note: When they are asked to define their identity, respondents can choose among 5 categories: (1) I feel only 
Spanish, (2) I feel more Spanish than Catalan, (3) I feel as Spanish as Catalan, (4) I feel more Catalan than Spanish, 
(5) I feel only Catalan. The graph plots, for each of the 5 categories, the difference between the fraction of 
respondents with secondary education who choose category X and the fraction of respondents without secondary 
education who choose category X against year of birth. All series are (5,1,5) moving averages.
Figure 3 .6 : F raction of re sp o n d n e ts  w ho feel only C atalan  by co h o rt and level of Education
C ata lan s  w ith S eco n d a ry  E ducatin C a ta lan s  w ithou t S eco n d a ry  E ducation
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Note: The graph plots the fraction of respondents with and without secondary education who choose I  feel only Catalan
against year of birth. All series are (5,1,5) moving averages.
Figure 3.7: Fraction of resp on d ents w h o fee l m ore Catalan than Spanish by 
cohort and level o f Education
C atlan s  with S eco n d ary  E ducation -■ - C a ta la n s  w ithou t S eco n d a ry  Education
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Note: The graph plots the fraction of respondents with and without secondary education who choose 11 feel more Catalan
than Spanish against year of birth. All series are (5,1,5) moving averages.
Figure 3.8: Fraction o f respondents w ho feel as Catalan as Spanish by cohort and 
level o f Education
C ata lan s  w ithou t S eco n d a ry  E ducation0.45 C ata lan s  with S eco n d a ry  E ducation
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0.25
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1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 196S 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978
Note: The graph plots the fraction of respondents with and without secondary education who choose I feel as Spanish as
Catalan against year of birth. All series are (5,1,5) moving averages.
Figure 3.9: Fraction of respondents who feel more Spanidh than Catalan by cohort and 
level of Education
C ata lan s  with S eco n d ary  E ducation - • - C a ta l a n s  w ithou t S eco n d a ry  Education
1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978
Note: The graph plots the fraction of respondents with and without secondary education who choose I feel more Spanish
than Catalan against year of birth. All series are (5,1,5) moving averages.
Figure 3 .10: Fraction o f resp on den ts w h o fee l only Spanidh by cohort and level o f
rH im tinn
- C ata lan s  with S eco n d a ry  E ducation -C a ta la n s  w ithou t S eco n d a ry  E ducation
1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978
Note: The graph plots the fraction of respondents with and without secondary education who choose I feel only Spanish
against year of birth. All series are (5,1,5) moving averages.
Figure 3.11: The effect of Education on feeling only Catalan by y e a r  of birth
Note: The graph plots the difference between the fraction of respondents with secondary education who choose I feel only 
Catalan and the fraction of respondents without secondary education who choose I feel only Catalan against year of birth. All 
series are (5.1.5) moving averages.
F ig u re  3 .1 2 :  T h e  e f f e c t  o f  E d u c a tio n  o n  f e e lin g  m o re  C a ta la n  th a n  S p a n is h  b y  y e a r  o f  b ir th
Note: The graph plots the difference between the fraction of respondents with secondary education who choose I feel more 
Catalan than Spanish and the fraction of respondents without secondary education who choose I feel more Catalan than Spanish 
against year of birth. All series are (5,1,5) moving averages.
Fig u re  3 .1 3 : T he e ffe c t o f E du ca tio n  o n  fe e lin g  a s  C a ta lan  a s  5 p a n la h  by  y e a r  o f  b ir th
Note: The graph plots the difference between the fraction of respondents with secondary education who choose I feel as Spanish 
as Catalan and the fraction of respondents without secondary education who choose I feel as Spanish as Catalan against year of 
birth. All series are (5,1,5) moving averages.
Figure 3 .14 : The a ffec t of Education on fee ling m ore  Span ish  th a n  C ata lan  by y e a r  of birth
Note: The graph plots the difference between the fraction of respondents with secondary education who choose I feel more Spanish 
than Catalan and the fraction of respondents without secondary education who choose feel more Spanish than Catalan against year of 
birth. All series are (5,1,5) moving averages.
F ig u re  3 . I S :  T h e  e f f e c t  o f  E d u c a t io n  o n  f e e l in g  o n ly  S p a n is h  b y  y e a r  o f  b i r th
Note: The graph plots the difference between the fraction of respondents with secondary education who choose I feel only Spanish 
than Catalan and the fraction of respondents without secondary education who choose I feel only Spanish against year of birth. All series 
are (5,1,5) moving averages.
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Table 3.4: Reform and Identity
Dependent variable: Identity
OLS
[1]
Ord. Logit 
[2]
OLS
[3]
Ord. Logit 
[4]
intensity .067** .147*** .082*** .183***
(.029) (.055) (.026) (.058)
non Catalan origin -1.335*** -3.038***
(-1) (.247)
mixed family -.493*** -1.074***
(.073) (.16)
non Catalan family -.958*** -2.187***
(.072) (.163)
YEARS OF EDUCATION YES YES YES YES
YEARS OF BIRTH YES YES YES YES
PROVINCES NO NO YES YES
No. obs.
Rsq
Pseudo-Rsq
1467
.088
1467
.032
1467
.324
1467
.149
Note: The specifications reported in Columns 1 and 2 include years of education and 
year of birth fixed effects. The specifications reported in Columns 3 and 4 include 
years of education, province fixed effects, year of birth fixed effects and dummy 
variables that control for gender, the origin of the respondent and of the parents of 
the respondents. W e classified respondents into 4 categories: 1) individuals who 
were not bom in Catalonia 2) individuals who were bom in Catalonia but whose 
parents were not 3) individuals who were born in Catalonia but with only one parent 
born in Catalonia and 4) individuals who were born in Catalonia whose parents were 
both born in Catalonia (omitted category). Robust standard errors are reported 
between parenthesis and are clustered at the cohort-years of education level. * 
Significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
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Figure 3.16: C hange in p robabilities (specification  3.1)
Note: we plot how the probability of each answer changes with the intensity of the reform, i.e. the number of years of Catalan instruction. This 
corresponds to the ordered logit regression in Column 4 of Table 3.4.
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Table 3.5: Effects for each level of treatment
Dependent variable: Identity
OLS
[1]
Ord. Logit 
[2]
OLS
[3]
Ord. Logit 
[4]
1 YEA R  OF TREATM ENT -.185 -.343 -.117 -.445
(.158) (.326) (.127) (.313)
2 YEA R S OF TREATM ENT .039 .118 .318* .751*
(.185) (.354) (.178) (.422)
3 YEA R S OF TREATM ENT .665*** 1.29*** 548*** 1.147***
(.162) (.329) (.124) (.303)
4 YEARS O F TREATM ENT -0.91 .062 .285 .721*
(.21) (.373) (.177) (.398)
5 YEARS OF TREATM ENT 1.033*** 1.981*** .785*** 1.6***
(.211) (.434) (.163) (.407)
6 YEA R S O F TREATM ENT .383 .904** .594*** 1.479***
(.245) (.443) (.227) (.508)
7 YEARS O F TREATM ENT .992*** 2.013*** .934*** 1.967***
(.226) (.447) (.194) (.471)
8 YEARS OF TREATM ENT .562** 1.264** .837*** 1.977***
(.28) (.505) (.264) (.588)
9 YEARS OF TREATM ENT .764*** 1.561*** .577** 1.185**
(.274) (.538) (.233) (.557)
10 YEARS OF TREATM ENT .464 1.189** .823*** 2.011***
(.329) (-6) (.303) (.679)
11 YEARS OF TREATM ENT .77** 1.57** .772*** 1.575**
(.317) (.624) (.262) (.63)
12 YEARS OF TREATM ENT .695** 1.585** 1.096*** 2.485***
(.35) (.637) (.321) (.719)
INDIVIDUAL CONTROLS NO NO YES YES
YEARS OF EDUCATION YES YES YES YES
YEARS OF BIRTH YES YES YES YES
PRO VINCES NO NO YES YES
No. obs.
Rsq
Pseudo Rsq
1467
.1
1467
.036
1467
.33
1467
.152
Note: The specifications reported in Columns 1 and 2 include years of education and 
year of birth fixed effects. The specifications reported in Columns 3 and 4 include years 
of education, province fixed effects, year of birth fixed effects and dummy variables that 
control for gender, the origin of the respondent and of the parents of the respondents. 
Robust standard errors are reported between parenthesis and are clustered at the cohort 
years of education level. * Significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
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Effect of the reform on different answers
Only Spanish More Spanish As Spanish as Catalan More Catalan Only Catalan
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Intensity 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Figure 3.17: Effect for each level of treatment (specification 3.2)
Note: we plot how the effect the reform changes with the intensity of the reform, i.e. the number of years of Catalan instruction. This corresponds to the 
ordered logit regression in Column 4 of Table 3.5.
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Table 3.6: Channels
Dependent variable: Identity
Language expose of Catalan 
OLS Ord. Logit OLS Ord. Logit First stage First Stage 2SLS 2SLS  
PI PI t3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Language exposure 
use of Catalan
0.032***
(.01)
0.075***
(.024)
.193***
(.013)
.515***
(.04)
.113***
(.262)
.508**'
(.161)
Intensity .695***
(.08)
.179**
(.08)
INDIVIDUAL CONTROLS YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
YEARS OF EDUCATION YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
YEARS OF BIRTH YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
PROVINCES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
No. obs. 1464 1464 1321 1321 1464 1321 1464 1321
Rsq 0.329 0.457 0.524 0.519 0.287
Pseudo Rsq 0.152 0.232 0.138
Note: Individuals were asked to classify from 1 to 5 how much of their education was in Catalan and how much in Spanish; we then 
create an index from 0 to 1, with 0 corresponding to education only in Spanish and 1 to education only in Catalan. "Language exposure” 
is the product between this index and the years of education. W e consider questions about the use of the Catalan language in everyday 
life: 1) when the interviewee meets friends, 2) when he is at home, 3) when he goes shopping, 4) if he is asked for directions in the 
street, 5) when he answers the phone, 6) when he interacts with civil servants 7) or when he is with the colleagues at work. Use of 
Catalan is an index that goes from 0 to 7, where 7 indicates that the interviewee uses the Catalan language in all of these circumstances. 
All the specifications include years of education, province fixed effects, year of birth fixed effects and dummy variables that control for 
gender, the origin of the respondent and of the parents of the respondents. Robust standard errors are reported between parenthesis 
and are clustered at the cohort-years of education level. * Significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%
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Table 3.7: Other robustness checks (1)
Dependent variable: Identity___________
O LS Ord. Logit OLS Ord. Logit OLS Ord. Logit 
[1] P ] [3] [4]_________[5]_________[6]____
intensity .08*** 0 .176*** .069** 0 .164*** .07** 0 .18***
(.028) (.062) (.027) (.063) (.033) (.079)
SAM PLE 1948-1983  1948-1983 1948-1983 1948-1983 1953-1978 1953-197
all all catorigin catorigin catorigin catorigin
IN D IV ID U A L C O N TR O LS YES Y ES YES YES YES Y ES
YEA R S O F E D U C A TIO N YES Y ES YES YES YES YES
Y EA R S  O F BIRTH YES Y ES YES YES YES YES
P R O V IN C E S YES Y ES YES YES YES YES
No. obs. 1467 1467 1333 1333 994 994
Rsq 0.326 0 .288 0.287
Pseudo Rsq 0.149 0.135 0 .138
Note: All the specifications include years of education, province fixed effects, year of birth fixed effects and 
dummy variables that control for gender, the origin of the respondent and of the parents of the respondents. 
In the specifications reported in Columns 1 and 2 we include also the fraction of respondents, within each 
cohort-educational group, belonging to each of the 4 origin categories. In the specifications reported in 
Columns 3 and 4, the sample considered consists only of respondents born in Catalonia and in the 
specifications reported in Columns 5 and 6 is further restricted to individuals bom between 1953 and 1978. 
Robust standard errors are reported between parenthesis and are clustered at the cohort-years of education 
level. * Significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
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Table 3.8: Other robustness checks (2)
OLS Ord. Logit OLS Ord. Logit
intensity 0.108*** 0.249*** 0.115*** 0.289***
(.027) (.064) (.031) (.072)
SAMPLE 1951-1980 1951-1980 1956-1975 1956-1975
INDIVIDUAL CONTROLS YES YES YES YES
YEARS OF EDUCATION YES YES YES YES
YEARS OF BIRTH YES YES YES YES
PROVINCES YES YES YES YES
No. obs. 1245 1245 853 853
Rsq 0.318 0.354
Pseudo Rsq 0.149 0.166
Note: All the specifications include years of education, province fixed effects, year of 
birth fixed effects and dummy variables that control for gender, the origin of the 
respondent and of the parents of the respondents. In the specifications reported in 
Columns 1 and 2 we consider only individuals born between 1951 and 1980; in the 
specifications reported in Columns 3 and 4 we consider only individuals bom 
between 1956 and 1975. Robust standard errors are reported between parenthesis 
and are clustered at the cohort-years of education level. * Significant at 10%, ** 
significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
97
Net m iara tion  flow s o v er to tal flow s
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Figure 3.18: M igration
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Table 9: Controlling for exogenous trends
Dependent variable: Identity
OLS Ord. Logit OLS Ord. Logit OLS Ord. Logit OLS Ord. Logit
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
intensity .115*** .232** .118*** .236*** .004 .021
(.037) (.93) (.033) (.076) (.025) (.054)
pseudo-intensity -.015 -.07 -.022 -.024
(.032) (.075) (.036) (.094)
Franco intensity .083** .122
(.04) (•1)
INDIVIDUAL CONTROLS YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
YEARS OF EDUCATION YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
YEARS OF BIRTH YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
PROVINCES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
1930-1965 1930-1965 1921-1980 1921-1980
No. obs. 1008 1008 1860 1860 1467 1467 1260 1260
Rsq .291 .295 .326 .231
Pseudo Rsq .131 .135 .149 .106
Note: In the specifications reported in Columns 1 and 2 we consider only cohorts who are not affected by the reform (1930-1965) and we assign 
a pseudo-treatment to the younger cohorts (1948 -1965). In the specifications reported in Columns 3 and 4 we consider cohorts bom between 
1921 and 1980 and the variable pseudo-intensity equals years of pseudo treatment for cohorts 1936-1950 and years of real treatment for cohorts 
1966-1980. In the specifications reported in Columns 5 and 6 we include the variable Franco intensity that measures the number of years for 
which individuals attended school once Franco had died but before the educational system became bilingual. All the specifications include years 
of education, province fixed effects, year of birth fixed effects and dummy variables that control for gender, the origin of the respondent and of the 
parents of the respondents. In Columns 7 and 8, we use the standard identification strategy, but a different dataset: we use use representative 
survey data on the institutional attachment of residents in the Basque Country to the Spanish State. Robust standard errors are reported between 
parenthesis and are clustered at the cohort-years of education level. * Significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%
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Table 3.10: First stage
Dependent variable: Intensity
OLS
[1]
Intensity compulsory 1.058***
(.028)
non Catalan origin .084
(.116)
Catalan origin mixed family -.108
(.089)
Catalan origin non Catalan family -.122
(.086)
YEARS OF EDUCATION YES
YEARS OF BIRTH NO
PROVINCES YES
AGE and AGE SQUARED YES
No. obs. 
Rsq
1467
.951
Note: The dependent variable is the number of years of education 
under the reform. The specification includes the number of years 
of compulsory education under the reform, years of education 
fixed effects, province fixed effects, the age and the age squared 
of the respondent and dummy variables that control for gender, 
the origin of the respondent and of the parents of the respondents. 
Robust standard errors are reported between parenthesis and are 
clustered at the cohort-years of education level. * Significant at 
10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%
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Table 3.11: Controlling for endogenity of years of education
Dependent variable: Identity
OLS Ord. Logit OLS Ord. Logit IV OLS Ord. Logit OLS
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
intensity .066** .158*** .055*** .107** .054**
(.026) (.059) (.020) (.044) (.023)
intensity compulsory .056** .105**
-0.025 (.049)
language at home .688*** 1.669***
(.096) (.235)
intensity (people arriving) .069**
(.038)
AGE AT ARRIVAL NO NO NO NO NO NO NO YES
INDIVIDUAL CONTROLS YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
YEARS OF EDUCATION YES YES YES YES OLS YES YES YES
YEARS OF BIRTH YES YES NO NO NO NO NO YES
PROVINCES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
AGE and AGE SQUARED NO NO YES YES YES YES YES NO
No. obs. 1467 1467 1467 1467 1467 1467 1467 361
Rsq .361 .299 .299 .296 .523
Pseudo Rsq .171 .136 .135
Note: The specifications reported in Columns 1 and 2 include cohort fixed effects. The specifications reported in Columns 3 and 4 include 
the age and the age squared of the respondents. The specification reported in Columns 5 includes the age and the age squared of the 
respondents and the variable intensity is instrumented by the variable intensity compulsory (the first stage is in Table 3.10). The 
specifications reported in Columns 6 and 7 include the age and the age squared of the respondents. The specification reported in Column 8 
includes cohort fixed effects and, as a measure of treatment, the number of years, within compulsory education, for which the respondents 
have studied in Catalonia after 1983. In this specification we restrict the sample to individuals who were not born in Catalonia. All the 
specifications include years of education fixed effects, province fixed effects and dummy variables that control for gender, the origin of the 
respondent and of the parents of the respondents. Robust standard errors are reported between parenthesis and are clustered at the cohort- 
years of education level (Columns 1-2), cohort level (Columns 3-7), cohort-year of arrival level (Column 8). * Significant at 10%, ** significant 
at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
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Note: we plot average years of education by cohort for Catalonia, the Madrid region (a region which 
have always been at the same level of development as Catalonia) and the rest of Spain. This is done 
using data from the Spanish Census in 2001
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Table 3.12: The role of individual origin
Dependent variable: Identity
OLS Ord. Logit
[1] [2]
intensity*non cat.origin .062* .115
(.035) (.078)
intensity*cat.family 0.086*** 0.197***
(.026) (.06)
intensity*mixed family 0.081*** 0.172***
(.029) (.065)
intensity*non catfamily 0.075*** 0.163**
(.028) (.063)
non Catalan origin -1.272*** -2.835***
(.114) (.272)
mixed family -.472*** -.976***
(.086) (.184)
non Catalan family -.913*** -2.047***
(.095) (.21)
YEARS OF EDUCATION YES YES
YEARS OF BIRTH YES YES
PROVINCES YES YES
No. obs.
Rsq
Pseudo Rsq
1467
.325
1467
.15
Note: The specifications include years of education, province fixed effects, year of birth fixed effects and dummy variables 
that control for gender, the origin of the respondent and of the parents of the respondents. We classified respondents into 
4 categories: 1) individuals who were not born in Catalonia 2) individuals who were born in Catalonia but whose parents 
were not 3) individuals who were born in Catalonia but with only one parent born in Catalonia and 4) individuals who were 
born in Catalonia whose parents were both bom in Catalonia (omitted category). The specifications include also 
interactions between the variable intensity and each of the 4 categories. Robust standard errors are reported between 
parenthesis and are clustered at the cohort-years of education level. * Significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** 
significant at 1%
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Chapter 4
Education and Political 
behaviour: Evidence from the  
Catalan Linguistic Reform
(joint with Oriol Aspachs-Bracons and Irma Clots-Figueras)
4.1 Introduction
Many social scientists have studied extensively the role of education and how schooling 
can create private and social benefits of different kinds. In particular, the economic 
literature has established a causal link between education and private earnings; and 
more recently, some scholars (Chiswick et al. 2006) have argued th a t schooling can 
increase the earnings of immigrants through its effect on language proficiency.
In addition, both the political science and the economic literature has investigated 
the link between education and political behaviour. In this respect, in 1978, Samuel 
Bowles argued tha t the school system has been instrumental in the interests of the 
elite and may have helped the consolidation of the capitalist system, reproducing the 
social relations which define the position of the capitalist class and the other dominant 
groups. However there is still not much evidence on the nature of the channels through 
which education can affect political outcomes and the causal link has only recently 
been carefully studied. Using compulsory education laws as instruments, Milligan et 
al. (2004) found a robust positive relationship between education and turnout for the 
United States. However, this was not the case for the United Kingdom.
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In this chapter, we focus on the relationship between schooling and political behaviour 
in ethnically divided societies. We explore how the linguistic reform tha t took place in 
Catalonia affected turnout and party choice. In 1983, the Catalan education system 
became bilingual and the law established the predominant use of Catalan in primary and 
secondary schools. Using survey data  from the “Centro de Investigationes Sociologicas” , 
we study the effect of such a reform on the political behaviour of Catalan citizens. 
Identity is a likely channel through which the linguistic reform affected political choices.
Our empirical argument relies on within and between cohort variation in exposure to 
Catalan language a t school. Between cohorts, the 1983 educational reform affected 
the younger cohorts (who were more exposed to  the language) more than the older 
generations. W ithin a given cohort, the exposure to Catalan varies according to  the 
number of years for which a student remains in education, as some students leave school 
earlier than others.
We find tha t individuals who have experienced greater exposure to teaching in Catalan 
are more likely to declare tha t they voted in the 1999 regional election and to have 
chosen a party with a Catalanist (i.e Catalan regionalist) platform. Thus, the intro­
duction of a bilingual education system, a standard example of multicultural policy in 
ethnically divided societies, increased the salience of the ethnic issue in Catalan society 
and helped the consolidation of a political system organized along ethnic lines.
While we can reject the existence of education specific cohort trends for political behav­
iour and we tend to rule out the possibility th a t the reform changed the composition 
of the Catalan population, we still have to conduct some checks to account for the fact 
tha t individual years of schooling are typically an individual and parental choice, so it 
may be the case they are affected by the reform and, at the same time, correlated with 
individual political preferences.
The chapter is related to several strands of literature. Firstly, there is the literature 
tha t focuses on the determinants of turnout and political behaviour (see Merlo 2006 for 
a review of the topic) and, in particular, to  tha t which studies the relationship between 
education and individual political choice (Milligan et al. (2004)).
Secondly, there is a connection with the early political science literature tha t analyzes 
the effect of multicultural policies and national building policies on individual choice. 
If we interpret the reform as an example of a nation building policy within Catalonia, 
where individuals living in Catalonia who were born elsewhere, or whose parents do not 
have Catalan origins are the relevant minority, we find tha t the nation building policies 
foster civic duties (turnout) and attachm ent to nationalistic parties.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 provides a brief description of the
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Catalan party system and of the data  we use. Section 4.3 describes our identification 
strategy, while Section 4.4 presents the basic empirical evidence. Sections 4.5 discusses 
the role of individual origin. Sections 4.6 provides some robustness checks, and Section 
4.7 presents the conclusion.
4.2 Background
4.2 .1  In stitu tio n a l S ettin g
The democratization process tha t occurred in Spain during the late seventies, after the 
end of Franco’s dictatorship, led to the approval of a Constitution tha t defined in tu rn  a 
decentralized government structure. As basic democratic rights came to  be recognized, 
the old political parties, which had existed in secrecy during the dictatorship, were 
legalized and new political parties also emerged. From the five parties in the Catalan 
Parliament at the time of the survey, one was created during the transition: Converg&n- 
cia i Uni6  (CIU), the party  tha t was in power from 1980 to  2003. The other four had 
existed, with variations, prior to the dictatorship: P artit dels Socialistes de Catalunya 
(PSC), Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC), Partido Popular (PP), and Inicia- 
tiva per Catalunya Verds (ICV). Three of these are Catalan-only parties, CIU, ERC 
and ICV, in the sense th a t they only present candidates in Catalonia, while the other 
two exist throughout the Spanish territory. In our wider classification of Catalan and 
non-Catalan parties, we consider as Catalan all parties tha t have in their programmes 
the approval of a law th a t would give Catalonia the right to self-determination. These 
parties are CIU, ERC and ICV. Then, in our narrower classification of the Catalan 
parties, we include only those parties tha t are in favour of an independent Catalonia: 
CIU and ERC.
One of the main concerns of the new Catalan administration was the promotion of 
Catalan in the field of education. The main Educational law th a t was undertaken by 
the Catalan Government was the "General Directory of Linguistic Policy" which was 
described extensively in the previous chapter. The law was approved in 1983 (when 
CIU was in power) and introduced Catalan (together with Spanish) as the medium of 
instruction in all of the schools of Catalonia.
4 .2 .2  D a ta  D escrip tio n
The empirical analysis draws on survey data provided by the "Centro de Investigaciones 
Sociologicas" in 2001. In this survey, individuals were asked about their age, education,
106
origin, origin of their parents, when they arrived in Catalonia and questions about their 
use of Catalan, as well as some ideological questions: their identity, whom they voted 
for in the 1999 elections and whether they voted at all.
The linguistic reform was first implemented in the 1983-84 school year in every school 
in Catalonia. We adopt the same strategy as the previous chapter: to identify the 
cohorts who are likely to be treated, we assume th a t all of the respondents started  their 
education at the age of 6 . As a result, since ,in Spain, primary education lasts for 8  
years and secondary education for 4 years, a respondent born in 1966 with secondary 
education received one year of treatment. The 1966-811 birth cohorts are the cohorts 
who were potentially tretated; a natural comparison group is the cohorts born between 
1950-1965.
The intensity of the treatm ent varies across cohorts and level of education. If there is a 
link between language policy and voting behaviour, the reform will change the voting 
behaviour for those cohorts who were educated in Catalan: the younger (born after 
1965) and more educated cohorts. We expect th a t individuals who experienced greater 
exposure to the reform will feel a greater identification with Catalonia and, as a result, 
to  be more likely to vote in the regional elections and choose Catalanist parties. A 
preliminary look at the data shows that this is indeed the case.
In Figure 4.1, we plot the fraction of individuals who turned out to vote in elections 
by cohort and level of education (we distinguish between respondents with secondary 
education and those w ithout). Even if the younger individuals vote less frequently, this 
negative trend is attenuated for individuals who were more affected by the Catalan 
reform: those born after 1966 who have secondary education. Figure 4.2 illustrates the 
difference between these two lines: th a t is, the within-cohort variation. For cohorts who 
were not affected by the reform, the line fluctuates around zero, while the difference 
starts to increase for cohorts born after 1965.
Figure 4.3 shows the fraction of voters who voted for Catalanist parties2, by cohort and 
education. This figure shows a large increase in the proportion of younger and more 
educated voters who voted for Catalanist parties, while, for less educated voters, there 
is a positive effect, but less strong. Figure 4.4 plots the difference between these two 
lines and shows the within-cohort variation for each cohort. The difference is larger for 
cohorts born after 1965.
In Table 4.1, we show descriptive statistics of the main variables employed in this study. 
We show descriptive statistics for all individuals, and then for individuals with and
1 Although we have data for people born in 1982 and 1983, these individuals could not vote in the 
1999 elections as they were under 18, so we do not include them in the sample.
2 We use the wider definition
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without secondary education. W ithin these groups, we show statistics for the different 
samples tha t we use in the regressions.
4.3 Empirical strategy
Students’ exposure to Catalan language varies according to year of b irth  and years of 
education. We obtain differences-in differences estimates using the equation
U i j m  =  Q! "h / 3 L i j m  +  ' y j  + Sm  " t"  X i j m fl £ i j m (4.1)
Lijm is the length of exposure to teaching in Catalan. 7  ^ is the cohort effect, 6m is 
a dummy for education background and X ijm is a vector of individual-level control 
variables, including gender, individual’s origin, parents’ origin and location dummies.3
As previously mentioned, we analyze the effect of the linguistic reform on political 
behaviour, namely turnout and party preferences. As a consequence, we use several 
dependent variables: yijm indicates whether or not an individual i, from cohort j with 
m years of schooling
(1) declares to have voted in the 1999 regional election. This specification checks if the 
linguistic reform stimulated turnout to the regional elections.
(2 ) declares to  have voted for a Catalanist party in the 1999 regional election (we restrict 
the sample only to people who declared to  have voted in tha t election). As a first step 
we consider IC, ERC and CIU as Catalanist parties, then we look only at ERC and 
CIU. Finally, we consider only CIU, the party tha t was in power and promoted the 
linguistic reform. This specification checks whether the linguistic reform increased the 
share of votes for Catalanist parties in the regional elections.
(3) declares to have voted for a Catalanist party in the 1999 regional election (we do 
not restrict the sample). As in point (2 ), firstly, we consider IC, ERC and CIU as 
Catalanist parties, then look only at ERC and CIU and, as a last step, we consider 
only CIU. This specification checks if the linguistic reform increased the to tal number 
of votes for the Catalanist parties the in regional elections.
The identification strategy relies on the fact th a t there is no other variable th a t affects 
the political behaviour of some cohort-years of education. We run this specification first 
as a linear regression and then as a logit, due to the binomial nature of the dependent
3 We exclude from the sample any migrants who received some education outside Catalonia.
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variable4. Robust standard errors are clustered at cohort-years of education level, to 
control for the fact tha t observations in a given cohort-years of education group may 
be correlated.
The second econometric specification to be tested is very similar to  the first one. How­
ever, the dependent variable can assume three different values. This time y%jm indicates 
whether individual i, from cohort j and with m years of schooling declared to  have (i) 
voted for a Catalanist party (ii) voted for a non-Catalanist party or (iii) abstained. 
We run this specification first as a multinomial logit; however, the multinomial logit 
would assume the independence of irrelevant alternatives. We then run a multinomial 
probit, assuming the error terms to be independent, and, as a last step, we run it as a 
multinomial probit but relaxing the assumption of independence of the error terms5.
4.4 R esults
4.4 .1  D ifference-in -D ifference E stim ates
Table 4.2 reports estimates for Equation (4.1) using as dependent variable the prob­
ability of voting during the regional election of 1999. In Columns 1 and 2 , we show 
estimates when we only control for years of education and year of birth fixed effects, for 
the OLS and the logit specifications, respectively. OLS estimates show a positive and 
significant coefficient, suggesting tha t an increase in exposure to the reform increases 
the probability tha t an individual votes. The logit results go in the same direction and 
are significant. In Columns 3 and 4, we add province dummies, controls for gender, 
family and individual origin. The coefficients are still positive and significant. The 
esults suggest tha t those who received Catalan-intensive instruction tend to be signif­
icantly more likely to vote; in fact, an extra year of education in Catalan increases 
the likelihood tha t the respondent declared to have voted by 4.5%. The probability of 
voting is also correlated with the individual origin and with the origin of the parents 
of the interviewee. We classified respondents into 4 categories: 1) individuals who were 
not born in Catalonia 2 ) individuals who were born in Catalonia but whose parents 
were not 3) individuals who were born in Catalonia but with only one parent born in 
Catalonia 4) individuals who were born in Catalonia whose parents were both born 
in Catalonia. We find tha t the probability of voting for a Catalanist party is highest 
among respondents with Catalan origins and with parents with Catalan origins.
Tables 4.3 and 4.4 report estimates for Equation (4.1) using as dependent variable the
4 The results for probit are very similar.
5 We use the asmprobit command in STATA.
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probability of voting for a Catalanist party during the regional election in 1999 when we 
restrict the sample only to people who declared th a t they voted in tha t election (Table 
4.3) and when we do not restrict the sample (Table 4.4). In Columns 1 and 2 of both 
tables we show estimates, for the OLS and the logit specifications, when we only control 
for years of education and year of birth fixed effects and when we classify IC, ERC and 
CIU as Catalanist parties. In Columns 3 and 4 of both tables, we consider only CIU 
and ERC as Catalanist parties. In Columns 5 and 6  of both tables, we focus only 
on CIU. OLS estimates show a positive and significant coefficient, suggesting th a t an 
increase in exposure to the reform increases the probability tha t an individual will vote 
for a Catalanist party. Furthermore, the results clearly show th a t most of the effects 
we find in Tables 4.2 and 4.3 come from the increase in the probability of choosing 
CIU. The logit results go in the same direction and are significant. In Columns 7-12 of 
both tables, we add province dummies, controls for family and individual origin. The 
coefficients are still positive and significant. The results suggest th a t those who received 
Catalan-intensive instruction tend to be significantly more likely to vote for a Catalanist 
party, both if we consider the sample of voters or the to tal sample. The probability of 
voting for a Catalanist party is also correlated, as predictable, with individual origin 
and with the origin of the parents of the interviewee. We find tha t probability of 
voting is highest among respondents with Catalan origins and with parents who have 
Catalan origins. As shown in Column 8  of Table 4.3 (restricted sample), an increase 
from 4 years of treatm ent (the average amount of treatm ent) to  8  years (the average 
amount of treatm ent plus one standard deviation) would increase the likelihood tha t 
the respondent declared to have voted for a party with Catalan affiliation by almost 
20%. Column 8  of Table 4.4 (unrestricted sample) shows tha t an increase from 4 to 8  
years of treatm ent would increase the likelihood tha t the respondent declared to have 
voted for a party with Catalan affiliation by 27%.
As a final step, we show results using the second econometric specification mentioned 
in the previous section. The dependent variable is now a variable th a t can assume three 
different values depending on whether the respondent: (i) voted for a Catalanist party 
(ii) voted for a non-Catalanist party or (iii) abstained. For this specification we consider 
CIU, ERC and IC as Catalanist parties. Columns 1-3 of Table 4.5 reports the results 
when we run this specification as s multinomial logit, Columns 4-6 when we run it as 
a multinomial probit, but assuming the error terms to be independent. Columns 7-9 
report the results when we run it as a multinomial probit but removing the assumption 
of the independence of the error term. The picture the table shows is, however, quite 
homogeneous. We observe th a t the reform caused a significant decline in abstention, a 
decline (but not always significant at standard level, i.e. significant at 1 0  per cent level 
only with the multinomial logit specification) in voting for a non Catalanist party and 
also a contemporaneous and significant increase in voting for a Catalanist party.
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The results in Columns 7-9 show how an increase in years of Catalan instruction from 4 
to  8  increases the likelihood tha t the respondent declared to  have voted for a Catalanist 
party by 25% and decreases the likelihood tha t the respondent declared to have voted 
for a non-Catalanist party by 16%. However, since the decline in the amount of votes for 
non-Catalanist parties is not always significant, the data do not allow us to distinguish 
between two different patterns of voting behavior:
1) a simple switch from abstention to voting for a Catalanist party
2 ) a more complex scenario in which
(i) on the one hand, the reform contributed to a general rise in electoral participation 
and, then, as a result, led to a switch from abstention to voting for both Catalanist and 
non-Catalanist parties
(ii) but, on the other hand, the reform increased individual preferences for a Catalanist 
party and, as a result, led to a switch from voting for a non-Catalanist party to a 
Catalanist party.
4.5 Heterogenous effects
In this section, we study whether the effect of the reform was homogenously spread 
across the population. We then interact our intensity measure with the four origin 
dummies we created and, as Table 4.6 shows, we find tha t the effect of the reform 
on both turnout and preference for a Catalanist party is positive not only for those 
respondents with Catalan origin and whose parents were both born in Catalonia, but 
also for individuals born in Catalonia but whose parents were not, for individuals born 
in Catalonia with only one parent with Catalan origin and for individuals who were not 
born in Catalonia. As is shown in Figures 4.5, 4.6 and 4.7, while political choices vary 
widely depending on origin among individuals with no treatm ent, origin plays almost 
no role among individuals with full treatment.
Since, as already mentioned in the introduction, we can interpret the reform as an 
example of a nation building policy within Catalonia, where individuals living in Cat­
alonia who were born elsewhere, or whose parents do not have Catalan origins are the 
relevant minority, we conclude tha t nation building policies foster civic duties (turnout) 
and attachm ent to nationalistic parties.
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4.6 Robustness
In this section we perform several robustness checks on the main specification. Firstly, 
we show tha t our results are not driven by education-specific cohort trends. Then, we 
deal with the possibility tha t years of education may be endogenous. Finally, we restrict 
the sample and conduct some extra checks to control for the fact th a t the reform could 
have encouraged migration in and out of Catalonia.
4.6 .1  E xogen ou s Trends
The estimates in Tables 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4, which show how intensive Catalan instruction 
affects political behaviour, may be confounded by education-specific cohort trends for 
turnout and political preferences. In particular, these trends may exist if different 
cohorts have been raised by parents with different values and political preferences (the 
younger parents being more pro-Catalan), and if those parents with stronger preferences 
for Catalanist parties have invested more in their children’s education.
As a formal falsification exercise, we run the specification proposed by Equation (4.1) 
on cohorts unaffected by the reform, namely cohorts 1934 to  1965. Cohorts 1950 to 
1965 received a pseudo treatm ent tha t consists of the intensity of the reform received 
by individuals with the same years of education but born 16 years later. Columns 1-6 
of panel A in Table 4.7 report the results of this exercise. We adopt both an ordinary 
least squares and a logit specification. The coefficient of the pseudo treatm ent variable 
is never significant, negative and very small when we consider turnout as dependent 
variable and positive but sufficiently small when we use as dependent variable whether 
or not the respondent declared th a t he/she voted for a Catalanist (IC, ERC and CIU) 
party in the 1999 regional election (both with the sample restricted only to  people who 
declared to have voted in th a t election and with the unrestricted sample).
In addition, in order to correct the estimates in Tables 4.1-4.3 for education-cohort 
trends, we perform a triple differences-type of analysis similar to tha t of Angrist et al 
(2006), using cohorts born between 1921 and 1980. We use the following equation:
V i j m  =  & f i L i j m  +  @ h j m  " I "  'Y j  d "  "I-  X i j m f A  - ( -  E i j m (4.2)
where L\jm is a term  tha t captures real exposure to teaching in Catalan, while lijm 
captures spurious effects.
Lijm are the years of real treatm ent for cohorts 1966-1980; while k jm equals years of
1 1 2
pseudo treatm ent for cohorts 1936-1950 (where now the pseudo-treatment consists of 
the intensity of the reform received by individuals with the same years of education 
but born 30 years later) and years of real treatm ent for cohorts 1966-19806. (3 are the 
triple difference estimates, i.e. the treatm ent effects from the real experiment net of 
the pseudo treatm ent effects estimated using cohorts 1921-1950. Columns 7-12 of panel 
A in Table 4.7 report the results of this specification. Triple difference estimates are 
positive and significant, while the coefficient tha t would be capturing spurious trends is 
negative and not significant. Both exercises are reassuring, as they may indicate that 
our results are not capturing the effect of an education-specific cohort trend.
As a further step, we study the possible interactions between the reform and Franco’s 
death in 1975. One may think tha t the end of the dictatorship could have affected the 
content of the textbooks and this, in turn, could have modified the political behaviour 
of the younger and more educated cohorts. In order to check whether this is the case, 
we propose the following exercise. We generate a variable called "Franco Intensity" that 
measures the number of years for which individuals attended school after Franco died 
but before the educational system became bilingual. Then, we run the Specification
(4.1) with our intensity measure and this additional variable. The results are shown 
in panel B of Table 4.7 and show how our measure of intensity remains positive and 
significant, while the Franco intensity variable is not significant and smaller. The 
coefficient of interest is not significant at standard level (but it is a t 10,3% level!) in only 
one of the six specifications tha t we run , i.e. in the one where, within an OLS estimation 
strategy, we use as dependent variable the probability tha t the respondent declares that 
he/she voted for a Catalanist party (restricting the sample only to people who declared 
tha t they voted in tha t election and considering IC, ERC and CIU as Catalanist parties). 
The coefficient of the variable th a t measures the exposure to the language reform, 
however, is similar in magnitude to the one we found in the main specification and, 
importantly, the coefficient of the variable "Franco intensity" is negative, pointing out 
tha t years of education after Franco’s death could not have affected people’s political 
preferences. This test further supports the theory th a t political behaviour changed with 
the language reform.
Like in the previous chapter, as a further test to rule out the possibility th a t our 
results are driven either by the existence of education-specific cohort trends or by the 
effect of the end of the dictatorship on the political behaviour of the younger and more 
educated cohorts, we consider an other Spanish region: the Basque Country. We use 
representative survey data on the institutional attachm ent of residents in the Basque 
Country to the Spanish State. This survey was also published by CIS in 2001 and 
is very similar to the survey conducted in Catalonia. The only difference is tha t the
6 Due to lack of data for very old cohorts we could not use a larger number of cohorts.
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Basque survey was conducted one month before the Catalan one. We then apply the 
same empirical strategy to  the Basque sample and we find th a t the coefficient of the 
variable of interest (years of treatm ent) is not significantly different from zero (Columns 
7-12 of panel B in Table 4.7) in all the specifications considered. Since the death of 
Franco is likely to have affected residents of Catalonia and Basque Country in the same 
way and education-specific cohort trends are likely to follow similar patterns in both the 
regions, the comparison between Catalonia and Basque Country helps us to exclude the 
possibility tha t the findings discussed in the previous sections are driven either by the 
existence of education-specific cohort trends or by the end of the Franco’s dictatorship .7
4 .6 .2  E n d ogen eity  o f  years o f  ed u cation
In this section, we discuss the possibility of an endogenous response of schooling to 
the 1983 language reform. This is a concern, since we rely on the differences between 
schooling groups across cohorts to identify the effect of the reform. Indeed, we may 
think tha t respondents with very intense anti-Catalanist political preferences may have 
decided to drop out of school because of the new legislation and because they may felt 
less comfortable about receiving education in the Catalan language.
As a preliminary check, we include in our specification also a dummy variable tha t is 
equal to one if the respondent used to speak Catalan at home with their parents. The 
results are reported in Columns 1 and 2 for all sets of regressions in Table 4.8 and these 
are consistent with those shown in Tables 4.1-4.3. We believe tha t this is important, 
since individuals who are less confident in the Catalan language may drop out of school 
earlier as a consequence of the reform and, at the same time, are also the ones more 
likely to vote for a non-Catalanist party.
We then remove cohort fixed effects from Equation (4.1); in this way, our identification 
strategy relies less on within cohort variation in years of education, tha t is likely to 
be endogenous. In order to control for age trends correlated with the dependent vari­
ables, however, we include in our specification also the age and the squared age of the 
respondents. The results are reported in Columns 3 and 4 in Table 4.8 and are similar 
to  those obtained previously, even though the coefficients are quite smaller.
Moreover, as a further (but unsuccessful) robustness check, we consider only compulsory 
education and eliminate all within cohort variation. We build a measure of exposure to 
the reform tha t is not the result of individual choice: the number of years of compulsory 
education received in Catalan language. Each respondent belonging to the same cohort 
will be subject to the same amount of exposure to compulsory education. This index
7We consider pnv, eh and ea as ethnic/ Basque regionalist parties.
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should provide an exogenous measure of years of education, but it should also increase 
the measurement error and cause attenuation bias in the coefficient of our variable of 
interest. Unfortunately, as Columns 5-6 in Table 4.8 show, the coefficients are positive 
but smaller in size and not significant.
As shown in Figures 4.1-4.4, the effect of the reform varies according to the amount 
of exposure: tha t is, according to  the number of years for which a given individual 
has been taught in Catalan. In the previous regressions, we do not take this variation 
into account and so we cannot add cohort fixed effects. Given th a t voting behaviour 
may change with age, it would seem appropriate to include cohort fixed effects in the 
regression. Thus, instead of using years of education as intra-cohort variation in years 
of treatment, we use variation in the timing of arrival as a determinant of more or 
less exposure to the electoral reform8. In order to perform this exercise, we restrict 
the sample to individuals who were not born in Catalonia. These individuals arrived 
at different points in time and a t different stages during their education. For each 
individual, we compute the number of years, within compulsory education, th a t they 
have studied in Catalonia after 1983. We believe th a t this specification is particularly 
useful, since it allows us to  use both compulsory years of education and cohort fixed 
effects. In this way, we are able to control for any issue related to the endogeneity of the 
education decision and, at the same time, and rule out any potential problem of omitted 
variables correlated with both identity and age (although in a non linear fashion). The 
results, reported in Column 7 in Table 4.8, are fairly similar to those obtained when 
the within-cohort variation used was given by differences in years of education9.
Morover, as Figure 3.19 in the previous chapter shows, when we plot average years of 
education by cohort for Catalonia, the Madrid region and the rest of Spain, we do not 
find an anomalous pattern for cohorts affected by the reform (those born in Catalonia 
after 1965).
4 .6 .3  R estr ic tin g  th e  sam ple
Cohorts affected and not affected by the reform are actually individuals of very different 
ages. In order to compare cohorts who are more similar to each other and who are more 
likely to be affected by similar shocks, we restrict the sample and compare cohorts of 
similar ages. The results are shown in panel A of Table 4.9. A comparison between 
individuals aged 26 (cohort 1975) and individuals aged 45 (cohort 1956) should be more 
reliable then a comparison between individuals aged 20 (cohort 1981) and individuals
8 To this purpose, we also include in the sample migrants who received some education outside of 
Catalonia and who were not included in any of the previous specifications.
9 Due to lack of data, we use only an OLS specification.
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aged 51 (cohort 1950). The results are robust. The coefficients are always positive 
and significant and their size is also similar in magnitude to the ones we found in the 
main specification. The coefficient of interest is not significant at standard level (only 
a t 15% level!) in only one of the six specifications tha t we run, i.e the one where, 
within an OLS estimation strategy, we use as dependent variable the probability tha t 
the respondent declares to have voted for a Catalanist party (restricting the sample 
only to people who declared tha t they voted in tha t election and considering IC, ERC 
and CIU as Catalanist parties).
4 .6 .4  M igration  pattern s
Migration patterns in and out of Catalonia changed the composition of the Catalan 
population. As table 4.1 shows, the fraction of respondents whose parents were both 
born in Catalonia is larger among control cohorts than among treated cohorts. In 
general the family characteristics of a respondent belonging to the control cohorts are 
different from the family characteristics of a respondent belonging to  the treated (or 
potentially treated) cohorts. Altough in the main specification we control for the type 
of family of the respondents, migration patterns, affecting the composition of each 
cohort educational group, might have biased our results. In order to  control for this 
possible source of bias, we add in the regressions a new set of controls. As already 
mentioned, we classified respondents into 4 categories: 1) individuals who were not born 
in Catalonia 2 ) individuals who were born in Catalonia but whose parents were not 3) 
individuals who were born in Catalonia but with only one parent born in Catalonia and 
4) individuals who were born in Catalonia whose parents were both born in Catalonia. 
As in the previous chapter, we calculate, within each cohort-educational group, the 
fraction of respondents belonging to  each of the 4 categories. We then adopt the 
following econometric specification
U i j m  =  Q : +  4 "  T j  8 m  " t-  +  S j m £ i j m  (4.3)
W here the dependent variable yijm indicates, as usual, whether individual i, from cohort 
j and with m years of schooling answers (1) I feel only Spanish, (2) I feel more Catalan 
than Spanish, (3) I feel as Spanish as Catalan, (4) I feel more Catalan than Spanish,
(5) I feel only Catalan. s jm is a vector of 4 explanatory variables th a t control for 
the composition of each cohort educational group jm .  Each variable measures the size, 
within the cohort educational group jm ,  of one of the 4 family groups.
It turns out, as columns 1-6 of Panel B in Table 4.9 show, th a t (3k, the coefficient of
1 1 6
our variable of interest, is still positive and significant and the size of the coefficient is 
very similar to the size of the coefficient in our baseline specification.
A further concern is endogenous migration; moving costs could also be related to  school­
ing opportunities. Thus, the effect of the reform on migration costs could be partic­
ularly strong for potential migrants with highly anti-Catalanist political preferences. 
This could introduce a selection problem in the sample we study.
We therefore carry out the following exercise: we restrict our sample to individuals 
born in Catalonia. In this way, since the youngest cohort is the one born 1981, we 
consider only respondents whose parents were already in Catalonia when the reform 
was implemented. As a result, their parents’ decision to  migrate should be less likely to 
have been affected by the linguistic reform. Columns 1-6 of panel B in Table 4.9 show 
th a t the results are robust to  this check.
While panel B in Table 4.9 successfully controls for the possible endogeneity of the mi­
gration inflows, unfortunately we have not been able to  perform any tests th a t consider 
the possible effect of the reform on patterns of migration outflows. However, as reported 
in the previous chapter (Figure 3.18), when we use data from INE and compare net 
migration flows during the last 40 years in Catalonia with those in Madrid, the other 
main Spanish region, we find tha t migration patterns are fairly similar.
4.7 Conclusions
In ethnically divided societies, education can affect political behaviour through the lan­
guage used for teaching. This chapter presents evidence of a positive effect of the ed­
ucational reform, whereby the Catalan education system became bilingual, on turnout 
and on the likelihood of choosing a party with a Catalanist nature. Identity is a likely 
channel through which the linguistic reform affected political choices.
4.8 Appendix
4 .8 .1  D efin ition  o f  th e  variables
- Years of education: (i) if the respondent answered tha t he did not complete primary 
education, we assume tha t he received 4 years of schooling; (ii) if the respondent an­
swered tha t he completed only primary education, we assume tha t he received 8  years 
of education; (iii) if the respondent answered tha t he started but did not complete
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secondary education or th a t he received some professional training, we assume that 
he received 1 0  years of education; and (iv) if the respondent answered th a t he com­
pleted secondary education or a higher level of professional training, we assume tha t 
he received 1 2  years of education. Source: CIS
-Catalan origin, Catalan family: dummy equal to (1), if the respondent answered tha t 
he was born in Catalonia and both his parents were born in Catalonia. Source: CIS
-Catalan origin, mixed family: dummy equal to (1 ), if the respondent answered tha t 
he was born in Catalonia and only one of his parents were born in Catalonia. Source: 
CIS
-Catalan origin, non Catalan family: dummy equal to  (1 ), if the respondent answered 
tha t he was born in Catalonia and both his parents were not born in Catalonia. Source: 
CIS
-non Catalan origin: dummy equal to (1 ), if the respondent answered tha t he was not 
born in Catalonia. Source: CIS
-Voting: dummy equal to (1), if the respondent declares to have voted in the 1999 
regional election. Source: CIS
-Catalan Voting (IC+ERC+CIU): dummy equal to  (1 ) if the respondent declares to 
have voted for a Catalanist party in the 1999 regional election. We consider IC, ERC 
and CIU as Catalanist parties Source: CIS
-Catalan Voting (ERC+CIU): dummy equal to (1) if the respondent declares to have 
voted for a Catalanist party in the 1999 regional election. We consider ERC and CIU 
as Catalanist parties Source: CIS
-Catalan Voting (CIU): dummy equal to  (1) if the respondent declares to  have voted for 
a Catalanist party in the 1999 regional election. We consider CIU as the only Catalanist 
parties Source: CIS
-Language at home: dummy equal to  (1 ), if the individual spoke Catalan at home with 
his parents
-Female: dummy equal to (1), if the respondent is female
4.9 Figures and Tables
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Figure 4 .1 :Participation rate by cohort and level of education
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Note: The graph plots the fraction of respondents who voted during the regional
e lections  against year of birth. All ser ie s  are (5,1,5) moving averages .
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Figure 4 .2 : Effect o f th e  reform  on th e  participation rate by coh ort
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Note: The graph plots the difference betw een  the fraction of resp ondents  with
secon d ary  education who voted during the regional e lections and the fraction of 
resp ondents  without secon d ary  education w ho voted during the regional e lections  
against year of birth. All ser ie s  are (5,1,5) moving averages.
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Figure 4.3: Ethnic Voting by cohorts and level of education
—■—C a t a la n s  w ith  S e c o n d a r y  E d u c a t io n  - A - C a t a l a n s  w i t h o u t  S e c o n d a r y  Edi
0 3
0.8
0.75
0.7
0.65
0.6
1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976
Note: The graph plots the fraction of respondents who voted for a Catalanist party during the  
regional e lections against year of birth. All ser ies  are (5,1,5) moving a v era g es .
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Figure 4.4: Effect of the reform on Ethnic Voting by cohort
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Note: The graph plots the difference betw een  the fraction of respondents  with secon d ary  education  
who voted for a Catalanist party during the regional e lections and the fraction of resp ondents  without 
seco n d a ry  education who voted for a Catalanist party during the regional e lections against year of  
birth. All se r ie s  are (5 ,1 ,5)  moving averages .
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Table 4.1
______Cohorts (total sample)________________Cohorts (with sec, edu)______________ Cohorts (without sec, edu)
1950-81 1950-65 1966-81 1950-81 1950-65 1966-81 1950-81 1950-65 1966-41
Identity Average 3.52 3.54 3.50 3.7 3.71 3.7 3.3 3.39 3.21
St. Dev. 1.02 1.03 1.01 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.1 1.1 1.09
Observations 1326 557 769 680 236 444 646 321 325
Identity (binomial) Average 0.49 0.49 0.48 0.57 0.55 0.58 0.39 0.45 0.34
St. Dev. 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.48 0.49 0.47
Observations 1326 557 769 680 236 444 646 321 325
Years of Education Average 10.38 9.97 10.67 12 12 12 8.46 8.27 8.65
St. Dev. 1.88 1.99 1.74 0 0 0 0.99 0.98 0.97
Observations 1349 565 784 697 241 456 652 324 328
Cat. Origin, Cat. Family Average 0.43 0.46 0.40 0.49 0.56 0.45 0.35 0.38 0.32
St. Dev. 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.5 0.49 0.49 0.47 0.48 0.46
Observations 1349 565 784 697 241 456 652 324 328
Cat. Origin, mixed Family Average 0.17 0.14 0.19 0.17 0.14 0.19 0.17 0.14 0.19
SL Dev. 0.38 0.35 0.39 0.38 0.35 0.39 0.37 0.35 0.4
Observations 1349 565 784 697 241 456 652 324 328
Cat. Origin, no Cat. Family Average 0.28 0.21 0.32 0.24 0.16 0.28 0.32 0.25 0.39
St. Dev. 0.44 0.41 0.46 0.43 0.37 0.45 0.46 0.43 0.48
Observations 1349 565 784 697 241 456 652 324 328
No Catalan Origin Average 0.11 0.17 0.06 0.08 0.13 0.05 0.14 0.2 0.08
S t Dev. 0.31 0.37 0.25 0.27 0.33 0.23 0.35 0.4 0.27
Observations 1349 565 784 697 241 456 652 324 328
Voting Average 0.77 0.83 0.72 0.79 0.84 0.77 0.74 0.83 0.65
St Dev. 0.41 0.36 0.44 0.40 0.36 0.41 0.43 0.37 0.47
Observations 1248 528 720 642 223 419 606 305 301
Catalan voting (CIU+ERC+IC) Average 0.50 0.52 0.48 0.56 0.57 0.55 0.42 0.48 0.37
St. Dev. 0.50 0.49 0.50 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.5 0.48
Observations 1248 528 720 642 223 419 606 305 301
Catalan voting (CIU+ERC) Average 0.44 0.47 0.42 0.49 0.49 0.48 0.39 0.45 0.33
St. Dev. 0.19 0.49 0.49 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.48 0.49 0.47
Observations 1248 528 720 642 223 419 606 305 301
Catalan voting (CIU) Average 0.31 0.33 0.29 0.31 0.3 0.31 0.3 0.35 0.25
St. Dev. 0.46 0.47 0.45 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.47 0.43
Observations 1248 528 720 642 223 419 606 305 301
Catalan voting (CIU+ERC+IC)-only voters Average 0.66 0.63 0.68 0.71 0.68 0.73 0.59 0.58 0.59
St. Dev. 0.47 0.48 0.46 0.45 0.46 0.43 0.49 0.49 0.49
Observations 941 439 502 503 190 313 438 249 189
Catalan voting (CIU+ERC)-only voters Average 0.58 0.57 0.60 0.62 0.59 0.64 0.54 0.55 0.53
St. Dev. 0.49 0.49 0.48 0.48 0.49 0.48 0.49 0.49 0.5
Observations 941 439 502 503 190 313 438 249 189
Catalan voting (ClU)-only voters Average 0.41 0.40 0.41 0.4 0.36 0.42 0.42 0.43 0.41
St. Dev. 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.18 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49
Observations 941 439 502 503 190 313 438 249 189
Language at home Average 0.44 0.47 0.41 0.5 0.54 0.47 0.36 0.42 0.31
St Dev. 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.5 0.49 0.49 0.48 0.49 0.46
Observations 1340 561 779 692 238 454 648 323 325
Intensity of treatment Average 3.83 0.00 6.47 5.17 0 7.85 2.23 0 4.36
St. Dev. 4.54 0.00 4.21 4.89 0 3.9 3.47 0 3.78
Observations 1349 565 784 697 241 456 652 324 328
Intensity of (compulsory) treatment Average 2.41 0.00 4.07 2.8 0 4.26 1.94 0 3.79
St. Dev. 3.26 0.00 3.35 3.37 0 3.32 3.08 0 3.39
Observations 1349 565 784 697 241 456 652 324 328
Female Average 0.49 0.48 0.49 0.49 0.44 0.52 0.48 0.52 0.45
St. Dev. 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.5 0.49 0.49 0.5 0.48 0.49
Observations 1349 565 784 697 241 456 652 324 328
Table 4.2: Reform and Turnout
Dependent variable:Turnout
OLS Logit OLS Logit
[1] [2] [3] [4]
intensity .056*** .045*** .057*** .045***
(.018) (.015) (.018) (.015)
non Catalan origin -.113* -.142*
(.057) (.073)
c a t origin mixed family -.084** -.095***
(.039) (.045)
c a t origin non Catalan family -.1291*** -.144***
(.038) (.043)
YEARS O F EDUCATION  
YEARS O F BIRTH  
PROVINCES
YES
YES
NO
YES
YES
NO
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
No. obs. 1248 1248 1248 1248
Rsq .078 .099
Pseudo-Rsq .071 .093
Note: The dependent variable is a Dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the 
respondent voted during the egional elections. The specifications reported in Columns 
1 and 2 include years of education and year of birth fixed effects. The specifications 
reported in Columns 3 and 4 include years of education, province fixed effects, year of 
birth fixed effects and dummy variables that control for gender, the origin of the 
respondent and of the parents of the respondents. W e classified respondents into 4 
categories: 1) individuals who were not born in Catalonia 2) individuals who were born 
in Catalonia but whose parents were not 3) individuals who were born in Catalonia but 
with only one parent born in Catalonia and 4) individuals who were born in Catalonia 
whose parents were both born in Catalonia (omitted category). Robust standard errors 
are reported between parenthesis and are clustered at the cohort-years of education 
level. * Significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Marginal effects 
evaluated at the average are reported for the logit regressions.
124
Table 4.3: Reform and Ethnic voting (1)
D ep en d en t variable:Probability o f  ethnic voting (am ong voters)
CIU+ERC+IC CIU+ERC+IC CIU+ERC CIU+ERC CIU CIU CIU+ERC+IC CIU+ERC+IC CIU+ERC CIU+ERC CIU CIU
OLS Logit OLS Logit OLS Logit OLS Logit OLS Logit OLS Logit
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12]
intensity .041*** .046*** .047** .049** .049*** .053*** .040** .051*** .046** .057** 049** .052**
(.018) (.017) (.020) (.087) (.020) (.022) (.016) (.017) (.019) (.023) (.020) (.022)
non Catalan origin -.359*** -.408*** -.399*** -.423*** -.169** -.171**
(.072) (.074) (.072) (.063) (.075) (.070)
cat origin mixed family -.135*** -.179*** -.183*** -.220*** -.044 -.046
(.042) (.054) (.021) (.053) (.061) (.061)
cat origin non Catalan family -.382*** -.429*** -.412*** -.442*** -.156*** -.160***
(.045) (.051) (051 ) (.050) (.048) (.047)
YEARS OF EDUCATION YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
YEARS OF BIRTH YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
PROVINCES NO NO NO NO NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES
No. obs. 941 941 941 941 941 941 941 941 941 941 941 941
Rsq .057 .04 .054 .194 .194 .084
Pseudo-Rsq .046 .030 .042 .161 .153 .065
Note: The dependent variable is a Dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the respondent voted for a Catalanist party during the egional elections. In Columns 1-2, 7-8 we consider CIU, 
ERC and IC as Catalanist parties; in Columns 3-4, 9-10 we consider CIU, ERC as Catalanist parties; in columns 5-6,11-12 we consider only CIU as a Catalanist party. We restrict the 
sample only to respondents who voted. The specifications reported in Columns 1-6 include years of education and year of birth fixed effects. The specifications reported in Columns 7- 
12 include years of education, province fixed effects, year of birth fixed effects and dummy variables that control for gender, the origin of the respondent and of the parents of the 
respondents. We classified respondents into 4 categories: 1) individuals who were not bom in Catalonia 2) individuals who were bom in Catalonia but whose parents were not 3) 
individuals who were bom in Catalonia but with only one parent bom in Catalonia and 4) individuals who were bom in Catalonia whose parents were both bom in Catalonia (omitted 
category). Robust standard errors are reported between parenthesis and are clustered at the cohort-years of education level. * Significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 
1 %. Marginal effects evaluated at the average are reported for the logit regressions.
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Table 4.4: Reform and Ethnic voting (2)
Dependent variable:Probability of ethnic voting (among all citizens)
CIU+ERC+IC CIU+ERC+IC CIU+ERC CIU+ERC CIU CIU CIU+ERC+IC CIU+ERC+IC CIU+ERC CIU+ERC CIU CIU
OLS Logit OLS Logit OLS Logit OLS Logit OLS Logit OLS Logit
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12]
intensity .049*** .057*** .053*** .059*** .048*** .053*** .054*** .068*** .057*** .071*** .050*** .055**
(.015) (.017) (.017) (.019) (.016) (.091) (.014) (.018) (.016) (.020) (.016) (.019)
non Catalan origin -.363*** -.347*** -.381*** -.335*** -.182*** -.158***
(.067) (.053) (.064) (.045) (.063) (.049)
cat origin mixed family -.176*** -.190*** -.207*** -.204*** -.077 -.073
(.043) (.044) (.045) (.040) (.051) (.045)
cat origin non Catalan family -.368*** -.379*** -.377*** -.370*** -.164*** -.157***
(.038) (.035) (.043) (.037) (.041) (.035)
YEARS OF EDUCATION YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
YEARS OF BIRTH YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
PROVINCES NO NO NO NO NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES
No. obs. 1248 1248 1248 1248 1248 1248 1248 1248 1248 1248 1248 1248
Rsq .062 .053 .055 .174 .176 .087
Pseudo-Rsq .047 .004 .048 .134 .137 .075
Note: The dependent variable is a Dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the respondent voted for a Catalanist party during the egional elections. In Columns 1-2, 7-8 we consider CIU, 
ERC and IC as Catalanist parties; in Columns 3-4, 9-10 we consider CIU, ERC as Catalanist parties; in columns 5-6, 11-12 we consider only CIU as a Catalanist party. The 
specifications reported in Columns 1-6 include years of education and year of birth fixed effects. The specifications reported in Columns 7-12 include years of education, province fixed 
effects, year of birth fixed effects and dummy variables that control for gender, the origin of the respondent and of the parents of the respondents. We classified respondents into 4 
categories: 1) individuals who were not bom in Catalonia 2) individuals who were bom in Catalonia but whose parents were not 3) individuals who were bom in Catalonia but with only 
one parent bom in Catalonia and 4) individuals who were bom in Catalonia whose parents were both bom in Catalonia (omitted category). Robust standard errors are reported between 
parenthesis and are clustered at the cohort-years of education level. * Significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Marginal effects evaluated at the average are 
reported for the logit regressions.
126
Table 4.5: Reform and voting patterns
Dependent variable:Voting choice (marginal effects)
Abstain Ethnicvoting Non Ethnicvoting Abstain Ethnicvoting Non Ethnicvoting Abstain Ethnicvoting Non Ethnicvoting
M LO G IT M LO G IT MLOG IT MPROBIT M PROBIT M PR O B IT A SM PR O B IT A SM PR O B IT A SM PR O B IT
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9]
intensity -.024* .065*** -.042** -.022 .065*** -.043** -0.022 .064*** -.042*
(.014) (.017) (.017) (.014) (.017) (.017) (0.031) (.021 ) (.022 )
YEARS OF EDUCATION YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
YEARS OF BIRTH YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
PROVINCES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
No. obs. 1248 1248 1248
Note: The dependent variable can assume three different values: (i) abstain (ii) ethnic voting or (iii) non ethnic voting. W e run this specification first as a multinomial logit (Colums 1-3); 
as a multinomial probit, assuming the error terms to be independent (Colums 4-6), and also relaxing the assumption of independence of the error terms (Colums 7-9). W e consider 
CIU, ERC and IC as Catalanist parties. Each group of three columns corresponds to a regression. All the specifications include years of education fixed effects, province fixed effects, 
year of birth fixed effects and dummy variables that control for gender, the origin of the respondent and of the parents of the respondents. Robust standard errors are reported 
between parenthesis and are clustered at the cohort-years of education level. * Significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Marginal effects evaluated at the average 
are reported for the logit regressions. Each group of three columns corresponds to a regression.
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Table 4.6: The role of individual origin
Dependent variable:_________________voting_________ethnic voting (share) ethnic voting (all)
OLS Logit OLS Logit OLS Logit
(coeff) (coeff) (coeff)
[1] [2] [1] [2 ] [1] [2 ]
intensity*non cat.origin .069*** .355*** .045* .252** .066** .325***
(.022 ) ( .111) (.024) (.114) (.020 ) ( .100)
intensity*cat.fam ily .056*** .268*** .042** .265*** 054*** .274***
(.018) (.094) (.016) (.084) (.014) (0 7 1 )
intensity*m ixed family .070*** .366*** .026 .169** .052*** .263***
(.018) (.095) (.016) (.085) (.016) (.078)
intensity*non cat.fam ily .047** .247** .043** .246*** .054*** .261***
(.021) (.104) (.018) (.090) (.016) (.081)
non Catalan origin -.136*** -.992*** -.36*** -1.685*** -.168*** -.738***
(.065) (.413) (.084) (.398) (.062) (.265)
m ixed family -.146*** - 1.012*** -.066 -.404 -.369*** -1.599***
(.05) (.322) (.06) (.321) (.054) (.255)
non Catalan family -.091** -.712** -.385*** -1.846*** -.386*** -1.675**
(.043) (.307) (.061) (.305) (.079) (.379)
YEARS OF EDUCATION YES YES YES YES YES YES
YEARS OF BIRTH YES YES YES YES YES YES
PRO VINCES YES YES YES YES YES YES
No. obs. 1248 1248 941 941 1248 1248
Rsq .107 .197 .175
Pseudo Rsq___________________________________ .100______________ .165__________________.135
Note: In Columns 1 and 2, the dependent variable is a Dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the respondent 
voted during the regional elections; in Columns 3 and 4, the dependent variable is a Dummy variable which is 
equal to 1 if the respondent voted for a Catalanist party (we consider CIU, IC and ERC as Catalanist parties) 
during the regional elections (we restricted the sample only to voters); in Columns 5 and 6 , the dependent 
variable is a Dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the respondent voted for a Catalanist party (we consider 
CIU, IC and ERC as Catalanist parties) during the regional elections (unrestricted sample). The specifications 
include years of education, province fixed effects, year of birth fixed effects and dummy variables that control 
for gender, the origin of the respondent and of the parents of the respondents. W e classified respondents into 
4 categories: 1) individuals who were not born in Catalonia 2) individuals who were born in Catalonia but 
whose parents were not 3) individuals who were bom in Catalonia but with only one parent bom in Catalonia 
and 4) individuals who were bom in Catalonia whose parents were both born in Catalonia (omitted category). 
The specifications include also interactions between the variable intensity and each of the 4 categories. Robust 
standard errors are reported between parenthesis and are clustered at the cohort-years of education level. * 
Significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%
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Figure 4.5: Probability of voting by intensity and origin: 1=catalan origin with Catalan parents, 2=catalan 
origin with mixed parents, 3=catalan origin with parents that are not Catalan, 4= not Catalan origin. This 
corresponds to the logit regression in Column 2 of Table 4.6.
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Figure 4.6: Probability of voting for an ethnic party (among voters) by intensity and origin: 1=catalan 
origin with Catalan parents, 2=catalan origin with mixed parents, 3=catalan origin with parents that are 
not Catalan, 4= not Catalan origin. This corresponds to the logit regression in Column 4 of Table 4.6.
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Figure 4.7: Probability of voting for an ethnic party (among all) by intensity and origin: 1=catalan origin 
with Catalan parents, 2=catalan origin with mixed parents, 3=catalan origin with parents that are not 
Catalan, 4= not Catalan origin. This corresponds to the logit regression in Column 6 of Table 4.6.
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Table 4.7: Robustness checks (1) 
PANEL A
1934-1965 1934-1965 1934-1965 1934-1965 1934-1965 1934-1965 1921-1980 1921-1980 1921-1980 1921-1980 1921-1980 1921-1980
voting voting ethnic voting ethnic voting ethnic voting ethnic voting voting voting ethnic voting ethnic voting ethnic voting ethnic voting
(voters) (voters) (all) (all) (voters) (voters) (all) (all)
OLS Logit OLS Logit OLS Logit OLS Logit OLS Logit OLS Logit
[1] [2] (3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12]
intensity .049** .032*** .044** .049** .056*** .066***
(.020) (-017) (-021) (.023) (.019) (.024)
pseudo-intensity -.001 -.013 .017 .019 .016 .018 .002 -0.00 -.012 -.013 -.011 -.013
(.008) (.092) (.013) (.013) (-012) (.013) (-011) (.014) (.018) (.020) (.017) (.021)
No. obs. 862 862 734 734 862 862 1674 1674 1386 1386 1674 1674
Rsq .337 .171 .163 .107 .178 .179
Pseudo-Rsq .097 .148 .130 .113 .153 .141
PANEL B
voting voting ethnic voting ethnic voting ethnic voting ethnic voting voting voting ethnic voting ethnic voting ethnic voting ethnic voting
(voters) (voters) (all) (all) (voters) (voters) (all) (all)
OLS Logit OLS Logit OLS Logit OLS Logit OLS Logit OLS Logit
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12]
intensity .057*** .046** .03 .04** .047** .06*** -.007 -.01 .003 .000 .008 .009
(.019) (.018) (-018) (.02) (.019) (.023) (017) (017) (-012) (.011) (..015) (017)
Franco-intensity .001 .002 -.021 -.024 -.013 -.017
(-017) (.02) (.018) (.02) (.02) (.023)
No. obs. 1248 1248 941 941 1248 1248 967 967 647 608 967 967
Rsq .099 .194 .174 .108 .132 .129
Pseudo-Rsq .092 .161 .134 .093 .138 .099
Note: In the specifications reported in Columns 1-6 of Panel A we consider only cohorts who are not affected by the reform (1934-1965) and we assign a pseudo­
treatment to the younger cohorts (1950 -1965). In the specifications reported in Columns 7-12 of Panel A we consider cohorts born between 1921 and 1980 and the 
variable pseudo-intensity equals years of pseudo treatment for cohorts 1936-1950 and years of real treatment for cohorts 1966-1980. In the specifications reported in 
in Columns 1-6 of Panel B we include the variable Franco intensity that measures the number of years for which individuals attended school once Franco had died 
but before the educational system became bilingual. The specifications include years of education, province fixed effects, year of birth fixed effects and dummy 
variables that control for gender, the origin of the respondent and of the parents of the respondents. Robust standard errors are reported between parenthesis and are 
clustered at the cohort-years of education level. In Columns 7-12 of Panel B, we use the standard identification strategy, but a different dataset: we use use 
representative survey data on the institutional attachment of residents in the Basque Country to the Spanish State.
Table 4.8: Robustness checks (2)
Endogeneity of years of education
OLS Logit OLS Logit OLS Logit OLS 
Pep van Turnout__________________________[1]________ [2]________ [3]________ [4]________ [5]________ [6]________ m
intensity 054*** .041*** .025** .19**
(.018) (.015) (.010) (.009)
intensity compulsory 0.001 .001
(.016) (.014)
language at home .154*** .155***
(.054) (.052)
intensity (people arriving) .035*
(.019)
No. obs. 1240 1240 1248 1248 1248 1248 317
Rsq/Pseudo R sq .11 .104 .067 .062 .061 .058 .503
OLS Logit OLS Logit OLS Logit OLS
Dep var: Ethnic voting (share) [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
intensity .035** .045*** .028** .032**
(.015) (.016) (.012) (.014)
intensity compulsory 0.01 .01
(.016) (.019)
language at home .242*** .269***
(.067) (.066)
intensity (people arriving) .121**
(.048)
No. obs. 935 935 941 941 941 941 195
Rsq/Pseudo R sq .216 .182 .172 .139 .167 .167 .578
OLS Logit OLS Logit OLS Logit OLS
Dep var: Ethnic voting (all) [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
intensity .047*** .062*** .032*** .037***
(.013) (.018) (.011) (.013)
intensity compulsory 0.01 .011
(.019) (.022)
language at home .299*** .32***
(.057) (.056)
intensity (people arriving) .04**
(.019)
No. obs. 1240 1240 1248 1248 1248 1248 317
Rsq/Pseudo R sq .205 .158 .154 .117 .148 .148 .44
Note: The specifications reported in Columns 1 and 2 include cohort fixed effects. The specifications
reported in Columns 3 and 4 include the age and the age squared of the respondents. The specifications 
reported in Columns 5 and 6 include the age and the age squared of the respondents. The specification 
reported in Column 7 includes cohort fixed effects and, as a measure of treatment, the number of years, 
within compulsory education, for which the respondents have studied in Catalonia after 1983. In this 
specification we restrict the sample to individuals who were not born in Catalonia. All the specifications 
include years of education fixed effects, province fixed effects and dummy variables that control for gender, 
the origin of the respondent and of the parents of the respondents. * Significant at the 10%, ** significant at 
the 5%, *** significant at the 1%. Robust standard errors are reported between parenthesis and are 
clustered at the cohort-years of education level (Columns 1-4 ), cohort level (Columns 5-6) and cohort-year 
of arrival level (Column 7). Column 7 includes also dummy variables for the age of arrival. Marginal effects 
evaluated at the average are reported for the logit regressions.
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Table 4.9: Robustness checks (3)
OLS Logit OLS Logit OLS Logit
PANEL A: Restricted sample [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
voting voting ethnic voting ethnic voting ethnic voting ethnic voting
(voters) (voters) (all) (all)
intensity .038* .029* .022 .032* .035** .042**
(.021) (.017) (.016) (.019) (.016) (.02)
SAMPLE 1956-1975 1956-1975 1956-1975 1956-1975 1956-1975 1956-1975
No. obs. 804 804 626 626 804 804
Rsq/Pseudo R sq 0.082 0.082 0.206 0.172 0.177 0.136
PANEL B: migration
OLS
[1]
Logit
[2]
OLS
[3]
Logit
[4]
OLS
[5]
Logit
[6]
OLS
[7]
Logit
[8]
OLS
[9]
Logit
[10]
OLS
[11]
Logit
[12]
voting voting ethnic voting ethnic voting ethnic voting ethnic voting voting voting ethnic voting ethnic voting ethnic voting ethnic voting
(voters) (voters) (all) (all) (voters) (voters) (all) (all)
intensity .045*** .032** .043*** .057*** .051*** .065*** .053*** .041** .051*** .06*** .062*** .078***
(.016) (.013) (.015) (.016) (.012) (.016) (.019) (.016) (.016) (.016) (.015) (.019)
SAMPLE 1950-1981 1950-1981 1950-1981 1950-1981 1950-1981 1950-1981 1950-1981 1950-1981 1950-1981 1950-1981 1950-1981 1950-1981
all all all all all all catorigin catorigin catorigin catorigin catorigin catorigin
No. obs. 1248 1248 941 941 1131 1248 1131 1114 857 857 1131 1131
Rsq/Pseudo R sq 0.106 0.099 0.201 0.167 0.18 0.139 0.117 0.107 0.197 0.167 0.184 0.143
Note: All the specifications include years of education fixed effects, province fixed effects and dummy variables that control for gender, the origin of the respondent and of the 
parents of the respondents. In the specifications reported in Columns 1-6 of panel B we include also the fraction of respondents, within each cohort-educational group, 
belonging to each of the 4 origin categories. * Significant at the 10%, ** significant at the 5%, *** significant at the 1%. Robust standard errors are reported between 
parenthesis and are clustered at the cohort-years of education level. Marginal effects evaluated at the average are reported for the logit regressions.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
Overall, the evidence of this thesis is suggestive of the following:
•  Using data  from the World Values Surveys, we find tha t there is no negative 
relationship between ethnic diversity and average national identity. Once we 
distinguish between minority and majority groups, however, it is possible to claim 
that: on the one hand, in countries with low ethnic diversity individuals from 
minorities have stronger national sentiment than individuals from majorities; on 
the other hand, in countries with high ethnic diversity, individuals from minorities 
have weaker national sentiment than individuals from majorities. We then provide 
a theretical model tha t builds on a recent contribution by Bisin et al (2006) and 
th a t helps explaining the empirical findings.
• We present evidence of a positive effect of the educational reform (whereby the ed­
ucation system became bilingual and Catalan -together with Spanish- was taught 
in schools) on Catalan feelings.
• The positive effect extends also to  individuals whose parents have no Catalan 
origins. We conclude tha t multicultural policies tend to favour the development 
of regional identities while nation building policies tend to  promote the expansion 
of a common national feeling.
• The introduction of a bilingual education system in Catalonia increased turnout 
and the likelihood of choosing a party who appeals to the electorate in ethnic 
terms.
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